This appeal requires this Court to determine whether Appellant Red Mendoza introduced sufficient evidence at trial to support her claim alleging hostile-environment sexual harassment. We conclude that she did not, and therefore we hold that the district court properly granted Appellee Borden's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim.1

In April 1997, Mendoza filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Borden alleging a variety of employment claims. Mendoza asserted claims for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), retaliation under Title VII, and sexual harassment under Title VII. Mendoza also asserted state-law claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Following discovery, Borden moved for summary judgment on all claims. After hearing oral argument, the district court granted summary judgment to Borden on all of Mendoza's claims except her sexual-harassment and disability-discrimination claims.

The parties then proceeded to a jury trial. Following the conclusion of Mendoza's case in chief, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Borden on her remaining claims including Mendoza's hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim.

Mendoza appealed the district court's orders awarding summary judgment to Borden on her ADEA, retaliation, and state-law claims and the district court's order granting Borden judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's sexual-harassment and ADA claims. A panel of this Court affirmed the district court's summary-judgment rulings and the entry of judgment as a matter of law on the ADA claim, but reversed the district court's ruling on Borden's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 158 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1998). On Borden's suggestion for rehearing en banc, this Court voted to hear the case en banc, vacated the panel's opinion, and subsequently directed the parties to brief issues related to Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 169 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 1999).

We agree with the panel that the district court properly granted Borden's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's claims for age discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Therefore, we affirm the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Borden on Mendoza's claims for age discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and Mendoza's state-law claims. However, we disagree with the panel's conclusion on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim. For the reasons below, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Borden's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim.

Mendoza worked in Borden's Miami facility for a total of sixteen months. In December 1993, Mendoza began work with Borden as a temporary employee in the accounting department. In April 1994, she became a permanent employee. Her employment ended in April 1995. According to Borden, Mendoza's employment ended because she was absent from work for three consecutive days without calling to explain her absence as required by Borden's written personnel policies.

During most of her tenure with Borden, Mendoza's supervisor was Daniel Page. He began working in the Miami facility in May 1994; and therefore, his employment overlapped with Mendoza's for approximately eleven months. As the controller of the Miami facility, Page was the highest ranking Borden employee at the facility. Thus, Page exercised supervisory authority over Mendoza.

The Miami facility where Mendoza worked consisted of several discrete areas. The plant where the milk was processed constituted the majority of the facility, but the facility also included various offices, hallways, and an outdoor picnic area. Mendoza worked in the same office area with eight to twelve other accounting clerks. Page worked in a glass-enclosed office situated in one corner of that office area. From his desk, Page could observe the rest of the office area.

In sexual harassment cases, the courts must consider the alleged conduct in context and cumulatively. Therefore, we set forth all alleged harassing conduct so that we can look at the totality of the circumstances. At trial, Mendoza testified to these instances of conduct by Page. First, she testified that:

the man was constantly watching me and following me around and looking me up and down, whether it was face to face with me or as I would get up from a lunch table or from the picnic table to walk away and to go back to the office.

Later, Mendoza further explained Page's conduct:

He seemed to be wherever I was in the plant. He followed me not around the office, but around the hallways in the Plant. Okay? He was at a lunch table in the lunch room. He would be at a picnic table outside. And he would look me up and down, very, in a very obvious fashion. When I was face to face with him, when I would get up and walk away from these tables or areas, I would feel him watching me up and down from--okay.

Finally, Mendoza reiterated that Page's following and watching "was a constant thing" and that Page never said anything during the following and watching.

Mendoza also testified about two instances when Page "looked at me up and down, and stopped in my groin area and made a . . . sniffing motion." Mendoza described these two instances as follows:

There was an incident where I was standing at a copy machine direct right next to his office. I was making copies. I felt somebody watching me. I looked directly to my right. He was sitting at a chair in the conference room, which is approximately 20, 25 feet away from me, at a chair at the end of the table. And he looked at me up and down, and stopped in my groin area and made a (indicating) sniffing motion.

This also happened another time. It had to be in March, I had the flu. I went into his office -- he was sitting at his computer -- to tell him that my doctor wanted me to take time off because of this flu. And he turned around to his right, looked directly at me, up and down, and stopped again in the groin area, made a sniffing motion again, (indicating), like that.

(Emphasis supplied.) In one instance, Page was twenty to twenty-five feet away from Mendoza, and in the other, Page was sitting at his computer when Mendoza entered his office. She further testified to one other time when he walked around her desk and sniffed without looking at her groin. Mendoza admitted that Page also never said anything to her during what she perceived to be the sniffing nor the looking up and down.

Explaining her only allegation that included any physical conduct, Mendoza testified that while she was at a fax machine in a hallway, Page passed by her and "rubbed his right hip up against my left hip" while touching her shoulder and smiling. Mendoza's complete description of this follows:

I was doing a fax. We had a small coffee machine directly outside the office to the right of our office. I was doing a fax. And this was -- the fax machine was by the doorway, and he rubbed -- he went by me and he rubbed his right hip up against my left hip. I was at an angle, rubbed against me, walked by me, touched my shoulders at the same time, simultaneously. I was startled, I looked up, and he gave me a big smile.

When asked if Page said anything at that point, Mendoza testified, "No, he didn't." Mendoza also explained that this was the only physical contact during the eleven months she worked for Page. Finally, Mendoza described an incident when she confronted Page by entering his office and saying "I came in here to work, period." According to Mendoza, Page responded by saying "Yeah, I'm getting fired up, too."2 When asked if Page said anything else during that meeting, Mendoza testified, "No, he didn't." Mendoza also admitted this was the only time where Page said anything to her that she perceived to be of a sexual nature. When asked if "Page ever use[d] vulgar language with you?", Mendoza replied, "No, he didn't."3

At the close of Mendoza's evidence, Borden moved for judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim. After hearing argument from counsel, the district court, ruling from the bench, granted Borden's motion. The court found the incidents of harassment "in the minds of a reasonable juror or to a reasonable person, are not physically threatening or humiliating, and certainly there was not a sufficient frequency and severity to suggest a hostile or abusive environment." The court further remarked that the allegations were largely devoid of any physical contact or overly offensive comments. Accordingly, the district court concluded that, assuming Mendoza's allegations were sexual in nature, Mendoza had not established a hostile or abusive work environment.

III. Standard of Review and Standard for Granting Judgments as a Matter of Law

This Court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998). We employ the same standard the district court applied, "review[ing] all of the evidence in the light most favorable to, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of, the nonmoving party." Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995). Although the existence of a genuine issue of material fact precludes judgment as a matter of law, "a jury question does not exist because of the presence of a 'mere scintilla of evidence'." Id. A motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied only if "reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Id. These standards require us to consider "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Combs, 106 F.3d at 1526 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). "If the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict, then the motion was properly granted." Combs, 106 F.3d at 1526 (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989)).

We recognize that claims of employment discrimination, including sexual-harassment claims, present fact-intensive issues. However, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's observation that motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law are appropriate to "police the baseline for hostile environment claims." Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 n.8 (5th Cir. 1999).

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). It expressly prohibits refusing to hire or discharging an employee based on a prohibited factor. Id. Likewise, Title VII also expressly provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.

Title VII does not mention sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and this Court long have recognized that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. " Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (other internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in (Title VII) is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.")).

To establish a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim under Title VII based on harassment by a supervisor, an employee must show: (1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer liable. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.4

Although Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination clearly includes sexual harassment, Title VII is not a federal "civility code." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1000-02 (1998) ("We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations."); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) ("A recurring point in these opinions is that 'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'" (internal citation omitted)); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII.").

Sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination only when the harassment alters the terms or conditions of employment. The paradigm of sexual harassment as federally prohibited employment discrimination occurs when an employee's expressed terms of employment, such as salary or continued employment, are conditioned upon compliance with the employer's sexual demands. Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2265 ("When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII."). In such a case, traditionally described as quid pro quo harassment, the "discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment [is] explicit." Id. at 2264; see also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 1998).

Absent such "explicit" discrimination, an employee must make some showing in order to connect allegations of sexual harassment to a violation of Title VII. Thus, in the cases traditionally described as hostile-environment cases, an employer's harassing actions toward an employee do not constitute employment discrimination under Title VII unless the conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'"Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).

Establishing that harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter an employee's terms or conditions of employment includes a subjective and an objective component. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. The employee must "subjectively perceive" the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. Id. The environment must be one that "a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive" and that "the victim . . . subjectively perceive[s] . . . to be abusive." Id. at 21. Furthermore, "the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.'" Oncale v. Sundown Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).

The objective component of this analysis is somewhat fact intensive. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and this Court have identified the following four factors that should be considered in determining whether harassment objectively altered an employee's terms or conditions of employment: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance. Allen v. Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). The courts should examine the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and determine under the totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment. Id.; see Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, and explaining that "[w]e directed courts to determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive by 'looking at all the circumstances'").

Other circuits have applied these factors to delineate a minimum level of severity or pervasiveness necessary for harassing conduct to constitute discrimination in violation of Title VII. Many decisions throughout the circuits have rejected sexual-harassment claims based on conduct that is as serious or more serious than the conduct at issue in this appeal. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 872-75 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that several incidents over a two-year period, including comment "your elbows are the same color as your nipples," another comment that plaintiff had big thighs, touching plaintiff's arm, and attempts to look down the plaintiff's dress, were insufficient to support hostile-environment claim); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264-67 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting it was "dubious" whether several sexually oriented comments and gestures and an implied threat of retaliation for refusing a sexual advance would be sufficient to establish a hostile environment); Quin v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that statement that plaintiff had the "sleekest ass" in office plus single incident of "deliberately" touching plaintiff's "breasts with some papers that he was holding in his hand" were insufficient to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employment); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding actions insufficient to support hostile environment claim where co-employees teased plaintiff, made sexual jokes aimed at her, asked her what "putting one rubber band on top and another on the bottom means," commented about her low neck tops, repeated staring at her breasts with attempts to make eye contact, and four incidents of touching her arm, fingers or buttocks); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding five "sexually-oriented, offensive" statements over sixteen months insufficient to show hostile environment, even though one of the harasser's statements occurred while he put his arm around plaintiff, looked down her dress and said, "well, you got to get it when you can"); Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding offensive comments including repeatedly calling the plaintiff a "sick bitch" insufficient under Harris because not necessarily gender-related); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753-54 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding evidence that the harasser "bumped into [the plaintiff], positioned a magnifying glass over [the plaintiff's] crotch, flipped his tie over to see its label, gave him a congratulatory kiss in the receiving line at [a] wedding, and stared at him in the bathroom" insufficient to establish violation of Title VII); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 823-24 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing jury verdict and finding conduct was "sex-based" but insufficiently severe or pervasive to state actionable claim, where conduct over a four-month period involved repeated sexual jokes; one occasion of looking plaintiff up and down, smiling and stating, there's "Nothing I like more in the morning than sticky buns"; suggesting land area be named as "Titsville" or "Twin Peaks"; asking plaintiff, "Say, weren't you there [at a biker bar] Saturday night dancing on the tables?"; stating, "Just get the broad to sign it"; telling plaintiff she was "paid great money for a woman"; laughing when plaintiff mentioned the name of Dr. Paul Busam, apparently pronounced as "bosom"); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding insufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile-environment claim nine instances of offensive behavior over seven months including repeated references to plaintiff as a "tilly" and a "pretty girl" and one instance of simulated masturbation); Kidwai v. McDonald's Corp., No. 93-1720 (4th Cir. April 18, 1994) (holding insufficient under Harris seven incidents, including one instance in which harasser asked plaintiff whether "she was in bed with someone"); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding plaintiff's claims - supervisor repeatedly asked about her personal life, told her how beautiful she was, asked her on dates, called her a dumb blonde, put his hand on her shoulder at least six times, placed "I love you" signs in her work area, and tried to kiss her once at a bar and twice at work - were not sufficient for actionable sexual harassment); see also DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A hostile environment claim embodies a series of criteria that express extremely insensitive conduct against women, conduct so egregious as to alter the conditions of employment and destroy their equal opportunity in the workplace."); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999) ("All of the sexual hostile environment cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved patterns or allegations of extensive, longlasting, unredressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs' work environment.").

In this appeal, the conduct alleged by Mendoza falls well short of the level of either severe or pervasive conduct sufficient to alter Mendoza's terms or conditions of employment. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mendoza, she presented evidence of four categories of harassing conduct: (1) one instance in which Page said to Mendoza "I'm getting fired up"; (2) one occasion in which Page rubbed his hip against Mendoza's hip while touching her shoulder and smiling; (3) two instances in which Page made a sniffing sound while looking at Mendoza's groin area and one instance of sniffing without looking at her groin; and (4) Page's "constant" following and staring at Mendoza in a "very obvious fashion."

As an initial matter, whether Page's conduct testified to by Mendoza includes the necessary sexual or other gender-related connotations to be actionable sex discrimination is questionable. See Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to buttress a hostile-environment claim with evidence of unpleasant, but non-sexual, conduct); Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167-68 (noting that the term "sick bitch" is not necessarily a sexual or gender-related term). For example, although the statement "I'm getting fired up" could under some circumstances denote sexual or romantic desire, Page's statement that he was "getting fired up" occurred in the context of reacting to a complaint by Mendoza. As she described the interaction: "I went into his office angry and disgusted. . . . Mr. Page turned around and I said to him, 'I came in here to work, period' and his reply to me was 'yeah, I'm getting fired up, too.'" By Mendoza's own description, Page did not approach her but instead, she approached Page while another employee was present in his office. Mendoza also admits that Page said nothing else. Thus, the circumstances of this interaction do not objectively indicate that the statement "I'm getting fired up" had a sexual or other gender-related connotation.

As another example, although "following and staring" can betray romantic or sexual attraction, the everyday observation of fellow employees in the workplace is also a natural and unavoidable occurrence when people work together in close quarters or when a supervisor keeps an eye on employees. For example, Mendoza described Page's constant "following and staring" as "he always seemed to be wherever I was. If I was in the lunch room, he was there. If I was at a picnic table outside on a break, he was there." Nevertheless, because we conclude that the conduct established by Mendoza was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Mendoza's terms or conditions of employment, we assume, but do not decide, that this conduct is sexual in nature and thus might implicate sex discrimination.5

Turning to the heart of this appeal, an examination of the factors from Harris and applied in Allen demonstrates that Mendoza did not endure conduct that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the terms or conditions of her employment. Three of the four factors - physically threatening or humiliating conduct, interference with job performance, and severity - are clearly absent from the conduct established by Mendoza. The other factor - frequency of the harassing conduct - is also for the most part lacking, but to the extent Mendoza showed frequent conduct, the frequency of it does not compensate for the absence of the other factors.

First and most importantly, Mendoza did not present evidence that Page's conduct was "physically threatening or humiliating" or that the cumulative effect of this conduct "unreasonably interfered" with Mendoza's job performance. Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mendoza, Page's statement "I'm getting fired up" and the sniffing sounds are hardly threatening or humiliating. Compare Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (sexual harassment established with evidence that, inter alia, female employees were held down so that other employees could touch their breasts and legs), with Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 309 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding sexually-oriented joke is the kind of non-threatening "utterance" that cannot alone support hostile-environment claim). Even more clearly, the one instance of Page brushing his hip against Mendoza's hip and Page's constant "following" of Mendoza are neither threatening or humiliating. Likewise, nothing in the record indicates that Page's conduct impaired Mendoza's job performance.

Second, none of the conduct alleged by Mendoza is severe. Even if somehow offensive, Page's statement "I'm getting fired up," the three sniffing sounds, the one instance of physical conduct, and the following/staring are much less severe than the incidents of sexual banter and inappropriate touching described, and found insufficient, by the Second Circuit in Quin and the Fourth Circuit in Hopkins, for example. Quin, 159 F.3d at 768 (holding a comment about the plaintiff's "posterior" and touching of her breasts with some papers did not create a hostile environment); Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 753-54 (holding that multiple instances of inappropriate conduct, including placing a magnifying glass over the plaintiff's crotch, did not establish sexual harassment).

Third, aside from Page's "constant" following and staring, the conduct asserted by Mendoza was not frequent. She established a single instance of slight physical contact, one arguably inappropriate statement, and three instances of Page's making a sniffing sound. These instances occurred over an eleven-month period and therefore were far too infrequent to alter the conditions under which Mendoza was required to perform her job. Cf. Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1366 (reasoning that five sexually-oriented incidents over sixteen months were sporadic).

To the extent Mendoza's testimony about "constant" following and staring established the frequency factor, this evidence does not create a jury issue on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim. There is no allegation of any staring or following Mendoza outside the workplace or of any calling Mendoza after work. Regarding the workplace, Mendoza admits that Page never followed her in the office part of the plant where Mendoza worked, and thus necessarily spent most of her time.6 Indeed, Mendoza did not describe the following as walking close behind her in an intimidating or threatening fashion, but instead simply as Page's showing up when Mendoza happened to be in the hallways, in the lunch room, or at the picnic table outside. In her testimony at trial, Mendoza never described Page's following or staring as "stalking" or "leering" or "intimidating" or "threatening." Similarly, none of Mendoza's briefs regarding her Title VII claim before the panel or en banc characterizes Pages's following or staring as "stalking," "leering," "intimidating," or "threatening."7

Given normal office interaction among employees, the following and staring in the manner described by Mendoza are not the type of conduct that can render Mendoza's claim actionable, even with evidence that the following and staring were "constant" and thus "frequent" under the Harris factors. Also, considering the following and staring described by Mendoza with and in the context of the sniffs, one verbal statement, and one slight touching as Page walked by the fax, we find Mendoza's claim still falls far short of actionable hostile environment sexual harassment.8[Entire Page Contains Footnotes]

Were we to conclude that the conduct established by Mendoza was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her terms or conditions of employment, we would establish a baseline of actionable conduct that is far below that established by other circuits. For example, in Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., the Seventh Circuit considered a sexual harassment-claim consisting of nine instances of sexually-graphic behavior by the alleged harasser over a period of seven months. 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). These instances included diminutive references to the plaintiff as a "pretty girl" and a "tilly" and one particularly obscene instance in which the alleged harasser simulated the act of masturbation. Id. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the obvious offensiveness and vulgarity of this conduct, but nonetheless concluded that these events could not "reasonably be thought to add up to sexual harassment." Id. The Seventh Circuit expressly held that "[w]e conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Hall's remarks created a hostile working environment." Id. at 431.9 Likewise, in Shepherd, the plaintiff produced evidence of several fairly serious instances of harassment including: (1) the statement "your elbows are the same color as your nipples;" (2) the statement "you have big thighs"; (3) attempts to look down the plaintiff's clothing; and (4) multiple instances of touching. 168 F.3d at 872. Similar to the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Baskerville, the Fifth Circuit in Shepard noted that the conduct was "boorish and offensive." Id. at 874. The Court, however, specifically found that the conduct was not severe, threatening, or an impediment to job performance and therefore concluded that the plaintiff could not establish a hostile-environment claim. Id. at 874-75. Although we need not endorse or adopt the conclusions in Baskerville, Shepard, or the other cases cited herein, these decisions illustrate that conduct that is much more severe and pervasive than the conduct shown by Mendoza has been found insufficient as a matter of law to sustain hostile-environment claims.10

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Borden judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's sexual-harassment claim under Title VII. We agree with the panel's decision in this case that the district court properly granted summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's other claims. Therefore, we affirm the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Borden on Mendoza's claims for age discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and Mendoza's state-law claims. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

I concur in today's judgment and court opinion.

I write separately on a point, which the court's opinion does not reach, that I think deserves some attention: the essence of a Title VII case, including one based on a claim of sexual harassment, is plaintiff's proof of actual discrimination. And in this case, plaintiff never presented evidence that other employees -- particularly men -- at her workplace were treated considerably differently and better than she was treated. This failure of proof (apart from other reasons) warranted the district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law for defendant.

Plaintiff says she, at the job site, was "constantly" observed and followed by her supervisor. She says her supervisor brushed against her once at the fax machine. She also says that, after she angrily entered her supervisor's office (where he was already meeting with another employee) and said she was there "to work, period," the supervisor replied "Yeah, I'm getting fired up, too." And she says, on two or three occasions, the supervisor (after looking her up and down) looked in the direction of her groin and sniffed.

Nothing in the record suggests that other employees, including men, were treated differently. When plaintiff was asked if other employees were treated the same as she was treated, she testified that she did not know.1

Title VII was never intended to protect employees from all unpleasant and rude conduct in the workplace.2 It is an antidiscrimination statute. Title VII provides, in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer --

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). But in this case, plaintiff made no effort to show that she was treated differently and less favorably than male employees.

The conduct of which plaintiff complains is neither obviously sexual in nature nor even sex-specific. That supervisors regularly look at employees or place themselves in the same common areas of the workplace as employees can occur whether the employees are men or women. A supervisor can bump into men at the office occasionally. The phrase "I'm getting fired up, too" is not necessarily (and frequently is not) a sexual statement. The words can readily be explained as either a statement of anger or exasperation which could have been aimed at any employee -- man or woman -- who interrupts a conference to inject some heated protest towards the supervisor. Even the looking-and-sniffing incidents are not unambiguously sexual gestures. To sniff at something or someone is commonly understood to be a sign of contempt or disdain; a man or a woman could be the subject of that disdain and of that treatment.

My thought is not that the supervisor's conduct in this case could not possibly have sexual connotations. I suppose that almost every act can -- depending on context, tone of voice and so on.

My thought is this one: at least when the sexual content of a supervisor's conduct is not obvious, a plaintiff asserting a claim of sexual discrimination in employment must present some evidence that plaintiff's coworkers, those not of plaintiff's sex, were treated differently and better.3 Otherwise, Title VII's vital element -- discrimination -- is read out of the statute. The plaintiff's burden to show that similarly situated employees were treated better is not a heavy one; ordinarily, the plaintiff testifies to that circumstance herself or himself. But that the burden can usually be met easily by a properly motivated plaintiff does not mean that meeting the burden is a meaningless formality or that actual evidence is unrequired. This evidence -- evidence of the discrimination -- is the heart of the case. And, therefore, courts must allow no fudging on the proof.

Here plaintiff put forward just two witnesses, including herself. Neither of the witnesses claimed to know whether other employees -- especially men -- were treated significantly differently and better than plaintiff. Discrimination based on plaintiff's sex must be proved in harassment cases. The proof of discrimination was insufficient. This failure of proof by itself warranted the district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law for defendant.

Concurring fully in the judgment of the Court and in Judge Hull's opinion for it, I write separately to discuss the reluctance courts should have about permitting plaintiffs who claim sexual harassment to rely upon their subjective interpretations of ambiguous conduct. An essential part of Mendoza's contention that she was sexually harassed is based upon her perception that Page, her supervisor, constantly followed her around and stared at her. That is her perception, or more specifically, what she testified at trial is her perception, of the frequency and the manner in which Page went to where she was in the work place and looked at her during the eleven months she was under his supervision.

Mendoza's perception that Page had followed her around and looked at her in an offensive way brings to mind a recent Seventh Circuit case in which the plaintiff perceived that her boss had regularly talked to her in a "sexy voice." See Minor v. Ivy Tech State College, 174 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit's treatment of the "sexy voice" contention in Minor is instructive. The plaintiff in that case was employed by a public vocational college whose chancellor, a man named Cole, had an office in another town. She claimed that for eleven months Cole called her "almost every day, rarely discussing business." Id. at 856. The court described the plaintiff's perception of these daily phone calls as follows:

Cole talked, she thought, in a very friendly way, the way a boyfriend might talk; his voice was sexy; and though he never asked her for a date or proposed any sexual or otherwise erotic connection, she believed that his calls constituted overtures awaiting a response from her. She says that his words were at times "stalker-like" and "had these overtones at certain times that were sexual," but she does not indicate what the words were that gave her these impressions.

Id. The plaintiff in Minor also said that Cole, her boss, once entered her office and told her he had been watching her through a window, which she thought was "lecherous of Cole," and it really scared her. Id. There was objectionable conduct, including Cole putting his arms around her, squeezing her, and kissing her while saying, "Now, is this sexual harassment?" Id. at 857.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendant in Minor, holding that the "sexy voice" conduct was outside the period of limitations and should not be considered. But the Court went on to hold in the alternative that even if that conduct was considered, there was still insufficient evidence of sexual harassment to avoid summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit explained why this had to be so:

As for Cole's "sexy voice," we are concerned about the legal risk that would be placed on employers if a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case could get to a jury on the basis of nebulous impressions concerning tone of voice, body language, and other nonverbal, nontouching modes of signaling. It is one thing to tell a supervisor that he should not propose sex to a subordinate, display pornographic pictures to her, or touch her in a suggestive fashion; those are indeed things that an employer should tell its supervisors not to do. It is another thing for an employer to be required under pain of legal sanctions to make sure that its supervisors never inflect their voice or posture in such a way that a woman might think they were "coming on" to her. That would be a counsel of perfection, and the aims of Title VII are more modest.

Likewise, it is "another thing" for an employer to be required under pain of legal sanctions to ensure that supervisors never look or stare at a subordinate whom they are supervising in such a way that she might think they were "coming on" to her. That would be, in the Seventh Circuit's words, "a counsel of perfection, and the aims of Title VII are more modest." Id. The Seventh Circuit in Minor also recognized that, "[i]t is no part of Title VII to change a 'hands on' management style (provided 'hands on' is understood metaphorically) merely because it might strike a suspicious employee as having sexual overtones." Id. The same is true of an "eyes on" management style. There is an objective as well as a subjective component to a sexual harassment claim. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 20, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1993). Stated somewhat differently, Title VII requires a baseline of objectively offensive conduct, and that baseline cannot be met with objectively ambiguous conduct that a suspicious employee subjectively perceives to be improper.

There are good reasons that this is so. In addition to those discussed by the Seventh Circuit in Minor, there is also the problem of perception prevarication. An employee who makes up or exaggerates a description of objective conduct runs a risk of being found out that is greater than the risk run by an employee who is attempting to make a case based upon her subjective impressions. There is more temptation to exaggerate, to "puff," to put subjective spin on the facts. A plaintiff describing her subjective impressions can say that while her supervisor's conduct might have appeared neutral to some, she felt, believed - just knew - it was lecherous. That is what the plaintiff in Minor said about the voice her boss used when talking with her: she considered it "sexy" and stalker-like. Id. at 856. Similarly, Mendoza testified that when her boss was looking at her, he was staring in an offensive manner; and when he turned up where she was in the workplace, he had followed her there.

And what could Page or any other supervisor accused of doing something that was objectively neutral but perceived by an subordinate to be lecherous do to rebut testimony about those perceptions? If an employee says that her supervisor looked or stared at her in a sexy way, or spoke to her in a sexy voice, or did both things, how is a supervisor who is innocent of any lecherous intent or thoughts to establish his innocence ? Supervisors must observe, look at, and speak to employees they supervise; they regularly go about the work place to see what employees are doing, and sometimes follow them around on the work site. And supervisors should be free to do so without being hauled into court every time an employee - who may well have other reasons to be unhappy with the supervision - perceives the supervisor's constant presence, or the way he looks at her, or the tone of his voice, or the way he stands, or the way he walks, to be offensive to her.

This case illustrates the dangers of permitting litigation by perception. At her deposition, Mendoza was questioned about her claim that Page had followed her around the workplace:

Q. The second thing you mentioned was that Dan Page followed you all over the place.

A. Yes, he did, several times. This happened several times, two, three times that I can remember. I would go to the routeman's room reference paperwork. And when I would come out, go to the left to go back to my office, he would be at the end of the hall and watching me and smiling at me. Several times I laughed in his face. He might have taken it to be a smile like I enjoyed it. It wasn't a smile. I laughed in his face.

For Mendoza, the problem with her perception about Page following her around only "several times, two, three that I can remember," as she described it under oath at deposition, is that it was unlikely to get her to the jury, to give her a chance at recovery from the company that had terminated her because she failed to come to work for three consecutive days. Given the nature of perceptions, however, that was no problem for Mendoza. When she got to trial, she simply changed her perception. During her trial testimony, she no longer perceived that Page had followed her around only "several times, two three times that I can remember," but instead perceived that he had followed her around "constantly."

The Court does well to rule out litigation by perception and require objectively offensive conduct that is itself severe or pervasive before a Title VII claim can go to a jury.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part, in which BIRCH, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, join:

In its zeal to discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits, the Court today hands down an opinion that will certainly be used by other courts as a model of how not to reason in hostile environment sexual harassment cases brought underTitle VII.1 Ten years ago, in Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989), this court set forth an analytical framework for deciding when, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff's case of harassment is sufficient to withstand a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.2In reversing the district court, we explained that the district court had erred in granting the motion because it had failed to consider all of the circumstances in context and had instead analyzed each alleged instance of harassment separately. Apparently, Vance has now either been forgotten or is being ignored, because the court today makes exactly the same mistake the district court made in that case ten years ago. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority's holding with respect to the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII.3

Title VII forbids an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. See, e.g., Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404-05, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986). Two types of sexual harassment are prohibited by Title VII: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment. See Fleming v. Boeing Co. 120 F.3d 242, 244 (11th Cir. 1997). In this appeal, we focus on Red Mendoza's allegations of hostile work environment sexual harassment.

In order to establish a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, an employee must show: (1) that the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon the employee's sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer liable. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-905 (11th Cir. 1982).

With regard to the fourth element, sufficient severity or pervasiveness, the harassing conduct must create both an objectively hostile or abusive environment - one "that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive" - and a subjectively hostile or abusive environment - one that "the victim . . . subjectively perceive[s] . . . to be abusive." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993).

In determining whether a plaintiff has met the burden of alleging sufficient harassment, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed "that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances.' " Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371). If there is one principle of law that stands out in this area, it is that courts must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371; Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69, 106 S. Ct. at 2406; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Among other things, courts should look to "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371.

The inquiry is both fact intensive, and contextually specific. It "requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. This means that behavior that might be experienced by an employee as perfectly innocent in one context can, when considered in light of other occurrences and behavior, take on a more incriminating flavor. No act can be considered in isolation. Depending upon the circumstances, an employer's comment to an employee that he or she "looks good today" could be construed as a friendly compliment, a harmless flirtation, or the kind of sexually offensive verbal assault that is "every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." Henson, 682 F.2d at 902. To put the point yet another way,

[a] professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive . . . if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field - even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.

Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.

We review the district court's grant of a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to Mendoza, the non-moving party. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Combs v. Meadowcraft Co., 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998). A directed verdict is only proper when "[t]he facts and inferences . . . 'so overwhelmingly favor the verdict' that no reasonable juror could reach a contrary decision." Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hibiscus Assocs. v. Board of Trustees, 50 F.3d 908, 920 (11th Cir. 1995)). Thus, to affirm the judgment as a matter of law, we must be convinced that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the conduct complained of constituted actionable sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.

Before Mendoza went to work in the accounting department of Borden's Miami facility, she spent some time as a cocktail waitress in restaurants, bars, and hotel lounges. Her work environment was often pervaded by foul language and personal insult. Some customers, doubtless after a few libations, attempted to approach Mendoza sexually. On at least one occasion Mendoza was followed home from work, and she was propositioned for dates several times. Throughout it all, Mendoza never made a claim of sexual harassment. At trial she stated that "it was just part of the job."

In December 1993, Mendoza found work as a temporary employee at Borden. For six months she experienced no job related difficulties that could give rise to a Title VII lawsuit. In fact, Mendoza was so successful in her temporary position that she was eventually hired as a permanent employee and given a pay raise. All of that changed when Dan Page came to work at Borden in 1994. Page was hired as the plant's "Controller," the highest ranking position at the Miami facility. From his glass enclosed office, Page kept a watchful eye on the employees in the accounting department, all of whom knew that their job security and employment possibilities rested in his hands.

Page kept a particularly watchful eye on one employee - Red Mendoza. In early 1995, Page began to "constantly" follow Mendoza around the plant, and stare at her in a suggestive manner. Page's stalking and leering continued for at least four months until Mendoza finally left Borden in April 1995. Mendoza testified that Page "always seemed to be wherever I was. If I was in the lunch room, he was there. If I was at the picnic table outside on a break, he was there." Page did not limit his physical pursuit of Mendoza to the actual office in which they both worked. He followed her in the plant's hallways and outside to the facility's picnic area.

Unfortunately for Page, his physical pursuit did not have its intended effect of peaking Mendoza's interest, and so he decided to use other methods of beguilement. Perhaps hoping that Mendoza would see his true "animal magnetism," Page stared at Mendoza's groin on at least three occasions and made a loud, sniffing sound. For unexplained reasons, Mendoza failed to become enraptured. In fact, she became rather terrified. But Page remained undaunted. Because Mendoza was not succumbing to his Casanova-like charms, he decided to make physical contact. One day when Mendoza was at the fax machine, Page walked over and moved his hips into hers while grabbing her shoulders and smiling at her. As inexplicable as it may seem, this again failed to capture Mendoza's favorable attentions.

By now Mendoza had also had enough. She had been stalked, leered at, touched on her hips and shoulders, and her groin area had been made the object of a sniffing ritual so bizarre that only Page could understand its true import. Jenny Voltapetti4 testified that on at least twelve occasions Mendoza told her that she was "being harassed on the job," and that "it was an immediate supervisor." Voltapetti described Red Mendoza, a woman who had accepted as "just part of the job" being propositioned and followed home from work during her years as a cocktail waitress, as "extremely distraught" and "very upset." But what could Mendoza do? With instances of co-worker harassment or even in many situations where one's superior is doing the harassing, the employee has access to channels of complaint - the head boss or somebody who is superior to the superior. In this situation, however, Page was the head boss. He was the highest ranking employee at the Miami plant. Mendoza nevertheless went to Page to tell him that she had come there "to work, period." Page's only response was that he was "getting fired up, too."

These are the facts when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mendoza, as we are required to do in reviewing a judgment as a matter of law. Reading the majority opinion, however, one would think that we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. The en banc opinion reads like a defense attorney's classic attack on a plaintiff's (or a prosecutor's) circumstantial evidence case. Contrary to the Supreme Court's direction, what the majority does is examine each instance of alleged harassment in isolation and then declare that it alone could not support a finding of liability. Because of this, and here is the rub, all of the evidence added together is likewise insufficient to satisfy the Harris requirement of severity or pervasiveness.

The majority declares that "Page's statement 'I'm getting fired up' and the sniffing sounds are hardly threatening or humiliating."5 Ante at 1249. With that evidence conveniently disposed of, thecourt then moves on to scoff at "the one instance of Page brushing his hip against Mendoza's." Id. Last, we are told that Page's constant following and staring at Mendoza in a sexually suggestive manner cannot save the claim, because "[g]iven normal office interaction among employees, following and staring in the manner described by Mendoza are not the type of conduct that can render Mendoza's claim actionable . . . ." Id. at 1250.6

Every defense attorney knows that this is the traditional way to undermine a case built upon circumstantial evidence. You isolate each piece that the other side puts into evidence and then attempt to trivialize it by taking it out of context. The defendant was just driving his car, the defense attorney will argue. So what of the fact that the car was parked outside a bank? People park outside of banks all the time. The bank was being robbed at the time? How could the defendant have known that? He was sitting outside the bank, remember. And so what of the fact that defendant allowed the two men who were robbing the bank into his car, and then drove away at a high rate of speed? People drive at a high rate of speed all the time. Can the members of the jury actually say that they have never broken the speed limit?

The majority's analysis might be useful for a practicing seminar on defense strategies in employment discrimination cases, but it is certainly not faithful to the Supreme Court's direction that we look at the "constellation of surrounding circumstances" when analyzing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's allegations. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. More than a decade ago in Vance, we addressed a district court that made the same analytical mistake in a racial harassment case that the majority makes today. In that case, the district court granted a directed verdict to the employer after examining independently each allegation of harassment, and finding either that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case for each incident, or that the defendant had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. After weeding out most of the plaintiff's allegations in this manner, the district court then ruled that the two remaining instances of harassment (a noose was twice hung over the plaintiff's work station) were insufficient to establish a "'persistent, pervasive practice.'" Vance, 863 F.2d at 1510 (quoting Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (M.D. Fla. 1987)). We corrected the district court as follows:

The prima facie showing in a hostile environment case is likely to consist of evidence of many or very few acts or statements by the defendant which, taken together, constitute harassment. It is important to recognize that in assessing the credibility and weight of the evidence presented, the jury does not necessarily examine each alleged incident of harassment in a vacuum. What may appear to be a legitimate justification for a single incident of alleged harassment may look pretextual when viewed in the context of several other related incidents.

[T]he district court examined each individual allegation of discrimination in turn, and found that the plaintiff had made out aprima facie case of discrimination only as to the two noose incidents . . . . [But] as we stated in Henson, the severity of the harassment is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. It was thus incorrect for the district court to require that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to each individual allegation that the jury could properly consider. A hostile environment claim is a single cause of action rather than a sum total of a number of mutually distinct causes of action to be judged each on its own merits.

Id. at 1510-11 (citations omitted).

The majority today makes the same mistake as the district court did in Vance. By examining each of Mendoza's allegations of harassment in isolation from one another, the majority concludes that Mendoza does not have enough evidence to reach the jury because each allegation is individually insufficient. But the whole of a hostile environment sexual harassment case will often be greater than the sum of its parts. Incidents that might not seem so disturbing by themselves can take on new meaning in the context of other evidence of discrimination. This case is a perfect example. By itself, it may not seem so significant that Page moved his hip into Mendoza's while touching her shoulder and smiling at her suggestively. But add to that a suggestive comment ("I'm getting fired up"). Now the hip incident begins to look a little more troubling. By the time we get to the repeated incidents of Page's staring directly at Mendoza's groin and making sniffing sounds, we realize that Mendoza's whole employment experience at Borden's may have been pervaded by overt and highly offensive acts of sexual aggression. Once we take all the evidence into account, we begin to appreciate that Page's constant following and staring at Mendoza may have been motivated less by a need to monitor employee work habits, than by a desire to stalk and terrorize an innocent female victim.7 If we looked to the majority for guidance, however, we would miss all of this. We would miss the proverbial forest for the trees because we would fail to see the cumulative meaning of Mendoza's allegations in context.

The court's analytical mistakes do not end here. As I read the majority opinion today, it appears that we are telling district courts that they should cast a skeptical eye towards a plaintiff's evidence of pervasive stalking and leering by a supervisor in hostile environment sexual harassment cases. The court writes that "[g]iven normal office interaction among employees, the following and staring in the manner described by Mendoza are not the type of conduct that can render Mendoza's claim actionable, even with evidence that the following and staring were 'constant' and thus 'frequent' under the Harris factors." Ante at 1250. The first problem with this reasoning is that it is circular. The court answers the question, why are the following and staring alleged by Mendoza not the kind of conduct that can support a sexual harassment claim, with a most insightful response: because they "are not the [right] type of conduct." Id. This is plainly inadequate. The question deserves an answer, not a tautology.

But the real problem runs deeper. The logical inference that one draws from the court's statement is either: (a) that a plaintiff can never use evidence of following and staring by a supervisor to buttress a claim of sexual harassment; or (b) that in order for evidence of following and staring to be considered probative, it must be something more than "constant." The answer almost certainly cannot be (a). No court has ever made such a sweeping declaration, defining an entire class of conduct as immune to suspicion. In fact, courts routinely use evidence of following and/or staring to support a finding of sufficient severity or pervasiveness. See Cross v. Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1995) ("glaring looks, piercing looks"); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 171 F.3d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1999) ("stare at her for periods of ten to twenty minutes"); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) ("stalked her throughout the postal facility"); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 571 (8th Cir. 1997) ("following her around the store"); Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997) ("stare at her during work"); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1997) ("followed her around the warehouse"); Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1997) ("stared at her with a menacing look"); Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 1995) ("threatening and intimidating stares"); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) ("stares, glares, snickers, and comments"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082, 115 S. Ct. 733, 130 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1995); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Whenever she asked to go to the restroom, [the supervisor] would follow her and wait in the hall until she returned.").8 Given the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on social context, that "[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships[,]" Oncale, 118 S.Ct at 1003, it would make no sense for us to exclude, ex ante, a whole class of behavior from the realm of what might contribute to a finding of sexual harassment.

The court must, therefore, be saying that in order for evidence of following and staring to be considered probative, it must be something more than what Mendoza alleged. It is difficult to imagine what that "more" might consist of. Mendoza alleged that Page's following and staring were "constant," making his conduct appear to be the equivalent of stalking and leering. See supra at n. 7. But apart from the majority's failure to describe what kind of following and staring would be sufficiently harassing to "count" in an employee's claim for hostile environment sexual harassment (must the harasser walk closer to the victim? touch her? breathe down her neck?), the court once again substitutes bald assertion for reasoned argument. Why is the following and staring "not the type of conduct that can render Mendoza's claim actionable"? We do not know. The court has ci