The question presented in this case is whether Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]'' or "aid[ing]'' a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.

It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington. In 1854, Washington's first Territorial Legislature outlawed "assisting another in the commission of self-murder.''1 Today, Washington law provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.'' Wash. Rev.Code 9A.36.060(1) (1994). "Promoting a suicide attempt'' is a felony, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and up to a $10,000 fine. —§§9A.36.060(2) and 9A.20.021(1)(c). At the same time, Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the "withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment'' at a patient's direction "shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.'' Wash. Rev.Code §XX-XXX-XXX(1).2

Petitioners in this case are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents Harold Glucksberg, M. D., Abigail Halperin, M. D., Thomas A. Preston, M. D., and Peter Shalit, M. D., are physicians who practice in Washington. These doctors occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, and declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for Washington's assisted-suicide ban.3 In January 1994, respondents, along with three gravely ill, pseudonymous plaintiffs who have since died and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, sued in the United States District Court, seeking a declaration that Wash Rev.Code 9A.36.060(1) (1994) is, on its face, unconstitutional. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D.Wash.1994).4

The plaintiffs asserted "the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.'' Id., at 1459. Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990), the District Court agreed, 850 F.Supp., at 1459-1462, and concluded that Washington's assisted-suicide ban is unconstitutional because it "places an undue burden on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected liberty interest.'' Id., at 1465.5 The District Court also decided that the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that ""all persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike.''' Id., at 1466 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3253-3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)).

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that " [i]n the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final jurisdiction.'' Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (1995). The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, reversed the panel's decision, and affirmed the District Court. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (1996). Like the District Court, the en banc Court of Appeals emphasized our Casey and Cruzan decisions. 79 F.3d, at 813-816. The court also discussed what it described as "historical'' and "current societal attitudes'' toward suicide and assisted suicide, id., at 806-812, and concluded that "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death-that there is, in short, a constitutionally-recognized "right to die.''' Id., at 816. After " [w]eighing and then balancing'' this interest against Washington's various interests, the court held that the State's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional "as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.'' Id., at 836, 837.6 The court did not reach the District Court's equal-protection holding. Id., at 838.7 We granted certiorari, 519 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 37, 135 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1996), and now reverse.

* We begin, as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S., at 849-850, 112 S.Ct., at 2805-2806; Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 269-279, 110 S.Ct., at 2846-2842; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting importance of "careful "respect for the teachings of history'''). In almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide.8 The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 280, 110 S.Ct., at 2852 (" [T]he States-indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide''); see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2977, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (" [T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws''). Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. See generally, Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L.Rev. 1, 17-56 (1985) (hereinafter Marzen); New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 77-82 (May 1994) (hereinafter New York Task Force).

More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.9 Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 294-295, 110 S.Ct., at 2859-2860 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal-treatise writers, observed that " [j]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself.'' 2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 423 (f.150) (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne transl., 1968). The real and personal property of one who killed himself to avoid conviction and punishment for a crime were forfeit to the king; however, thought Bracton, "if a man slays himself in weariness of life or because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain . . . [only] his movable goods [were] confiscated.'' Id., at 423-424 (f.150). Thus, " [t]he principle that suicide of a sane person, for whatever reason, was a punishable felony was . . . introduced into English common law.''10 Centuries later, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was also a primary legal authority for 18th and 19th century American lawyers, referred to suicide as "self-murder'' and "the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure . . . . '' 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189. Blackstone emphasized that "the law has . . . ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes,'' ibid, although, anticipating later developments, he conceded that the harsh and shameful punishments imposed for suicide "borde[r] a little upon severity.'' Id., at *190.

For the most part, the early American colonies adopted the common-law approach. For example, the legislators of the Providence Plantations, which would later become Rhode Island, declared, in 1647, that " [s]elf-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: . . . his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing.'' The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 19 (J. Cushing ed.1977). Virginia also required ignominious burial for suicides, and their estates were forfeit to the crown. A. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 108, and n. 93, 198, and n. 15 (1930).

Over time, however, the American colonies abolished these harsh common-law penalties. William Penn abandoned the criminal-forfeiture sanction in Pennsylvania in 1701, and the other colonies (and later, the other States) eventually followed this example. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 294, 110 S.Ct., at 2859-2860 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Zephaniah Swift, who would later become Chief Justice of Connecticut, wrote in 1796 that

" [t]here can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge upon lifeless clay, that is insensible of the punishment. There can be no greater cruelty, than the inflicting [of] a punishment, as the forfeiture of goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of the offender . . . . -[Suicide] is so abhorrent to the feelings of mankind, and that strong love of life which is implanted in the human heart, that it cannot be so frequently committed, as to become dangerous to society. There can of course be no necessity of any punishment.'' 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 304 (1796).

This statement makes it clear, however, that the movement away from the common law's harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide; rather, as Chief Justice Swift observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing. Cruzan, supra, at 294, 110 S.Ct., at 2859 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Nonetheless, although States moved away from Blackstone's treatment of suicide, courts continued to condemn it as a grave public wrong. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284, 286, 23 L.Ed. 918 (1876) (suicide is "an act of criminal self-destruction''); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-627 (1982); Blackwood v. Jones, 111 Fla. 528, 532, 149 So. 600, 601 (1933) ("No sophistry is tolerated . . . which seek[s] to justify self-destruction as commendable or even a matter of personal right'').

That suicide remained a grievous, though nonfelonious, wrong is confirmed by the fact that colonial and early state legislatures and courts did not retreat from prohibiting assisting suicide. Swift, in his early 19th century treatise on the laws of Connecticut, stated that " [i]f one counsels another to commit suicide, and the other by reason of the advice kills himself, the advisor is guilty of murder as principal.'' 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 270 (1823). This was the well established common-law view, see In re Joseph G., 34 Cal.3d 429, 434-435, 194 Cal.Rptr. 163, 166, 667 P.2d 1176, 1179 (1983); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428 (1877) (""Now if the murder of one's self is felony, the accessory is equally guilty as if he had aided and abetted in the murder''') (quoting Chief Justice Parker's charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816)), as was the similar principle that the consent of a homicide victim is "wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who cause[d] [his death],'' 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 16 (1883); see 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law §§451-452 (9th ed. 1885); Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1018-1019, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1946) (""The right to life and to personal security is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable'''). And the prohibitions against assisting suicide never contained exceptions for those who were near death. Rather, " [t]he life of those to whom life ha[d] become a burden-of those who [were] hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded-nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, [were] under the protection of law, equally as the lives of those who [were] in the full tide of life's enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live.'' Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872); see Bowen, supra, at 360 (prisoner who persuaded another to commit suicide could be tried for murder, even though victim was scheduled shortly to be executed).

The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting suicide was enacted in New York in 1828, Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, §4, 1828 N.Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N.Y.Rev.Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §7, p. 661 (1829)), and many of the new States and Territories followed New York's example. Marzen 73-74. Between 1857 and 1865, a New York commission led by Dudley Field drafted a criminal code that prohibited "aiding'' a suicide and, specifically, "furnish[ing] another person with any deadly weapon or poisonous drug, knowing that such person intends to use such weapon or drug in taking his own life.'' Id., at 76-77. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was a crime in most States to assist a suicide. See Cruzan, supra, at 294-295, 110 S.Ct., at 2859-2860 (SCALIA, J., concurring). The Field Penal Code was adopted in the Dakota Territory in 1877, in New York in 1881, and its language served as a model for several other western States' statutes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Marzen 76-77, 205-206, 212-213. California, for example, codified its assisted-suicide prohibition in 1874, using language similar to the Field Code's.11 In this century, the Model Penal Code also prohibited "aiding'' suicide, prompting many States to enact or revise their assisted-suicide bans.12 The Code's drafters observed that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim.'' American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §210.5, Comment 5, p. 100 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).

Though deeply rooted, the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed. Because of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 16-18 (1983). Public concern and democratic action are therefore sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of life, with the result that there have been many significant changes in state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect. Many States, for example, now permit "living wills,'' surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. See Vacco v. Quill, --- U.S. ----, ---------, 117 S.Ct. 2293, ---------, --- L.Ed.2d ----; 79 F.3d, at 818-820; People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 478-480, and nn. 53-56, 527 N.W.2d 714, 731-732, and nn. 53-56 (1994). At the same time, however, voters and legislators continue for the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide.

The Washington statute at issue in this case, Wash. Rev.Code §9A.36.060 (1994), was enacted in 1975 as part of a revision of that State's criminal code. Four years later, Washington passed its Natural Death Act, which specifically stated that the "withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment . . . shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide'' and that " [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing . . . . '' Natural Death Act, 1979 Wash. Laws, ch. 112, §§8(1), p. 11 (codified at Wash. Rev.Code §§XX-XXX-XXX(1), XX-XXX-XXX (1994)). In 1991, Washington voters rejected a ballot initiative which, had it passed, would have permitted a form of physician-assisted suicide.13 Washington then added a provision to the Natural Death Act expressly excluding physician-assisted suicide. 1992 Wash. Laws, ch. 98, §10; Wash. Rev.Code §XX-XXX-XXX (1994).

California voters rejected an assisted-suicide initiative similar to Washington's in 1993. On the other hand, in 1994, voters in Oregon enacted, also through ballot initiative, that State's "Death With Dignity Act,'' which legalized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill adults.14 Since the Oregon vote, many proposals to legalize assisted-suicide have been and continue to be introduced in the States' legislatures, but none has been enacted.15 And just last year, Iowa and Rhode Island joined the overwhelming majority of States explicitly prohibiting assisted suicide. See Iowa Code Ann. §§707A.2, 707A.3 (Supp.1997); R.I. Gen. Laws §§11-60-1, 11-60-3 (Supp.1996). Also, on April 30, 1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide. Pub.L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §14401 et seq).16

Thus, the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues. For example, New York State's Task Force on Life and the Law-an ongoing, blue-ribbon commission composed of doctors, ethicists, lawyers, religious leaders, and interested laymen-was convened in 1984 and commissioned with "a broad mandate to recommend public policy on issues raised by medical advances.'' New York Task Force vii. Over the past decade, the Task Force has recommended laws relating to end-of-life decisions, surrogate pregnancy, and organ donation. Id., at 118-119. After studying physician-assisted suicide, however, the Task Force unanimously concluded that " [l]egalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable . . . . -[T]he potential dangers of this dramatic change in public policy would outweigh any benefit that might be achieved.'' Id., at 120.

Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this prohibition. Against this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice, we now turn to respondents' constitutional claim.

The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty'' it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068-1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Due Process Clause "protects individual liberty against "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them''') (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1446-1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Casey, 505 U.S., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at 2806-2807. In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty'' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); to use contraception, ibid; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), and to abortion, Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 278-279, 110 S.Ct., at 2851-2852.

But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.'' Collins, 503 U.S., at 125, 112 S.Ct., at 1068. By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,'' ibid, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court, Moore, 431 U.S., at 502, 97 S.Ct., at 1937 (plurality opinion).

Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'' id., at 503, 97 S.Ct., at 1938 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental''), and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'' such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,'' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description'' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Flores, supra, at 302, 113 S.Ct., at 1447; Collins, supra, at 125, 112 S.Ct., at 1068; Cruzan, supra, at 277-278, 110 S.Ct., at 2850-2851. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,'' Collins, supra, at 125, 112 S.Ct., at 1068, that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe . . . "fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'' 507 U.S., at 302, 113 S.Ct., at 1447.

Justice SOUTER, relying on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, would largely abandon this restrained methodology, and instead ask "whether [Washington's] statute sets up one of those "arbitrary impositions' or "purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,'' post, at __ (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776-1777, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).17 In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence, described briefly above, supra, at __, has been a process whereby the outlines of the "liberty'' specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review. In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.

Turning to the claim at issue here, the Court of Appeals stated that " [p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to be resolved is whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's death,'' 79 F.3d, at 801, or, in other words, " [i]s there a right to die?,'' id., at 799. Similarly, respondents assert a "liberty to choose how to die'' and a right to "control of one's final days,'' Brief for Respondents 7, and describe the asserted liberty as "the right to choose a humane, dignified death,'' id., at 15, and "the liberty to shape death,'' id., at 18. As noted above, we have a tradition of carefully formulating the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases. For example, although Cruzan is often described as a "right to die'' case, see 79 F.3d, at 799; --- U.S., at ----, 117 S.Ct., at 2307 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Cruzan recognized "the more specific interest in making decisions about how to confront an imminent death''), we were, in fact, more precise: we assumed that the Constitution granted competent persons a "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'' Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 279, 110 S.Ct., at 2843; id., at 287, 110 S.Ct., at 2856 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (" [A] liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions''). The Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits "aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,'' Wash. Rev.Code §9A.36.060(1) (1994), and, thus, the question before us is whether the "liberty'' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.18

We now inquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation's traditions. Here, as discussed above, supra, at __-__, we are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31, 43 S.Ct. 9, 9-10, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922) ("If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it''); Flores, 507 U.S., at 303, 113 S.Ct., at 1447 ("The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that "substantive due process' sustains it'').

Respondents contend, however, that the liberty interest they assert is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-process line of cases, if not with this Nation's history and practice. Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our jurisprudence in this area as reflecting a general tradition of "self-sovereignty,'' Brief of Respondents 12, and as teaching that the "liberty'' protected by the Due Process Clause includes "basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy,'' id., at 10; see Casey, 505 U.S., at 847, 112 S.Ct., at 2804-2805 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter''). According to respondents, our liberty jurisprudence, and the broad, individualistic principles it reflects, protects the "liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue government interference.'' Brief for Respondents 10. The question presented in this case, however, is whether the protections of the Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide with another's assistance. With this "careful description'' of respondents' claim in mind, we turn to Casey and Cruzan.

In Cruzan, we considered whether Nancy Beth Cruzan, who had been severely injured in an automobile accident and was in a persistive vegetative state, "ha[d] a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment'' at her parents' request. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 269, 110 S.Ct., at 2846-2847. We began with the observation that " [a]t common law, even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery.'' Ibid. We then discussed the related rule that "informed consent is generally required for medical treatment.'' Ibid. After reviewing a long line of relevant state cases, we concluded that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment.'' Id., at 277, 110 S.Ct., at 2851. Next, we reviewed our own cases on the subject, and stated that " [t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.'' Id., at 278, 110 S.Ct., at 2851. Therefore, "for purposes of [that] case, we assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'' Id., at 279, 110 S.Ct., at 2852; see id., at 287, 110 S.Ct., at 2856 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). We concluded that, notwithstanding this right, the Constitution permitted Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id., at 280-281, 110 S.Ct., at 2852-2853.

Respondents contend that in Cruzan we "acknowledged that competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and thus hasten death,'' Brief for Respondents 23, and that "the constitutional principle behind recognizing the patient's liberty to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support applies at least as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal medication,'' id., at 26. Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaining food and water, necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.'' 79 F.3d, at 816.

The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. See Vacco v. Quill, --- U.S., at ---------, 117 S.Ct., at 2298-2302. In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide. 497 U.S., at 280, 110 S.Ct., at 2852.

Respondents also rely on Casey. There, the Court's opinion concluded that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.'' Casey, 505 U.S., at 846, 112 S.Ct., at 2804. We held, first, that a woman has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion "without undue interference from the State''; second, that States may restrict post-viability abortions, so long as exceptions are made to protect a woman's life and health; and third, that the State has legitimate interests throughout a pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the unborn child. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion discussed in some detail this Court's substantive-due-process tradition of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect certain fundamental rights and "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,'' and noted that many of those rights and liberties "involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.'' Id., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at 2807.

The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, found Casey ""highly instructive''' and ""almost prescriptive''' for determining ""what liberty interest may inhere in a terminally ill person's choice to commit suicide''':

"Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice "central to personal dignity and autonomy.''' 79 F.3d, at 813-814.

Similarly, respondents emphasize the statement in Casey that:

"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.'' Casey, 505 U.S., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at 2807.

Brief for Respondents 12. By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The opinion moved from the recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about ultimate considerations to the observation that "though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. '' Casey, 505 U.S., at 852, 112 S.Ct., at 2807 (emphasis added). That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-1298, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), and Casey did not suggest otherwise.

The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted "right'' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642-2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); Flores, 507 U.S., at 305, 113 S.Ct., at 1448-1449. This requirement is unquestionably met here. As the court below recognized, 79 F.3d, at 816-817,20 Washington's assisted-suicide ban implicates a number of state interests.21 See 49 F.3d, at 592-593; Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 26-29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-27.

First, Washington has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.'' Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 282, 110 S.Ct., at 2853. The State's prohibition on assisted suicide, like all homicide laws, both reflects and advances its commitment to this interest. See id., at 280, 110 S.Ct., at 2852; Model Penal Code §210.5, Comment 5, at 100 (" [T]he interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of an other'').22 This interest is symbolic and aspirational as well as practical:

"While suicide is no longer prohibited or penalized, the ban against assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the notion of limits in human relationships. It reflects the gravity with which we view the decision to take one's own life or the life of another, and our reluctance to encourage or promote these decisions.'' New York Task Force 131-132.

Respondents admit that " [t]he State has a real interest in preserving the lives of those who can still contribute to society and enjoy life.'' Brief for Respondents 35, n. 23. The Court of Appeals also recognized Washington's interest in protecting life, but held that the "weight'' of this interest depends on the "medical condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at stake.'' 79 F.3d, at 817. Washington, however, has rejected this sliding-scale approach and, through its assisted-suicide ban, insists that all persons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental condition, are under the full protection of the law. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 2478-2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979) (". . . Congress could reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than other patients, from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise''). As we have previously affirmed, the States "may properly decline to make judgments about the "quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy,'' Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 282, 110 S.Ct., at 2853. This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who are near death.

Relatedly, all admit that suicide is a serious public-health problem, especially among persons in otherwise vulnerable groups. See Washington State Dept. of Health, Annual Summary of Vital Statistics 1991, pp. 29-30 (Oct.1992) (suicide is a leading cause of death in Washington of those between the ages of 14 and 54); New York Task Force 10, 23-33 (suicide rate in the general population is about one percent, and suicide is especially prevalent among the young and the elderly). The State has an interest in preventing suicide, and in studying, identifying, and treating its causes. See 79 F.3d, at 820; id., at 854 (Beezer, J., dissenting) ("The state recognizes suicide as a manifestation of medical and psychological anguish''); Marzen 107-146.

Those who attempt suicide-terminally ill or not-often suffer from depression or other mental disorders. See New York Task Force 13-22, 126-128 (more than 95% of those who commit suicide had a major psychiatric illness at the time of death; among the terminally ill, uncontrolled pain is a "risk factor'' because it contributes to depression); Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (Comm. Print 1996); cf. Back, Wallace, Starks, & Pearlman, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State, 275 JAMA 919, 924 (1996) (" [I]ntolerable physical symptoms are not the reason most patients request physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia''). Research indicates, however, that many people who request physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression and pain are treated. H. Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure 24-25 (1997) (suicidal, terminally ill patients "usually respond well to treatment for depressive illness and pain medication and are then grateful to be alive''); New York Task Force 177-178. The New York Task Force, however, expressed its concern that, because depression is difficult to diagnose, physicians and medical professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously ill patients' needs. Id., at 175. Thus, legal physician-assisted suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from suicidal impulses.

The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. In contrast to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the integrity of the medical profession would [not] be threatened in any way by [physician-assisted suicide],'' 79 F.3d, at 827, the American Medical Association, like many other medical and physicians' groups, has concluded that " [p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer.'' American Medical Association, Code of Ethics §2.211 (1994); see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (" [T]he societal risks of involving physicians in medical interventions to cause patients' deaths is too great''); New York Task Force 103-109 (discussing physicians' views). And physician-assisted suicide could, it is argued, undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and harming. Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 355-356 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests will be hard to sustain'').

Next, the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the State's concern that disadvantaged persons might be pressured into physician-assisted suicide as "ludicrous on its face.'' 79 F.3d, at 825. We have recognized, however, the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 281, 110 S.Ct., at 2852. Similarly, the New York Task Force warned that " [l]egalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable . . . . The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group.'' New York Task Force 120; see Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d, at 593 (" [A]n insidious bias against the handicapped-again coupled with a cost-saving mentality-makes them especially in need of Washington's statutory protection''). If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs.

The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and "societal indifference.'' 49 F.3d, at 592. The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's. See New York Task Force 101-102; Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, at 9, 20 (discussing prejudice toward the disabled and the negative messages euthanasia and assisted suicide send to handicapped patients).

Finally, the State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. The Court of Appeals struck down Washington's assisted-suicide ban only "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors.'' 79 F.3d, at 838. Washington insists, however, that the impact of the court's decision will not and cannot be so limited. Brief for Petitioners 44-47. If suicide is protected as a matter of constitutional right, it is argued, "every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it.'' Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d, at 591; see Kevorkian, 447 Mich., at 470, n. 41, 527 N.W.2d, at 727-728, n. 41. The Court of Appeals' decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide ample support for the State's concerns. The court noted, for example, that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself,'' 79 F.3d, at 832, n. 120; that "in some instances, the patient may be unable to self-administer the drugs and . . . administration by the physician . . . may be the only way the patient may be able to receive them,'' id., at 831; and that not only physicians, but also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate in assisting suicide. Id., at 838, n. 140. Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited right to "physician-assisted suicide'' is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain.23 Washington's ban on assisting suicide prevents such erosion.

This concern is further supported by evidence about the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Dutch government's own study revealed that in 1990, there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as "the deliberate termination of another's life at his request''), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request. In addition to these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses without the patients' explicit consent. Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, at 12-13 (citing Dutch study). This study suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures, euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia. Id., at 16-21; see generally C. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands (1991); H. Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure (1997). The New York Task Force, citing the Dutch experience, observed that "assisted suicide and euthanasia are closely linked,'' New York Task Force 145, and concluded that the "risk of . . . abuse is neither speculative nor distant,'' id., at 134. Washington, like most other States, reasonably ensures against this risk by banning, rather than regulating, assisting suicide. See United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2668, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973) ("Each step, when taken, appear[s] a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance'').

We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection. We therefore hold that Wash. Rev.Code §9A.36.060(1) (1994) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors.'' 79 F.3d, at 838.24

***

Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. The decision of the en banc Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.

Three terminally ill individuals and four physicians who sometimes treat terminally ill patients brought this challenge to the Washington statute making it a crime "knowingly . . . [to] ai[d] another person to attempt suicide,'' Wash. Rev.Code §9A.36.060 (1994), claiming on behalf of both patients and physicians that it would violate substantive due process to enforce the statute against a doctor who acceded to a dying patient's request for a drug to be taken by the patient to commit suicide. The question is whether the statute sets up one of those "arbitrary impositions'' or "purposeless restraints'' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776-1777, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). I conclude that the statute's application to the doctors has not been shown to be unconstitutional, but I write separately to give my reasons for analyzing the substantive due process claims as I do, and for rejecting this one.

* Although the terminally ill original parties have died during the pendency of this case, the four physicians who remain as respondents here1 continue to request declaratory and injunctive relief for their own benefit in discharging their obligations to other dying patients who request their help.2 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (question was capable of repetition yet evading review). The case reaches us on an order granting summary judgment, and we must take as true the undisputed allegations that each of the patients was mentally competent and terminally ill, and that each made a knowing and voluntary choice to ask a doctor to prescribe "medications . . . to be self-administered for the purpose of hastening . . . death.'' Complaint ¶2.3. The State does not dispute that each faced a passage to death more agonizing both mentally and physically, and more protracted over time, than death by suicide with a physician's help, or that each would have chosen such a suicide for the sake of personal dignity, apart even from relief from pain. Each doctor in this case claims to encounter patients like the original plaintiffs who have died, that is, mentally competent, terminally ill, and seeking medical help in "the voluntary self-termination of life.'' Id., at ¶2.5-2.8. While there may be no unanimity on the physician's professional obligation in such circumstances, I accept here respondents' representation that providing such patients with prescriptions for drugs that go beyond pain relief to hasten death would, in these circumstances, be consistent with standards of medical practice. Hence, I take it to be true, as respondents say, that the Washington statute prevents the exercise of a physician's "best professional judgment to prescribe medications to [such] patients in dosages that would enable them to act to hasten their own deaths.'' Id., at ¶2.6; see also App. 35-37, 49-51, 55-57, 73-75.

In their brief to this Court, the doctors claim not that they ought to have a right generally to hasten patients' imminent deaths, but only to help patients who have made "personal decisions regarding their own bodies, medical care, and, fundamentally, the future course of their lives,'' Brief for Respondents 12, and who have concluded responsibly and with substantial justification that the brief and anguished remainders of their lives have lost virtually all value to them. Respondents fully embrace the notion that the State must be free to impose reasonable regulations on such physician assistance to ensure that the patients they assist are indeed among the competent and terminally ill and that each has made a free and informed choice in seeking to obtain and use a fatal drug. Complaint ¶3.2; App. 28-41.

In response, the State argues that the interest asserted by the doctors is beyond constitutional recognition because it has no deep roots in our history and traditions. Brief for Petitioners 21-25. But even aside from that, without disputing that the patients here were competent and terminally ill, the State insists that recognizing the legitimacy of doctors' assistance of their patients as contemplated here would entail a number of adverse consequences that the Washington Legislature was entitled to forestall. The nub of this part of the State's argument is not that such patients are constitutionally undeserving of relief on their own account, but that any attempt to confine a right of physician assistance to the circumstances presented by these doctors is likely to fail. Id., at 34-35, 44-47.

First, the State argues that the right could not be confined to the terminally ill. Even assuming a fixed definition of that term, the State observes that it is not always possible to say with certainty how long a person may live. Id., at 34. It asserts that " [t]here is no principled basis on which [the right] can be limited to the prescription of medication for terminally ill patients to administer to themselves'' when the right's justifying principle is as broad as ""merciful termination of suffering.''' Id., at 45 (citing Y. Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, Hastings Center Report 32, 36-37 (May-June 1993)). Second, the State argues that the right could not be confined to the mentally competent, observing that a person's competence cannot always be assessed with certainty, Brief for Petitioners 34, and suggesting further that no principled distinction is possible between a competent patient acting independently and a patient acting through a duly appointed and competent surrogate, id., at 46. Next, according to the State, such a right might entail a right to or at least merge in practice into "other forms of life-ending assistance,'' such as euthanasia. Id., at 46-47. Finally, the State believes that a right to physician assistance could not easily be distinguished from a right to assistance from others, such as friends, family, and other health-care workers. Id., at 47. The State thus argues that recognition of the substantive due process right at issue here would jeopardize the lives of others outside the class defined by the doctors' claim, creating risks of irresponsible suicides and euthanasia, whose dangers are concededly within the State's authority to address.

When the physicians claim that the Washington law deprives them of a right falling within the scope of liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against denial without due process of law,3 they are not claiming some sort of procedural defect in the process through which the statute has been enacted or is administered. Their claim, rather, is that the State has no substantively adequate justification for barring the assistance sought by the patient and sought to be offered by the physician. Thus, we are dealing with a claim to one of those rights sometimes described as rights of substantive due process and sometimes as unenumerated rights, in view of the breadth and indeterminacy of the "due process'' serving as the claim's textual basis. The doctors accordingly arouse the skepticism of those who find the Due Process Clause an unduly vague or oxymoronic warrant for judicial review of substantive state law, just as they also invoke two centuries of American constitutional practice in recognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action. Although this practice has neither rested on any single textual basis nor expressed a consistent theory (or, before Poe v. Ullman, a much articulated one), a brief overview of its history is instructive on two counts. The persistence of substantive due process in our cases points to the legitimacy of the modern justification for such judicial review found in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe,4 on which I will dwell further on, while the acknowledged failures of some of these cases point with caution to the difficulty raised by the present claim.

Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive constitutional review resting on a theory of unenumerated rights occurred largely in the state courts applying state constitutions that commonly contained either due process clauses like that of the Fifth Amendment (and later the Fourteenth) or the textual antecedents of such clauses, repeating Magna Carta's guarantee of "the law of the land.''5 On the basis of such clauses, or of general principles untethered to specific constitutional language, state courts evaluated the constitutionality of a wide range of statutes.

Thus, a Connecticut court approved a statute legitimating a class of previous illegitimate marriages, as falling within the terms of the "social compact,'' while making clear its power to review constitutionality in those terms. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 225-226 (1822). In the same period, a specialized court of equity, created under a Tennessee statute solely to hear cases brought by the state bank against its debtors, found its own authorization unconstitutional as "partial'' legislation violating the state constitution's "law of the land'' clause. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 2 Yerg. 599, 602-608 (1831) (Green, J.); id., 2 Yer., at 613-615 (Peck, J.); id., at 618-623 (Kennedy, J.). And the middle of the 19th century brought the famous Wynehamer case, invalidating a statute purporting to render possession of liquor immediately illegal except when kept for narrow, specified purposes, the state court finding the statute inconsistent with the state's due process clause. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 486-487 (1856). The statute was deemed an excessive threat to the "fundamental rights of the citizen'' to property. Id., at 398 (Comstock, J.). See generally, E. Corwin, Liberty Against Government 58-115 (1948) (discussing substantive due process in the state courts before the Civil War); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *85-*129, *351-*397.

Even in this early period, however, this Court anticipated the developments that would presage both the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, by making it clear on several occasions that it too had no doubt of the judiciary's power to strike down legislation that conflicted with important but unenumerated principles of American government. In most such instances, after declaring its power to invalidate what it might find inconsistent with rights of liberty and property, the Court nevertheless went on to uphold the legislative acts under review. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 656-661, 7 L.Ed. 542 (1829); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 386-395, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550-552, No. 3,230 (1823). But in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), the Court went further. It struck down an act of the Georgia legislature that purported to rescind a sale of public land ab initio and reclaim title for the State, and so deprive subsequent, good-faith purchasers of property conveyed by the original grantees. The Court rested the invalidation on alternative sources of authority: the specific prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing contracts in Article I, §10 of the Constitution; and "general principles which are common to our free institutions,'' by which Chief Justice Marshall meant that a simple deprivation of property by the State could not be an authentically "legislative'' act. Fletcher, 6 Cranch, at 135-139, 3 L.Ed. 162.

Fletcher was not, though, the most telling early example of such review. For its most salient instance in this Court before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, the case that the Amendment would in due course overturn, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857). Unlike Fletcher, Dred Scott was textually based on a due process clause (in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the national government), and it was in reliance on that clause's protection of property that the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise. 19 How., at 449-452. This substantive protection of an owner's property in a slave taken to the territories was traced to the absence of any enumerated power to affect that property granted to the Congress by Article I of the Constitution, id., at 451-452, the implication being that the government had no legitimate interest that could support the earlier congressional compromise. The ensuing judgment of history needs no recounting here.

After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantee of due process protection against the States, interpretation of the words "liberty'' and "property'' as used in due process clauses became a sustained enterprise, with the Court generally describing the due process criterion in converse terms of reasonableness or arbitrariness. That standard is fairly traceable to Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), in which he said that a person's right to choose a calling was an element of liberty (as the calling, once chosen, was an aspect of property) and declared that the liberty and property protected by due process are not truly recognized if such rights may be "arbitrarily assailed,'' id., 16 Wall., at 116.6 After that, opinions comparable to those that preceded Dred Scott expressed willingness to review legislative action for consistency with the Due Process Clause even as they upheld the laws in question. See, e.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 133-135, 21 L.Ed. 929 (1874); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123-135, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877); Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331, 6 S.Ct. 1191, 29 L.Ed. 636 (1886); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659-670, 8 S.Ct. 273, 295-302, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887). See generally Corwin, Liberty Against Government, at 121-136 (surveying the Court's early Fourteenth Amendment cases and finding little dissent from the general principle that the Due Process Clause authorized judicial review of substantive statutes).

The theory became serious, however, beginning with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), where the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute for excessive interference with Fourteenth Amendment liberty to contract, id., at 588-593, 17 S.Ct., at 430-433, and offered a substantive interpretation of "liberty,'' that in the aftermath of the so-called Lochner Era has been scaled back in some respects, but expanded in others, and never repudiated in principle. The Court said that Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes "the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.'' Id., at 589, 17 S.Ct., at 431. " [W]e do not intend to hold that in no such case can the State exercise its police power,'' the Court added, but " [w]hen and how far such power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it arises.'' Id., at 590, 17 S.Ct., at 432.

Although this principle was unobjectionable, what followed for a season was, in the realm of economic legislation, the echo of Dred Scott. Allgeyer was succeeded within a decade by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905), and the era to which that case gave its name, famous now for striking down as arbitrary various sorts of economic regulations that post-New Deal courts have uniformly thought constitutionally sound. Compare, e.g., id., at 62, 25 S.Ct., at 545 (finding New York's maximum-hours law for bakers "unreasonable and entirely arbitrary'') and Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 559, 43 S.Ct. 394, 401-402, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923) (holding a minimum wage law "so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the United States'') with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 57 S.Ct. 578, 581-582, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937) (overruling Adkins and approving a minimum-wage law on the principle that "regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process''). As the parentheticals here suggest, while the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they espoused.

Even before the deviant economic due process cases had been repudiated, however, the more durable precursors of modern substantive due process were reaffirming this Court's obligation to conduct arbitrariness review, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Without referring to any specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights, the Court invoked precedents from the Slaughter-House Cases through Adkins to declare that the Fourteenth Amendment protected "the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'' Id., at 399, 43 S.Ct., at 626. The Court then held that the same Fourteenth Amendment liberty included a teacher's right to teach and the rights of parents to direct their children's education without unreasonable interference by the States, id., at 400, 43 S.Ct., at 627, with the result that Nebraska's prohibition on the teaching of foreign languages in the lower grades was, "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State,'' id., at 403, 43 S.Ct., at 628. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573-574, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (finding that a statute that all but outlawed private schools lacked any "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State''); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327-328, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152-153, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) ("even in the field of substantive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts''; "Is that [injury] to which the statute has subjected [the appellant] a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?'') (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

After Meyer and Pierce, two further opinions took the major steps that lead to the modern law. The first was not even in a due process case but one about equal protection, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), where the Court emphasized the "fundamental'' nature of individual choice about procreation and so foreshadowed not only the later prominence of procreation as a subject of liberty protection, but the corresponding standard of "strict scrutiny,'' in this Court's Fourteenth Amendment law. See id., at 541, 62 S.Ct., at 1113. Skinner, that is, added decisions regarding procreation to the list of liberties recognized in Meyer and Pierce and loosely suggested, as a gloss on their standard of arbitrariness, a judicial obligation to scrutinize any impingement on such an important interest with heightened care. In so doing, it suggested a point that Justice Harlan would develop, that the kind and degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual. Poe, 367 U.S., at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1776-1777.

The second major opinion leading to the modern doctrine was Justice Harlan's Poe dissent just cited, the conclusion of which was adopted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and the authority of which was acknowledged in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). See also n. 4, supra. The dissent is important for three things that point to our responsibilities today. The first is Justice Harlan's respect for the tradition of substantive due process review itself, and his acknowledgement of the Judiciary's obligation to carry it on. For two centuries American courts, and for much of that time this Court, have thought it necessary to provide some degree of review over the substantive content of legislation under constitutional standards of textual breadth. The obligation was understood before Dred Scott and has continued after the repudiation of Lochner's progeny, most notably on the subjects of segregation in public education, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694-695, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), marital privacy and contraception, Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-691, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015-2019, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977), Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 481-486, 85 S.Ct., at 1679-1683, abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 869-879, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2805-2806, 2816-2822, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (joint opinion of O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-166, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-733, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), personal control of medical treatment, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-289, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2856-2857, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at 302, 110 S.Ct., at 2863-2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id., at 331, 110 S.Ct., at 2879 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); see also id., at 278, 110 S.Ct., at 2851 (majority opinion), and physical confinement, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-83, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785-1787, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). This enduring tradition of American constitutional practice is, in Justice Harlan's view, nothing more than what is required by the judicial authority and obligation to construe constitutional text and review legislation for conformity to that text. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Like many judges who preceded him and many who followed, he found it impossible to construe the text of due process without recognizing substantive, and not merely procedural, limitations. "Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.'' Poe, 367 U.S., at 541, 81 S.Ct., at 1775.7 The text of the Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less than an obligation to give substantive content to the words "liberty'' and "due process of law.''

Following the first point of the Poe dissent, on the necessity to engage in the sort of examination we conduct today, the dissent's second and third implicitly address those cases, already noted, that are now condemned with virtual unanimity as disastrous mistakes of substantive due process review. The second of the dissent's lessons is a reminder that the business of such review is not the identification of extratextual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the history of our values as a people. It is a comparison of the relative strengths of opposing claims that informs the judicial task, not a deduction from some first premise. Thus informed, judicial review still has no warrant to substitute one reasonable resolution of the contending positions for another, but authority to supplant the balance already struck between the contenders only when it falls outside the realm of the reasonable. Part III, below, deals with this second point, and also with the dissent's third, which takes the form of an object lesson in the explicit attention to detail that is no less essential to the intellectual discipline of substantive due process review than an understanding of the basic need to account for the two sides in the controversy and to respect legislation within the zone of reasonableness.

My understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and subsequent cases avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific level. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-849, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2804-2806, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). That understanding begins with a concept of "ordered liberty,'' Poe, 367 U.S., at 549, 81 S.Ct., at 1780 (Harlan, J.); see also Griswold, 381 U.S., at 500, 85 S.Ct., at 1690, comprising a continuum of rights to be free from "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,'' Poe, 367 U.S., at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1777 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

"Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.'' Id., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776.

See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) ("Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society''') (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S., at 501, 85 S.Ct., at 1691 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

After the Poe dissent, as before it, this enforceable concept of liberty would bar statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental restraints are undeniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (economic legislation "not . . . unconstitutional unless . . . facts . . . preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis''); see also Poe, 367 U.S., at 545, 548, 81 S.Ct., at 1778, 1779-1780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to usual "presumption of constitutionality'' and ordinary test "going merely to the plausibility of [a statute's] underlying rationale''). Such instances are suitably rare. The claims of arbitrariness that mark almost all instances of unenumerated substantive rights are those resting on "certain interests requir[ing] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma [ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)]; Bolling v. Sharpe, [347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954)],'' id., at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1777; that is, interests in liberty sufficiently important to be judged "fundamental,'' id., at 548, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780; see also id., at 541, 81 S.Ct., at 1775-1776 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371, 380 (C.C.E.D.Pa.1823)). In the face of an interest this powerful a State may not rest on threshold rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted. Poe, supra, at 548, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (an "enactment involv[ing] . . . a most fundamental aspect of "liberty' . . . [is] subjec[t] to "strict scrutiny''') (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S., at 541, 62 S.Ct., at 1113);8 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1446-1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (reaffirming that due process "forbids the government to infringe certain "fundamental' liberty interests . . . unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest'').9

This approach calls for a court to assess the relative "weights'' or dignities of the contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar to the common law. Common law method is subject, however, to two important constraints in the hands of a court engaged in substantive due process review. First, such a court is bound to confine the values that it recognizes to those truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those expressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by "the traditions from which [the Nation] developed,'' or revealed by contrast with "the traditions from which it broke.'' Poe, 367 U.S., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776 (Harlan, J., dissenting). ""We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits . . . derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process . . . [,] considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.''' Id., at 544-545, 81 S.Ct., at 1778 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-171, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208-209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S., at 325, 58 S.Ct., at 152 (looking to ""principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental''') (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)).

The second constraint, again, simply reflects the fact that constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking, is a court's business here. The weighing or valuing of contending interests in this sphere is only the first step, forming the basis for determining whether the statute in question falls inside or outside the zone of what is reasonable in the way it resolves the conflict between the interests of state and individual. See, e.g., Poe, supra, at 553, 81 S.Ct., at 1782 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-321, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2460-2461, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). It is no justification for judicial intervention merely to identify a reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the terms of the legislation under review. It is only when the legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way. Only if this standard points against the statute can the individual claimant be said to have a constitutional right. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S., at 279, 110 S.Ct., at 2851-2852 (" [D]etermining that a person has a "liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; "whether [the individual's] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests''') (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at 321, 102 S.Ct., at 2461).10

The Poe dissent thus reminds us of the nature of review for reasonableness or arbitrariness and the limitations entailed by it. But the opinion cautions against the repetition of past error in another way as well, more by its example than by any particular statement of constitutional method: it reminds us that the process of substantive review by reasoned judgment, Poe, 367 U.S., at 542-544, 81 S.Ct., at 1776-1778, is one of close criticism going to the details of the opposing interests and to their relationships with the historically recognized principles that lend them weight or value.

Although the Poe dissent disclaims the possibility of any general formula for due process analysis (beyond the basic analytic structure just described), see id., at 542, 544, 81 S.Ct., at 1776, 1777-1778, Justice Harlan of course assumed that adjudication under the Due Process Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent on common-law method, being more or less persuasive according to the usual canons of critical discourse. See also Casey, 505 U.S., at 849, 112 S.Ct., at 2805-2806 ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment''). When identifying and assessing the competing interests of liberty and authority, for example, the breadth of expression that a litigant or a judge selects in stating the competing principles will have much to do with the outcome and may be dispositive. As in any process of rational argumentation, we recognize that when a generally accepted principle is challenged, the broader the attack the less likely it is to succeed. The principle's defenders will, indeed, often try to characterize any challenge as just such a broadside, perhaps by couching the defense as if a broadside attack had occurred. So the Court in Dred Scott treated prohibition of slavery in the Territories as nothing less than a general assault on the concept of property. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., at 449-452.

Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the selections of statements of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for the selections made. It is here that the value of common-law method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples. The "tradition is a living thing,'' Poe, 367 U.S., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776 (Harlan, J., dissenting), albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully taken. "The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.'' Id., at 544, 81 S.Ct., at 1777 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exact analysis and characterization of any due process claim is critical to the method and to the result.

So, in Poe, Justice Harlan viewed it as essential to the plaintiffs' claimed right to use contraceptives that they sought to do so within the privacy of the marital bedroom. This detail in fact served two crucial and complementary functions, and provides a lesson for today. It rescued the individuals' claim from a breadth that would have threatened all state regulation of contraception or intimate relations; extramarital intimacy, no matter how privately practiced, was outside the scope of the right Justice Harlan would have recognized in that case. See id., at 552-553, 81 S.Ct., at 1781-1782. It was, moreover, this same restriction that allowed the interest to be valued as an aspect of a broader liberty to be free from all unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of the home and the family life within it, a liberty exemplified in constitutional provisions such as the Third and Fourth Amendments, in prior decisions of the Court involving unreasonable intrusions into the home and family life, and in the then-prevailing status of marriage as the sole lawful locus of intimate relations. Id., at 548, 551, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780, 1781.11 The individuals' interest was therefore at its peak in Poe, because it was supported by a principle that distinguished of its own force between areas in which government traditionally had regulated (sexual relations outside of marriage) and those in which it had not (private marital intimacies), and thus was broad enough to cover the claim at hand without being so broad as to be shot-through by exceptions.

On the other side of the balance, the State's interest in Poe was not fairly characterized simply as preserving sexual morality, or doing so by regulating contraceptive devices. Just as some of the earlier cases went astray by speaking without nuance of individual interests in property or autonomy to contract for labor, so the State's asserted interest in Poe was not immune to distinctions turning (at least potentially) on the precise purpose being pursued and the collateral consequences of the means chosen, see id., at 547-548, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780. It was assumed that the State might legitimately enforce limits on the use of contraceptives through laws regulating divorce and annulment, or even through its tax policy, ibid., but not necessarily be justified in criminalizing the same practice in the marital bedroom, which woul