No holiday season is complete, at least for the courts, without one or more First Amendment challenges to public holiday displays. At issue in this case is the holiday display policy promulgated by the Department of Education ("DOE") of the defendant City of New York ("City" or "New York") for the City's public elementary and secondary schools. That policy allows the menorah to be displayed as a symbol of the Jewish holiday of Chanukah and the star and crescent to be displayed as a symbol of the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, but it does not allow a crèche or nativity scene to be displayed as a symbol of the Christian holiday of Christmas. Plaintiff Andrea Skoros sues pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of herself and her two minor children asserting that the policy violates her children's rights under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as her parental right to control her children's religious upbringing and education as secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. While Skoros's complaint seeks to enjoin the operation of the DOE holiday display policy, the record suggests that her goal is not so much to preclude defendants' use of the menorah or the star and crescent as it is to compel inclusion of the crèche in public school holiday displays.1

After a bench trial, Judge Charles P. Sifton of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected plaintiffs' constitutional claims on the merits and entered judgment in favor of the City, as well as co-defendants Joel L. Klein, sued in his official capacity as DOE Chancellor, and Sonya Lupion, sued individually and in her official capacity as the principal of the City's Edith K. Bergtraum elementary school ("P.S.165"). See Skoros v. City of New York, No. CV-02-6439, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004). Skoros now appeals that judgment, and the State of Alabama appears as amicus curiae to support her challenge. In urging affirmance, defendants have the support of the Anti-Defamation League as amicus curiae.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We emphasize at the outset that we do not decide on this appeal whether, consistent with the First Amendment, the DOE could ever include a crèche in a public school winter holiday display. We decide only that the defendants do not violate the Constitution when, in pursuing the secular goal of promoting respect for diverse cultural traditions, they do not include a crèche in such displays, representing Christmas through a variety of that holiday's well recognized secular symbols, even though Chanukah is represented by the menorah and Ramadan by the star and crescent.

Plaintiff Andrea Skoros is a Roman Catholic raising her two minor sons, Nicholas and Christos Tine, in that faith. During the 2001-2002 school year, Nicholas was a third-grade student at New York City's P.S. 165. In the 2002-2003 school year, Nicholas attended fourth grade at P.S. 169, while his brother Christos attended second grade at P.S. 184. The boys remained in these public schools through the trial of this case.

New York City has the largest public school system in the country, with over one million students enrolled in its 1200 public schools and programs. This student population, like the population of the City itself, represents virtually every race, nationality, ethnicity, and religious and cultural tradition in the world. City public school students speak 140 different primary languages, including Spanish, Chinese, Russian, Urdu, Bengali, Haitian-Creole, Arabic, Korean, Albanian, French, Punjabi, and Polish. More than 125,000 students are enrolled in programs to learn English.

For some time, City educators have recognized the obvious: young schoolchildren are often excited toward the end of the year about approaching holidays. School officials decided that this excitement could be channeled constructively by using the variety of year-end holidays — including Christmas, Chanukah, Ramadan, and Kwanzaa2 — to teach children about and to encourage respect for the different cultures in their community. Because some of the identified holidays have religious origins, questions arose as to what holiday symbols could appropriately be displayed in the public schools without appearing to endorse religion in violation of the First Amendment. To provide guidance, in 1997, the DOE Office of Legal Services, working in conjunction with the City Office of Corporation Counsel, developed a holiday display policy for the public schools.

The iteration of this policy here at issue is that memorialized in virtually identical memoranda dated November 28, 2001, and November 18, 2002, from the Chancellor's general counsel to all City public school superintendents and principals (hereafter referred to collectively as the "Holiday Display Memo").3 The first paragraph of the Holiday Display Memo states the purpose of the DOE policy:

New York City is a diverse multi-cultural community. It is our responsibility as educators to foster mutual understanding and respect for the many beliefs and customs stemming from our community's religious, racial, ethnic and cultural heritage. In furtherance of this goal, we must be cognizant of and sensitive to the special significance of seasonal observances and religious holidays. At the same time, we must be mindful that the Constitution prohibits a school system from endorsing or promoting a particular religion or belief system.

Holiday Display Memo at 1. The memorandum proceeds to outline the "guidelines [that] should be followed with respect to the display of cultural/holiday symbols":

1. The display of secular holiday symbol decorations is permitted. Such symbols include, but are not limited to, Christmas trees, Menorahs, and the Star and Crescent.

2. Holiday displays shall not appear to promote or celebrate any single religion or holiday. Therefore, any symbol or decoration which may be used must be displayed simultaneously with other symbols or decorations reflecting different beliefs or customs.

3. All holiday displays should be temporary in nature.

4. The primary purpose of all displays shall be to promote the goal of fostering understanding and respect for the rights of all individuals regarding their beliefs, values and customs.

Id. (emphasis in original).

D. The Catholic League's Challenge to the Holiday Display Policy

Soon after the November 2001 dissemination of the Holiday Display Memo, the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights unsuccessfully petitioned the DOE to include the crèche in its list of approved symbols for holiday display in the public schools. Skoros submits that she was aware of and in agreement with the Catholic League's efforts and, therefore, did not independently pursue the matter with DOE officials.

According to a December 4, 2001 letter from Catholic League President William A. Donohue to then-Chancellor Harold O. Levy, the Chancellor initially denied the League's request to permit the display of a crèche in public schools because he understood the Supreme Court to have "`previously refused to permit erection of a nativity scene on public property.'" Donohue Letter to Levy, Dec. 4, 2001, at 2 (purporting to quote Levy). Donohue submitted that this misconstrued Supreme Court precedent, which only barred a public display of a nativity scene in isolation, not in conjunction with secular holiday symbols. See id. (comparing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989)). Donohue did not assert that the crèche was a secular rather than religious symbol. Instead, he insisted that the right to display religious symbols on public property had been recognized in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995). See Donohue Letter to Levy, Dec. 4, 2001, at 2.

In a subsequent letter dated December 14, 2001, Donohue challenged the DOE's characterization of the menorah and the star and crescent as secular symbols and asked for a clarification as to DOE policy regarding nativity scenes: "Are they secular or religious, and can they be displayed in the schools?" Donohue Letter to Levy, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1. The Chancellor's general counsel replied that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized both the Menorah and Christmas tree as secular symbols of the holiday season. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has found that a nativity scene is not a secular symbol and, therefore, it is unconstitutional to display it on public property." Vignola Letter to Donohue, Dec. 20, 2001, at 1.

Over the next several months, Donohue and the Chancellor's general counsel continued to exchange letters debating the relevant case law on holiday displays. In an October 28, 2002 letter, counsel stated that Donohue's reliance on Capitol Square was misplaced because that case concerned the display of a religious symbol in a "public forum," which public schools were not. Vignola Letter to Donohue, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1.4 Counsel similarly asserted that the Supreme Court's approval of a crèche display in Lynch was limited to the particular facts of that case, which were not translatable to a public school setting. See id. Finally, counsel disputed Donohue's reading of Allegheny. He asserted that the religious symbol there at issue, a menorah, was recognized by the Court to have "both religious and secular dimensions," which was not the case with a crèche, which "is solely a religious symbol." Id. Further, counsel stated that the Supreme Court in Allegheny had "acknowledged that there is no more secular alternative symbol" to represent Chanukah, which the DOE concluded was not the case with Christmas. Id.

The net result was that, despite the Catholic League's protest, the DOE continued to disallow crèches from holiday displays in the City public schools.

E. The Holiday Displays in the Schools Attended by Skoros's Sons

In December 2001, at which time Nicholas Tine attended P.S. 165, a temporary holiday display in the front lobby of that school included a 1 ½ foot Christmas tree, a one-foot menorah, a similarly sized star and crescent,5 and a kinara.6 Red plastic was hung on a lobby wall to make the wall appear to be a large gift box tied with red ribbon. An American flag was affixed to the ribbon, as well as a gift tag stating, "A gift of liberty and justice for all."

In December 2002, at which time Christos Tine attended P.S. 184, a holiday display in that school lobby included a large, "festively decorated Christmas tree," next to which stood a small table "with several dreidels7 and three paper menorahs, one with a sign stating `Happy Hanukah.'" Skoros v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234, at *7 (footnote added). "[F]ive dreidels and two kinaras" were also displayed on the walls adjacent to the Christmas tree and table. Id. At the rear entrance to P.S. 184, a more modest holiday display had two large snowflakes hanging from the ceiling, while student artwork on the walls depicted six paper Christmas wreaths framing students' written work, four dreidels, and a kinara.

Christos's own classroom was decorated with a variety of student art projects. The district court accurately described the display, which is memorialized in a series of photographs, as follows:

Hanging by clothespins from a line strung across the classroom are student-created, three-dimensional paper Christmas wreaths and dreidels and at least one drawing of a kinara. Affixed to tables and chairs in the classroom are student-created stockings, with a name on each, presumably the students' names. There is also a paper wreath made of alternating snowmen and Christmas trees topped with a Star of Bethlehem affixed to a wall, as well as a display of snowmen under "A Winter Wonderland" sign.

Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted).

A calendar for the month of December also hung in the classroom. At the top, it depicted Santa Claus in his sleigh pulled by reindeer. Each day of the month was noted in a cut-out figure of either a snowman, Christmas tree, or dreidel.8

Skoros alleged that, as one class project, Christos had been required to make a menorah, but the district court found that assertion unsupported by the record. See id. at *13. The evidence indicates that Christos's teacher did give children a Chanukah booklet, with text describing the origin of the dreidel and latkes9 and black-and-white illustrations, including a cover depiction of a menorah, boldly outlined as in a coloring book. Christos's teacher asked the children to color the booklets, but she did not check to see whether they had done so nor did she display any pictures from the booklets in class. See Dahan Aff. at 2-3. Skoros did not object to the booklet. Indeed, in a letter to Christos's teacher, she stated that she thought her son had done a "fantastic" job coloring the menorah and that she had played the dreidel game with him. Skoros Letter to Dahan, Dec. 9, 2002. She did, however, note that "[a] menorah is a religious symbol," and inquired whether the children would be coloring any religious symbols for Christmas. Id. In response, Christos's teacher advised Skoros that the children had made Christmas wreaths and stockings, which now decorated their classroom. She forwarded a copy of the DOE Holiday Display Memo, noting its focus on secular holiday symbols and its identification of the menorah as a permissible secular symbol. See Dahan Letter to Skoros (undated).

In December 2002, at which time Nicholas Tine attended P.S. 169, that school's holiday decorations included a wall display depicting a row of reindeer with shiny red noses, scattered five-pointed stars, two single candles, gingerbread boys, a Christmas tree, and a dreidel, all beneath a heading stating "Songs, Symbol[s], Signs of the Season." Other walls showed students' written work interspersed with art projects including cotton ball snowmen and brightly colored Santa Claus faces. The Santa display bore a heading stating "Let It Snow!"

Yet another wall display highlighted seasonal books and related student artwork. A card referencing the book Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer was placed amidst a herd of cheerful, brown-bag reindeer, with red ball noses, ribbon bowties, and flower-strewn antlers. A card referencing The Gingerbread Baby was placed with brightly colored gingerbread boys and girls dancing under a Christmas tree made from a mass of green-colored cut-outs of children's hand tracings. A card for The Chanukah Guest was placed with paper and stuffed teddy bears sporting bright red scarves and carrying small dreidels in one hand and a frying pan with latkes in the other. Elsewhere in the school, a large snowman sat on a stage atop decorated gift boxes.

In the school office, a small decorated Christmas tree shared the counter with a smaller menorah, and, at least for some time, with a bowl of fruit representing Kwanzaa.10 An office desk, one side of which depicted Santa Claus in his sleigh full of gifts, was festooned with multicolored lights. A red garland and white lights decorated the windows of another school room, while large candy canes, a Santa face, a Kwanzaa sign, and a dreidel hung from the ceiling.

In Nicholas's classroom, cards on the wall described four holidays: Kwanzaa, Christmas, Ramadan, and Chanukah.11

Kwanzaa is the holiday when African Americans celebrate their cultural heritage. It was created in 1966 by Dr. Maulana Karenga, an African American who wanted his people to have a special time to celebrate and learn about their cultural origins. Kwanzaa is celebrated from December 26 through January 1. Families and friends gather to remember their ancestors and to enjoy African music, dancing, poetry, and foods. The holiday has seven days, seven symbols, and seven principles. The principles correspond to the seven days of the celebration and serve as guides for daily living.

Each night, during Kwanzaa, everyone drinks from the kikombe, or unity cup. The first person who raises the cup says "Harambee," a Swahili word that means "Let's all pull together." What are other symbols of Kwanzaa?

Christmas, December 25, is the Christian holiday that celebrates the birth of Jesus Christ. This holy time is marked by Nativity scenes, caroling, and church services where Christians hear again the story of the birth of the baby Jesus. Christmas includes many festive customs such as decorating homes and evergreen trees with colored lights, bright ribbons, and shining ornaments. People hang stockings by the fireplace, send Christmas cards to friends near and far, and wrap carefully chosen gifts for their loved ones. The jolly figure of Santa Claus is the bringer of gifts in this happy season.

The Christmas tree is one of the many popular symbols of this holiday. People put gifts under the trees after they decorate them with lights and ornaments. What other Christmas symbols can you name?

Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, is a holy month for Muslims, believers in the religion Islam. During Ramadan, Muslims fast (take no food or drink) from dawn to sunset. It is a very spiritual time for Muslims. They arise early for a pre-dawn meal. At the end of the day, the fast is broken by taking the Iftar meal, often with friends or family invited into one another's homes. When the new moon appears and the month of Ramadan is over, Muslims celebrate a joyous holiday called Eid-ul-Fitr (Festival of Fast-Breaking). They dress in their best clothing for prayers at the mosque and celebrate with family and friends.

On Eid-ul-Fitr, Muslims often visit one another's homes with gifts of sweets, nuts, or coins. The festival is a happy end to the holy month of Ramadan. How is Ramadan like your winter holiday celebrations?

Hanukkah is celebrated by Jews in remembrance of a great victory, which won them the right to practice their religion. Also called the Festival of Lights, Hanukkah lasts for eight days because the oil in the Hanukkah story lasted that long. Candles are lit each evening during the eight days of Hanukkah. The candle holder is called a menorah. It holds eight candles and one servant candle, which is used to light the others — one more candle each night of Hanukkah. Some children receive gifts on each of the eight nights of Hanukkah. They play dreidel games and enjoy special Hanukkah foods.

Spinning a dreidel, a four-sided top, is a favorite game for children during Hanukkah. The letters on the four sides of the dreidel are the first letters of a Hebrew sentence that means "A great miracle happened there." What is the miracle?

Skoros filed the instant lawsuit on December 29, 2002. In an amended complaint, filed February 28, 2003, she charged that the City's holiday display policy, on its face and as applied by the named defendants, "impermissibly promoted and endorsed the religions of Judaism and Islam, conveyed the impermissible message of disapproval of Christianity, and coerced students to accept the Jewish and Islamic religions in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." Am. Compl. at 7, ¶ 22. She further alleged that the defendants had violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by coercing her sons "to accept the Jewish and Islamic religions and to renounce [their] Christian religion." Id. at 8, ¶ 25. Finally, she asserted that these actions infringed her own right "to control the religious upbringing and education of her children" in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 9, ¶ 28. In relief, Skoros sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendants had violated her own and her sons' constitutional rights, as pleaded in the amended complaint; (2) a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from further implementing the challenged holiday display policy in the City's public schools; and (3) an award of nominal damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. See id. at 9-10.

In October 2003, both sides moved for summary judgment. On December 4, 2003, they withdrew these motions and agreed to have the case tried to the bench on a stipulated record. After reviewing the parties' joint submission, which included numerous affidavits and exhibits, the district court issued a detailed 36-page decision on February 18, 2004, awarding judgment in favor of the defendants. See Skoros v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234.

a. The Establishment Clause Claim

The district court concluded that Skoros's Establishment Clause challenge failed because the DOE holiday display policy, on its face, satisfied the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (requiring challenged action to (1) have a valid secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid excessive state entanglement with religion).

The district court found that the stated purpose of the policy was secular: "`to foster mutual understanding and respect for the many beliefs and customs stemming from our community's religious, racial, ethnic and cultural heritage.'" Skoros v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234, at *21 (quoting Holiday Display Memo at 1). To the extent Skoros argued that this purpose statement masked the defendants' true goal to denigrate Christianity by secularizing Christmas and to promote Judaism and Islam, the district court found "no evidence" in the record "to establish such an insidious purpose." Id. at *22. It noted that the Supreme Court had construed the Establishment Clause to "`confin[e] the government's own celebrations of Christmas to the holiday's secular aspects.'" Id. at *26-27 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 611, 109 S.Ct. 3086). It further concluded that

[w]ithout a diversity policy a winter holiday display in New York City's public schools would be dominated by images representative of Christmas.... The DOE policy, permitting the inclusion of symbols of Kwanzaa, Chanukah, and Ramadan in addition to Christmas, is thus an attempt to diversify the season so that children who do not celebrate Christmas can participate in the seasonal celebration and can learn about cultures different from their own without trespassing on their own religious beliefs.

Id. at *23-25.

At the second step of the Lemon analysis, the district court ruled that the primary effect of the school display policy was secular: "celebrating the diversity of the winter holiday season." Id. at *37. It concluded that no objective observer would perceive the policy's effect to be that asserted by Skoros, that is, an endorsement of Judaism and Islam and a manifestation of hostility toward Christianity.

The court specifically found that the DOE had not singled out the crèche for exclusion from school holiday displays. Rather, it excluded all symbols that, like the crèche, were "purely religious." Id. at *35. At the same time, it allowed symbols with religious origins to be used in holiday displays if they had "developed significant secular connotations." Id. at *30. The district court explained that an objective observer would perceive this distinction as reasonable because, when symbols had acquired "significant secular dimensions," a school could more easily use them "in a prudent and objective manner, as a teaching aid" in "the advancement of a secular program of education, and not of religion." Id. at *31. Although the district court made no specific findings with respect to the menorah and the star and crescent, it apparently concluded that these symbols had acquired secular significance. See id. at *33.

Finally, the district court concluded that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test required little discussion because the DOE's attempt to design a uniform holiday display policy ensured that it did not need "to police each and every display in every public school year after year." Id. at *38.

Insofar as Skoros challenged the DOE holiday display policy as applied to particular displays at the public schools attended by her sons in December 2001 and 2002, the district court ruled that no child, viewing the "dizzying array of holiday symbols" included in the displays, would conclude that the school was endorsing or coercing the practice of "Judaism or Islam over Christianity." Id. at *42-43. Rather, "[t]he context of these holiday displays" satisfactorily "neutraliz[ed] the religious dimensions of the menorah and the star and crescent" so that "a reasonable Christian child ... would not perceive religious endorsement or coercion but `a celebration of the diversity of the holiday season, including traditional religious and secular symbols of that season.'" Id. at *43 (quoting Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir.1997)).

b. The Free Exercise Clause Claim

The district court also rejected Skoros's Free Exercise claim as without merit. Reiterating that the holiday displays at issue "conveyed an inclusive message, did not advance or promote any particular religion, and did not coerce [Skoros's sons] to reject Christianity," the court concluded that the boys' "passive exposure to and even their participation in the creation of the displays, including symbols from several different religious and cultural holidays, do not interfere with their ability to practice their own faith." Id. at *47-48. It reached the same conclusion with respect to any lessons about the religious origins of any of the holiday symbols displayed, because the "secular manner" in which the evidence indicated they were presented did not interfere with Skoros's sons ability to practice their own faith. Id. at *48.

c. The Parental Rights Claim

Acknowledging that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afforded Skoros the right to direct the religious upbringing and education of her children, the district court concluded that there was no violation of that right because the evidence simply did not support her claim that defendants sought to coerce her children "to accept the Jewish and Islamic faiths and renounce Christianity." Id. at *49.

On appeal from a bench trial, we generally review a district court's findings of adjudicative fact only for clear error and its conclusions of law, or mixed fact and law, de novo. See Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 53, 55 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that district court's finding of "a secular purpose for the crèche as part of the entire display... [was] not clearly erroneous"); accord National Mkt. Share, Inc. v. Sterling Nat'l Bank, 392 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir.2004); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (holding that "[t]he District Court's inference, drawn from the religious nature of the crèche, that the City has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly erroneous"). Where, as here, a case is tried on a stipulated record, our review is de novo because the district court's rulings are necessarily conclusions of law or mixed fact and law. See General Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.2001); accord McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir.2004); see also ACLU v. Florissant, 186 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.1999) (applying de novo review to holiday display case tried on stipulated record).

B. The First Amendment Religion Clauses and Public Displays Incorporating Religious Symbols

The First Amendment famously states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. Const. amend. I. The dual mandate of these Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses extends to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) ("The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact ... laws [contrary to the First Amendment's religion clauses].").

Skoros submits that New York City's holiday display policy for its public schools violates both religion clauses of the First Amendment. In reviewing plaintiffs' claims, we confront the challenge of frequently splintered Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of public displays involving religious symbols. Although the Court has never construed the religion clauses to require government "to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious," Van Orden v. Perry, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2868, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), its members have rarely agreed — in either analysis or outcome — in distinguishing the permissible from the impermissible public display of symbols having some religious significance.

The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of public holiday displays in 1984 in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604. Splitting five to four, the Court held that a crèche displayed in a park together with various secular holiday symbols did not violate the First Amendment. The majority ruled that the purpose and effect of the challenged display could not fairly be determined by focusing only on the crèche. See id. at 679-80, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Rather, the crèche had to be assessed in the context of the overall holiday display, which was reasonably understood to serve the legitimate secular purpose of depicting the origins of a national holiday. See id. at 680-81, 104 S.Ct. 1355.

Five years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472, the Court considered a different holiday display, with a crèche featured in a courthouse lobby, somewhat removed from secular holiday symbols exhibited elsewhere in the building. Once again, the Court divided five to four in holding this display unconstitutional because, "unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the [courthouse] display detracts from the crèche's religious message." Id. at 598, 109 S.Ct. 3086.

The crèche was not the only religious symbol whose public display was at issue in Allegheny. A First Amendment challenge was also raised to a menorah displayed outside another public building together with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. On this issue, six justices agreed that the combined menorah-Christmas tree display did not violate the Establishment Clause. This group of six, however, produced three different opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the Court. See id. at 613, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 632, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 655, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four justices concluded that passive religious displays, whether of a crèche or a menorah, were constitutionally permissible because they did not compel anyone "to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activity." Id. at 664, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Both Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor, however, insisted that the Establishment Clause reached beyond coercion to prohibit government endorsement of religion. See id. at 619-20, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 635-36, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).12

While Justices Blackmun and O'Connor recognized the menorah as a religious symbol that could communicate government endorsement of Judaism if displayed by itself, they concluded that the menorah did not convey this impermissible message in the context of the challenged display. See id. at 616 n. 64, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 634, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For Justice Blackmun, the placement of a menorah "[i]n the shadow of the [Christmas] tree" communicated "a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition." Id. at 617-18, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). The sign saluting liberty reinforced the display's secular message by "link[ing] that theme with this Nation's legacy of freedom, which allows an American to celebrate the holiday season in whatever way he wishes, religiously or otherwise." Id. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 3086. Further, Justice Blackmun observed that no less religious symbol was reasonably available to represent Chanukah. See id. at 618, 109 S.Ct. 3086 ("An 18-foot dreidel would look out of place [beside a 45-foot Christmas tree] and might be interpreted by some as mocking the celebration of Chanukah."). Justice O'Connor did not think endorsement analysis required consideration of more secular alternatives for a challenged religious symbol. See id. at 636, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). She concluded simply that "a reasonable observer" of the display would understand that the defendants, by using "a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season rather than a religious one," together with a religious symbol such as the menorah, were "acknowledg[ing] the cultural diversity of our country" and conveying the permissible secular message of "tolerance of different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter holiday season is celebrated in different ways by our citizens." Id. at 635-36, 109 S.Ct. 3086.

The passage of time has not produced greater consensus on the Court in resolving First Amendment challenges to public displays of religious symbols. Last term, ten separate opinions were filed in two cases, one of which held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by a long-standing public display of the Ten Commandments, see Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2864 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2873 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2892 (O'Connor, J, dissenting); id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting), and the other of which ruled that the Clause was violated by a different Ten Commandments display with a background of endorsement, see McCreary County v. ACLU, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005); id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Government officials attempting to parse these sharply divided public display decisions might be forgiven for occasionally thinking, as do some of the justices, that they confront a "jurisprudence of minutiae" that leaves them to rely on "little more than intuition and a tape measure" to ensure the constitutionality of public holiday displays. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 674-75, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d at 57 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Kennedy's Allegheny opinion in noting challenge of "intensive fact-specific analyses" required in applying endorsement test to holiday display cases); see also ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir.1999) (Alito, J.) (observing that the Supreme Court's religious display decisions "have been marked by fine line-drawing," so that "it is not easy" for public officials "to determine whether particular displays satisfy the Court's standards"). The concern calls to mind Justice Jackson's observation that the metaphorical wall of separation between church and state erected by the Establishment Clause, see 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H.Washington, ed., 1861), can appear "as winding as the famous serpentine wall" designed by Jefferson for the University of Virginia. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-108, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing "wall" metaphor). No matter. Officials who authorize public holiday displays, like the lower courts that must rule on their constitutionality, are obliged to strive in good faith to identify and apply the principles of law controlling these Supreme Court decisions.

Following that mandate, a divided panel of this court, in Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir.1989), ruled that a menorah displayed by itself in a public park violated the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, in Elewski v. City of Syracuse, another divided panel concluded that a crèche could constitutionally be displayed in a town square, because a reasonable observer would view that display together with secular holiday decorations on the town's nearby main streets and a menorah in a neighboring square and would perceive the totality of holiday symbols as "a celebration of the diversity of the holiday season, including traditional religious and secular symbols of that season." 123 F.3d at 55. Moreover, the observer would understand the "principal purpose of that celebration [to be] to preserve the economic viability of downtown retailers." Id.

With the challenge of our own divided precedent as well as that of the Supreme Court in mind, we now confront the constitutionality of holiday displays in a different and more difficult context: public elementary and secondary schools.

In addressing Establishment Clause challenges, the Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he First Amendment contains no textual definition of `establishment,'" and that the term itself is "not self-defining." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2742; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (describing language of Establishment Clause as "opaque"). Most obviously, the Clause prohibits the establishment of a national or state church, but the Court has never construed its mandate to apply only to this most obvious proscription. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (observing that a prohibition on laws relating to religion necessarily extends beyond the establishment of a national church); accord McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2742. It has long been accepted that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from officially preferring one religious denomination over another: "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982); see McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2733; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).

Skoros submits that the City's holiday display policy violates this neutrality command by officially promoting and endorsing Judaism and Islam and by conveying disapproval of Christianity. See Am. Compl. at 7, ¶ 22. Like the district court, we find no record support for this argument.

In identifying the standard of review applicable to Skoros's Establishment Clause challenge, we begin with a preliminary word about "neutrality." In recently reiterating that neutrality is the "touchstone" of First Amendment analysis, McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2733, the Supreme Court noted that the principle provides a "sense of direction" in evaluating the variety of problems that can arise under the Establishment Clause, id. at 2742. Specifically, neutrality serves "to guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs in on one side of religious debate." Id. At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that, because "neutrality" is a general principal, it "cannot possibly lay every issue to rest, or tell us what issues on the margins are substantial enough for constitutional significance." Id. at 2743; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. at 2868-69 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that "[w]here the Establishment Clause is at issue, tests designed to measure `neutrality' alone are insufficient"); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("That government must remain neutral in matters of religion does not foreclose it from ever taking religion into account."). In making this point, McCreary cited approvingly to Justice Harlan's observation that "`neutrality'... is not so narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation" by the First Amendment. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2743 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (cautioning that an "untutored devotion to ... neutrality" can lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active hostility to the religious").

Thus, in reviewing Skoros's Establishment Clause claim, we do not test the City's challenged holiday display policy for absolute neutrality. Instead, we apply the three-prong analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105. Lemon instructs that, consistent with the general neutrality objective of the Establishment Clause, government action that interacts with religion (1) "must have a secular ... purpose," (2) must have a "principal or primary effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) "must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (internal quotation marks omitted).13

In applying the Lemon test, we recognize that, in considering the "purpose" prong, we must follow McCreary's recent instructions on the proper scope of purpose analysis. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2734-37. Similarly, in reviewing the "effect" of the DOE policy, we heed Justice O'Connor's observation, first advanced in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly and subsequently adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, that Lemon's second prong effectively asks whether "the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 592-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 75 (2d Cir.2001) (recognizing "endorsement" derives from second prong of Lemon).14 Finally, in reviewing the challenged DOE policy for possible "excessive entanglement" with religion, we are careful to observe the link drawn in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), between this third prong of Lemon analysis and the second "effect" prong. See Commack Self-Serv., Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 425 (2d Cir.2002).

a. Purpose

When government action interacts with religion, Lemon instructs that the government purpose must be "secular." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. The requirement is not intended to favor the secular over the religious, but to prevent government from "abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters." Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987).

(1) The Policy's Actual Purpose Is Secular

(a) The Stated Purpose to Promote Pluralism

The purpose of the defendants' challenged policy is plainly stated in the DOE Holiday Display Memo issued to all public schools: holiday displays are to be used "to foster mutual understanding and respect for the many beliefs and customs stemming from our community's religious, racial, ethnic and cultural heritage." Holiday Display Memo at 1. The Memo instructs that "[t]he primary purpose of all [holiday] displays shall be to promote the goal of fostering understanding and respect for the rights of all individuals regarding their beliefs, values and customs." Id. As these statements demonstrate, the purpose of the policy is not simply "to celebrate the secular holiday season," as our dissenting colleague suggests. Post at [45]. Rather, defendants are engaged in a specific pedagogical endeavor: to use children's natural excitement about various year-end holidays to teach the lesson of pluralism by showing children the rich cultural diversity of the city in which they live and by encouraging them to show tolerance and respect for traditions other than their own.15

Not only is this stated purpose clearly secular; this particular secular purpose is one in which there is a strong public interest. When the Supreme Court, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), ruled that the First Amendment did not permit New York State to create an independent school district for children of the Jewish Satmar sect, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, observed that what the state could have done to alleviate the fears of Satmar children about attending a broader based public school was to teach students "to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs. Action of that kind would raise no constitutional concerns and would further the strong public interest in promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools." Id. at 711, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas have acknowledged the same public interest, albeit in dissent in Lee v. Weisman: "maintaining respect for the religious observances of others is a fundamental civic virtue that government (including the public schools) can and should cultivate," 505 U.S. at 638, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Allegheny, has similarly identified "pluralism and freedom of belief" as secular purposes that properly can be promoted in a public holiday display without offending the Establishment Clause. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 635-36, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that display combining menorah, Christmas tree, and sign saluting liberty "is an effort to acknowledge the cultural diversity of our country and to convey tolerance of different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens"); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to tax exemptions for religious institutions because such organizations "contribute[] to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society").

In teaching the lesson of pluralism in New York City public schools, the defendants confront a greater challenge than the one at issue in Kiryas Joel, simply by virtue of the enormous size of the City school system and the extraordinary cultural diversity of its student body. Moreover, because a significant number of New York City schoolchildren or their parents are immigrants, sometimes from countries that place little value on either diversity or tolerance, City schools play a particularly important role in teaching these essential elements of pluralism to future generations of Americans. The fact that they do so, particularly at lower school levels, through cheerful multicultural holiday displays rather than formal textbook assignments, does not diminish the importance of the lesson, much less call into question its actual secular purpose.

In sum, because the promotion of tolerance and respect for diverse customs is the clearly stated purpose of the holiday display policy at issue in this case, we conclude that this purpose is permissibly secular.

(b) Skoros's Claim that the Policy's Stated Purpose Masks Defendants' Real Goal to Promote Judaism and Islam Over Christianity

At the first prong of Lemon analysis, we generally accord "deference" to such a clear government statement of an actual secular purpose provided that the reason is "genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2735; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. at 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 587, 107 S.Ct. 2573. Skoros asserts that the defendants' stated purpose is not "genuine" because, if they were truly interested in encouraging respect for the diverse traditions of public school students, they would include the crèche in holiday displays and not represent Christmas only through secular symbols. Skoros submits that, by excluding the crèche as a religious symbol and by mischaracterizing the menorah and the star and crescent as secular symbols in order to permit their inclusion in school displays, defendants demonstrate that their actual purpose is not secular pluralism but the endorsement of Judaism and Islam. Like the district court, we reject this argument.

Preliminarily, however, we note that we cannot agree with the DOE Memo's characterization of the menorah as a secular symbol. In Kaplan v. City of Burlington, this court specifically identified the menorah as "a religious symbol of the Jewish faith ... recognized as such by the general public." 891 F.2d at 1026. The Supreme Court and our sister circuits agree that the menorah is a religious symbol. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 613, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 633, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 643, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d at 108; Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir.1995).16 Nevertheless, we find no record evidence to support Skoros's contention that the DOE's characterization was an attempt to mask an impermissible purpose to promote Judaism and Islam or to denigrate Christianity. Rather, the record suggests that the DOE's characterization of the menorah as a secular symbol for purposes of inclusion in school holiday displays originated in a good-faith — if not entirely correct — reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny.

In his letter to Catholic League President Donohue, the Chancellor's general counsel stated:

The Allegheny court recognized that while the Menorah has both religious and secular dimensions, it has become the primary visual symbol for the holiday of Hanukkah. Further, the Court acknowledged that there is no more secular alternative symbol to represent Hanukkah. Neither of these factors hold true for the crèche. The crèche is solely a religious symbol and there clearly are other secular alternative symbols of the Christmas holiday.

Vignola Letter to Donohue, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1.

As we noted earlier, six justices agreed in Allegheny that a menorah displayed together with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty did not violate the Establishment Clause, but no one opinion commanded a majority of the Court on this point. Four justices observed that Chanukah, like Christmas, was a religious holiday that had acquired secular significance. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 585 & n. 29, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 633, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). It was Justice Blackmun who, in a footnote, stated that "menorahs — like Chanukah itself — have a secular as well as a religious dimension." Id. at 587 n. 34, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J.). On this point, however, he did not speak for the Court.17 Indeed, although Justices O'Connor and Stevens joined in this part of Justice Blackmun's opinion, they subsequently joined a majority of their colleagues in faulting Justice Blackmun for attempting to "relegate[] the menorah to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season." Id. at 633, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord id. at 643-44, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 676-78, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

To the extent the DOE may mistakenly have understood the Court as a whole to recognize a "secular dimension" for the menorah, we are not persuaded that this error exposes defendants' true purpose to be the promotion of Judaism or Islam in the City's public schools. Rather, we conclude that the interpretive error is attributable simply to the complexity of the opinions in Allegheny and to the DOE's failure carefully to distinguish between those parts of Justice Blackmun's opinion that spoke for a majority of the Court and those that did not.

In any event, the significance of any DOE error must not be overstated in evaluating the true purpose of its challenged policy. The DOE's characterization of discrete holiday symbols as secular or religious is not an end in itself but only a means to assist school administrators and teachers in identifying holiday symbols that could permissibly be used to convey the policy's approved secular message of pluralism. The fact that the menorah and perhaps the star and crescent might appropriately be characterized as religious rather than secular symbols does not necessarily indicate that the defendants pursue an unconstitutional purpose.18 Indeed, last term, the Supreme Court specifically declined to hold "that a sacred text [or symbol] can never be integrated constitutionally into a governmental display" to serve a secular purpose. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2741. The critical inquiry, as the Court had earlier made plain in the very context of a public school, is whether the religious text or symbol has been sufficiently "integrat[ed] ... into a secular scheme to forestall the broadcast of an otherwise clearly religious message." Id. at 2737-38 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam) (declaring unconstitutional isolated exhibition of Ten Commandments in school classrooms)); accord Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d at 76.

Allegheny undoubtedly holds that a menorah — although a religious symbol — can constitutionally be integrated into a public holiday display that has a secular rather than religious purpose and effect. This ruling has itself likely contributed to increased inclusion of menorahs in secular holiday displays over the last fifteen years. See, e.g., Mehdi v. United States Postal Serv., 988 F.Supp. 721, 729 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (Sotomayor, J.) (noting that Postal Service policy of displaying decorated evergreen trees and menorahs with other seasonal symbols "was no doubt crafted ... with Allegheny in mind"). Indeed, we can find proof of this trend in the lobby of our own Foley Square courthouse, which is decorated in December with a Christmas tree, numerous poinsettia plants, and a menorah.

The DOE policy does not permit the menorah or the star and crescent ever to be used in school holiday displays in isolation, thereby avoiding the problem prompting this court to invalidate a menorah display in Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d at 1030. Indeed, the policy expressly states that "any symbol or decoration which may be used" in a school holiday display "must be displayed simultaneously with other symbols or decorations reflecting different beliefs or customs." Holiday Display Memo at 1 (emphasis added). In light of this requirement, we reject Skoros's claim that the defendants' stated secular purpose is a sham for actual religious endorsement. We conclude that the actual purpose of the challenged policy is as stated by the defendants: to promote pluralism through multicultural holiday displays.

(2) An Objective Observer Would Perceive the Policy's Purpose to Be Secular

Although the purpose prong of Lemon had long been understood to require courts to inquire only as to "actual purpose," see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring), the Supreme Court has recently instructed that the inquiry must further extend to how the government's purpose is perceived by "an `objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2734 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(a) Identifying the "Objective Observer"

It might appear implicit in McCreary's quoted definition that the objective observer is an adult. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, however, the Supreme Court cast a high school student in this role. See 530 U.S. 290, 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (noting that "an objective Santa Fe High School student" would perceive pre-game prayer as stamped with school's approval); see also Board of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-52, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (same). We cannot conclude that it makes equal sense to treat a first or second grader as the "objective observer" who can take account of the text, history, and implementation of a challenged policy. Cf. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) ("[T]o the extent we consider whether the community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club's activities, the relevant community would be the parents, not the elementary school children.") (internal citation omitted). In this case, the children who are the intended audience for the challenged displays vary widely in age, from kindergarten students just learning to read to high school seniors eligible to vote. In these circumstances, we do not assume that the "objective observer" whose perception of purpose is relevant to our analysis is a student because not all such students are sufficiently mature to take full account of the text, history, and implementation of the challenged display policy.19 Instead, we assume the objective observer is an adult who, in taking full account of the policy's text, history, and implementation, does so mindful that the displays at issue will be viewed primarily by impressionable schoolchildren. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (noting schoolchildren's impressionability); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 597, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (same).

Our dissenting colleague disagrees with this identification of the objective observer, a disagreement that carries over into the second prong of Lemon analysis, where the "effect" of the challenged government action has long been tested by reference to a reasonable observer. See Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d at 75 (collecting cases).20 He concludes that a court must view the displays from the perspective of (1) "elementary or secondary school students in the New York City public school system," and (2) "parents of such students who experience the displays through and with their children and who have knowledge of the history and context of the policy and displays." Post at [43]. He notes that "we must not lose focus on who is actually the recipient of the message conveyed and how that message will affect such a recipient." Post at [47]. We agree that the intended recipient of a display message is a factor — undoubtedly an important factor — to be considered by the reasonable objective observer whose perceptions determine whether the government acts with a purpose and effect that violates the Establishment Clause, but we do not think the intended recipient of a display necessarily defines the objective observer.

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the reasonable objective observer standard, like other aspects of the Lemon test, is subject to criticism. Most recently, Justice Thomas faulted the standard for ignoring the fact that persons of faith or of no faith may have stronger concerns about particular government action than the model "reasonable observer." See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring). Whatever the merits of this criticism, until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, we are not free to discard or recast the reasonable objective observer test in assessing the secular purpose and effect of challenged government action. The Court has made plain that a reasonable objective observer must take full account of "the text, legislative history and implementation of the statute." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. at 2734 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Justice O'Connor insisted on this characterization in a case arising in the context of a public elementary school, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). In rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge by the father of a kindergarten child to a school policy providing for the voluntary recital of the Pledge of Allegiance, Justice O'Connor described the relevant reasonable objective observer as a person "fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of the practice in question." Id. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 2301. She concluded that "[s]uch an observer could not conclude that reciting the Pledge, including the phrase `under God,' constitutes an instance of worship." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, because, as even the dissent appears to recognize, see post at [____], young schoolchildren cannot satisfy the requirements of an objective observer recently specified by the Supreme Court in McCreary, we conclude that such children cannot provide the model of the objective observer for purposes of Lemon analysis in this case.

Nor does Supreme Court precedent appear to contemplate multiple reasonable objective observers, for example, persons who believe in God as distinct from those who do not; child observers as distinct from adult observers; or, as the dissent suggests, children who practice Judaism or Islam as distinct from other children. See post at [51, 55-56] (concluding that Jewish and Muslim students would think the challenged displays endorsed Judaism and Islam). As Justice O'Connor has explained, the reasonable observer standard does not "focus on the actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Instead, the standard strives to identify "a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior determined by the collective social judgment." Id. at 780, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Mindful of this goal, we do not attempt to cast schoolchildren of widely varying ages and religious backgrounds in the role of one or more reasonable objective observers. At the same time, however, we do not turn a "blind eye" to the fact that schoolchildren are the intended audience for the challenged displays, as the dissent suggests. See post at [42]. We reiterate that we expect that a mature reasonable objective observer, in noting the "context of the community and forum" in which the challenged holiday displays appear, would take into consideration that schoolchildren are the intended audience for the displays, that these children are being reared in a variety of faiths (as well as none), and that, by virtue of their ages, they may be especially susceptible to any religious messages conveyed by such displays.21

With this understanding of the objective-observer standard, we consider how two facts could affect such an observer's perception of the defendants' asserted secular purpose: (1) defendants' allowance of the menorah and the star and crescent in school holiday displays, and (2) their disallowance of the crèche.

(b) Defendants' Integration of the Menorah and the Star and Crescent in School Holiday Displays Communicates a Secular Purpose

As already noted, defendants do not permit the menorah, the star and crescent, or any holiday symbol to be used in isolation in school holiday displays. See Holiday Display Memo at 1 ("[A]ny symbol or decoration which may be used must be displayed simultaneously with other symbols or decorations reflecting different beliefs or customs"). The record evidence of holiday displays in P.S. 165, P.S. 169, and P.S. 184, detailed in our earlier discussion of the facts, see supra at [7-10], amply demonstrates that these instructions are, in fact, implemented by City schools in creating multicultural holiday displays. Thus, when menorahs or stars and crescents are displayed, their religious significance is appropriately neutralized by myriad accompanying symbols of other winter holidays having nonreligious as well as religious origins.22 As a result, no objective observer of the displays in evidence would understand the defendants' purpose to be other than that stated in the Holiday Display Memo, that is, to promote schoolchildren's understanding and respect for the many cultural traditions celebrated in New York City during the winter holiday season. Certainly, no objective observer would understand the purpose of the displays to be the endorsement or promotion of Judaism or Islam or the denigration of Christianity, as alleged by the plaintiff. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 635-36, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 711, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that "no constitutional concerns" arise from school efforts to teach children about minority religious customs in order to promote respect and tolerance); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (distinguishing between permissibly educating students as to meaning of flag salute and impermissibly compelling them to "declare a belief" by performing the salute).

Our dissenting colleague nevertheless concludes otherwise. He submits that, because a Jewish or Muslim child knows the religious significance of a menorah or star and crescent, such a child would perceive the defendants' real intent to be to endorse Judaism and Islam over Christianity. See post at [51, 55-56]. We cannot agree with this conclusion, which finds no support in the record. Certainly, no trial evidence was adduced in this case showing the effect of the challenged holiday displays on any child, much less an effect on Jewish and Muslim children leading them to think that school officials favored their religions over Christianity. Cf. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir.1984) (declining to speculate that crèche display affected children differently from adults in the absence of record evidence), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom., Board of Trustees of Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83, 105 S.Ct. 1859, 85 L.Ed.2d 63 (1985) (per curiam).

The dissent submits that no evidence is necessary on this point because the question of "`whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is ... in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.'" Post at [56] (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In any event, it submits that no evidence supports our conclusion that an objective adult observer would perceive the purpose and effect of the challenged displays as secular. We disagree.

First, we note that the conclusion we reach today is supported by both law and evidence, specifically, (1) by Allegheny's recognition that a menorah displayed with secular holiday symbols can reasonably be understood to convey to an objective observer "a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season," not a message to Jews (or Muslims) that their religion is officially endorsed, 492 U.S. at 635-36, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); and (2) by record evidence that the challenged holiday display policy, as stated and implemented, comports with Allegheny by prohibiting the celebration of any single holiday in school displays and by requiring any holiday symbol to be displayed in conjunction with "other symbols or decorations reflecting different beliefs or customs." Holiday Display Memo at 1. Indeed, we have discussed the actual displays in such detail, see supra at [7-10], precisely because we think it apparent that they pass constitutional muster under Allegheny.

Second, Justice O'Connor's cited observation in Lynch implies that no specific evidence is necessary to allow judges to determine how a mature objective mind would process the images and information conveyed by a holiday display. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (reviewing Establishment Clause challenge in school context by reference to mature objective observer, not schoolchild). But when the issue is whether an immature mind would process the same information differently, some evidence on that point may well be necessary to permit a judge to conclude, as the dissent does here, that displays that would communicate pluralism to an objective adult would communicate religious endorsement to a Jewish or Muslim child.

Further, the conclusion urged by the dissent as to the impact the challenged displays would have on Jewish and Muslim children is by no means the obvious "judicial interpretation of [the] social facts" here at issue. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It requires a court to assume not only that young Jewish and Muslim children recognize the religious significance of their own Chanukah and Ramadan symbols, but also that these children are sufficiently sophisticated in Christian iconography to understand that the myriad Christmas symbols included in school holiday displays lack religious significance. Absent some supporting evidence, however, it makes equal sense to conclude that young Jewish and Muslim children understand Christmas symbols simply as signs of a holiday celebrated primarily by the nation's Christian majority. In that context, a young Jewish child seeing a menorah or a Muslim child seeing a star and crescent included in the multicultural holiday displays in evidence in this case, would simply conclude that his beliefs and traditions are as respected as those of any other group, not that they are favored or officially endorsed. Thus, on the trial record developed in this case, we have no reason to conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny about the pluralistic message conveyed by the inclusion of a menorah (or a star and crescent) in a multicultural holiday display applies with any lesser force when such a display appears in a public school rather than a public park.

(c) Defendants' Decision to Represent Christmas in School Holiday Displays Through Secular Symbols Does Not Demonstrate a Purpose Hostile to Christianity

No different conclusion is warranted by the defendants' decision not to permit a crèche or nativity scene to represent Christmas in school holiday displays. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Allegheny concluded that the government's decision to use secular symbols to represent Christmas in a multicultural holiday display that used a menorah to represent Chanukah confirmed that the real purpose of the display was to communicate pluralism rather than to endorse religion, whether Judaism or Christianity. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 636, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d at 58 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (noting that "secular context and a message of pluralism" was what "enabled the menorah/Christmas tree display in Allegheny to survive constitutional scrutiny").

As we noted at the outset of this opinion, we do not here decide whether there are any circumstances in which the defendants could constitutionally include a crèche in a public school holiday display. Nor do we ignore the possibility that, in some circumstances, a government's deliberate exclusion of the religious symbol of one faith from a display that includes the religious symbols of other faiths could communicate the official favoritism or hostility among religious sects that is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See generally School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that government must "effect no favoritism among sects"); accord Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. at 2868 (Breyer J., concurring in the judgment). We hold only that where, as in this case, defendants permissibly include a religious symbol in a holiday display that unquestionably serves the secular purpose of pluralism, the Establishment Clause does not necessarily demand that they employ a religious symbol for every holiday that has a religious as well as a secular component.

This court has recognized that when "government endeavors to police itself and its employees in an effort to avoid transgressing Establishment Clause limits, it must be accorded some leeway, even though the conduct it forbids might not inevitably be determined to violate the Establishment Clause." Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d Cir.1999); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669, 90 S.Ct. 1409 (observing that, short of "governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion," the First Amendment allows some "room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality"); see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (reiterating Walz's recognition of "room for play in the joints"). In this case, the Chancellor's general counsel, in an affidavit submitted to the district court, explained that, to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause, the DOE's holiday display policy seeks to avoid the use of any holiday symbols that depict deities. See Vignola Aff. at 5, ¶ 16. A nativity scene undoubtedly qualifies as the depiction of a deity, with the infant Jesus usually being worshiped as God-made-man by adoring angels, shepherds, and wise men. While a menorah is understood to commemorate a miracle performed by God, it does not itself depict a deity. Nor does the star and crescent. This is not to suggest that the menorah (or the star and crescent) is a less religious symbol than the crèche. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 633-34, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing menorah as "the central religious symbol and ritual object" of Chanukah, which, like the crèche, could convey a message of endorsement when standing alone).23 It simply recognizes that the crèche conveys its religious message more representationally and less symbolically than the menorah and the star and crescent. For this reason, the religious significance of a crèche may be more obvious to the average schoolchild than that of the menorah and the star and crescent. Thus, whether or not the defendants' exclusion of the crèche is constitutionally mandated, an objective observer would recognize that the distinction drawn by the Chancellor's counsel reflects a sincere "effort to avoid transgressing Establishment Clause limits," Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d at 476, and not a religious purpose to endorse Judaism or Islam.

Indeed, that conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Christian holiday of Christmas is well represented in the City's school holiday displays through a variety of well recognized and beloved symbols, including the Christmas tree, Santa Claus, reindeer, candy canes, gingerbread boys and girls, tinsel garlands, strings of lights, not to mention Christmas wreaths, candles, stars, and presents.24 To the extent these Christmas symbols shared classroom, lobby, and hall space with snowmen, snowflakes, menorahs, dreidels, kinaras, and, on one occasion, a star and crescent, no objective observer would understand defendants' purpose to be to denigrate Christianity. Indeed, that argument is conclusively refuted by the instructional cards used by the defendants in some elementary school classrooms. See supra at [9-10]. As our earlier quotation of the text of these cards demonstrates, they afford equally respectful treatment to the religious origins of Christmas, Chanukah, and Ramadan, as well as the secular origins of Kwanzaa. The Christmas card even alludes to the Christian tradition of erecting nativity scenes.

In sum, even if the DOE erred in characterizing the menorah and the star and crescent as "secular" symbols, and whether or not the DOE is correct in its assessment that the crèche would be more difficult than the menorah or the star and crescent to incorporate into a secular holiday display in New York City public schools, no reasonable objective observer would perceive from the totality of the circumstances in this case that the purpose of the challenged display policy was, in fact, to communicate to City schoolchildren any official endorsement of Judaism and Islam or any dismissal of Christianity. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the district court, that the defendants satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test because the actual and perceived purpose of the DOE holiday display policy is secular: to use holiday celebrations to encourage respect for the City's diverse cultural traditions.

In the next section of this opinion, we consider whether, despite this secular purpose, the DOE holiday display policy nevertheless has the impermissible effect of endorsing Judaism or Islam or inhibiting the practice of Christianity.

b. Primary Effect

The second prong of the Lemon test mandates that the "principal or primary effect" of the challenged government action "must neither advance nor inhibit religion." Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d at 430. When applied to holiday display challenges, this analysis is "highly fact-specific," asking: "Would a reasonable observer of the display in its particular context perceive a message of governmental endorsement or sponsorship of religion?" Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d at 53 (emphasis added); accord Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d at 75.

(1) The Endorsement Test

As Justice O'Connor, the principal architect of the "endorsement test," explained in Allegheny, the concept of endorsement is not limited to government coercion or efforts at proselytization; it is intended to take account of "the numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others." 492 U.S. at 627-28, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).25 The endorsement test does not require courts to "sweep away all government recognition and acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens." Id. at 623, 109 S.Ct. 3086; see id. at 631, 109 S.Ct. 3086 ("[G]overnment can acknowledge the role of religion in our society in numerous ways that do not amount to an endorsement." (emphasis in original)). Rather, it seeks to ensure that government does "not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community," id. at 627, 109 S.Ct. 3086, thereby sending "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community," Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Like the "objective observer" whose perception of purpose is at issue at the first step of Lemon analysis, the "reasonable observer" employed in the endorsement test, see Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d at 75 (collecting cases), is not a particular individual, but "`a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,'" Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting W. Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 175 (5th ed.1984)). A court reviewing an Establishment Clause challenge to a particular holiday display is not required to ask "whether there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion, whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think [the State] endorses religion.'" Id. (quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc) (emphasis in original)). Rather, it considers whether a "reasonable observer ... aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears," would understand it to endorse religion or, in this case, one religion over another. Id.; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

(2) Applying Endorsement Analysis to Public Schools

When, as in this case, we apply endorsement analysis to a policy that operates throughout a city's public elementary and secondary schools, special concerns arise in the identification of a reasonable observer. As we noted in discussing a similar ideal observer whose perception of purpose was relevant at step one of the Lemon analysis, it makes no sense at the effect step to view a kindergarten child or first grader as someone "fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of the practice in question," Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), even if certain high school students may fit this description, see Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. at 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266. Because of the range of the students to whom the challenged display policy applies, we conclude that the relevant objective observer, whether with respect to purpose or effect, is an adult who is "aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears," Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and who understands that the display of a religious symbol in a school context may raise particular endorsement concerns, because of the pressure exerted on children by the "law of imitation," Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. at 227, 68 S.Ct. 461 (Frankfurter, J, concurring) (observing that "nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children").26

The latter concerns do not mean that the Constitution prohibits public schools from making any mention of religion when teaching a secular lesson about pluralism and tolerance. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 42, 101 S.Ct. 192 (recognizing that Bible may be used "in an appropriate study of civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like"); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (recognizing Bible as "worthy of study for its literary and histo