Absent. TODD, J.

THIS was an appeal by Manuel Pinto, from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of New York, affirming (pro forma) the sentence of the District Court which condemned that part of the cargo which was claimed by him.

The facts of the case are thus stated by the chief justice in delivering the opinion of the Court.

Manuel Pinto, a native of Buenos Ayres, being in London, on the 26th of August, 1813, entered into a contract with John Drinkald, owner of the ship 'Nereide,' whereof William Bennett was master, whereby the said Drinkald let to the said Pinto the said vessel to freight for a voyage to Buenos Ayres and back again to London, on the conditions mentioned in the charter party. The owner convenanted that the said vessel, being in all respects sea-worthy, well manned, victualed, equipped, provided, and furnished with all things needful for such a vessel, should take on board a cargo to be provided for her, that the master should sign the customary bills of lading, and that the said ship being laden and dispatched, should join and sail with the first convoy that should depart from Great Britain for Buenos Ayres: that on his arrival the master should give notice thereof to the agents or assigns of the said freighter, and make delivery of the cargo according to bills of lading; and that the said ship, being in all respects sea-worthy, manned, &c. as before mentioned, should take and receive on board at Buenos Ayres all such lawful cargo as they should tender for that purpose, for which the master should sign the customary bills of lading: and the ship being laden and dispartched, should sail and make the best of her way back to London, and on her arrival deliver her cargo according to the bills of lading. For unloading the outward and taking in the homeward cargo, the owner agreed to allow 90 running days, and for unloading the return cargo 15 running days. The owner also agreed that the freighter and one other person whom he might appoint should have their passage without being chargeable therefor. In consideration of the premises the freighter agreed to send, or cause to be sent along side of the ship, such lawful goods as he might have to ship, or could procure from others, and dispatch her therewith in time to join and sail with the first convoy, and on her arrival at Buenos Ayres to receive the cargo according to bills of lading, and afterwards to send along side of the ship a return cargo and dispatch her to London, and on her arrival receive the cargo according to bills of lading, and to pay freight as follows, viz. for the outward cargo 700l. together with five per cent. primage, to be paid on signing the bills of lading, and for the homeward, or return cargo, at the rate mentioned in the charter party. He was also to advance the master at Buenos Ayres, such money as might be necessary for disbursements on the ship. It was provided that all the freight of the outward cargo, except on the goods belonging to the freighter, which should not exceed 400l. should be received by the owner on the bills of lading being signed; and in case of the loss of the ship such freight should be his property; but if she arrived safe back with a full cargo, then the freighter should be credited for the excess of the said freight over and above the sum of 700l. A delay of 10 running days over and above the time stipulated is allowed the freighter, he paying for such demurrage at the rate of 10l 10s per day.

Under this contract a cargo, belonging in part to the freighter, in part to other inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, and in part of British subjects, was taken on board the Nereide, and she sailed under convoy some time in November, 1813.

Her license, or passport, dated the 16th of November, states her to mount 10 guns and to be manned by 16 men.

The letter of instructions from the owner to the master is dated on the 24th of November, and contains this passage: 'Mr. Pinto is to advance you what money you require for ship's use at River Plate, and you will consider yourself as under his directions so far as the charter party requires.'

On the voyage, the Nereide was separated from her convoy, and on the 19th of December, 1813, when in sight of Madeira, fell in with, and after an action of about fifteen minutes, was captured by the American privateer 'The Governor Tompkins.' She was brought into the port of New York, where vessel and cargo were libelled; and the vessel and that part of the cargo which belonged to British subjects were condemned without a claim. That part of the cargo which belonged to Spaniards was claimed by Manuel Pinto, partly for himself and partners, residing in Buenos Ayres, and partly for the other owners residing in the same place. On the hearing, this part of the cargo was also condemned. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where the sentence of the District Court was affirmed, pro forma, and from that sentence an appeal has been prayed to this Court.

HOFFMAN, of New York, for the Appellant.

It is true this vessel was armed, but Pinto had no agency in arming her. She was an armed vessel as early at least as May, 1811, before the war between the United States and Great Britain. It is true she sailed with convoy, but this she was obliged by law to do. It is true also that she resisted the capturing vessel; but neither Pinto, who was a passenger on board, nor any other neutral passenger, gave any aid in the engagement.

The claim of Pinto, in behalf of himself, his father and sister, who were jointly interested with him in the business which he carried on in his own name, was of three descriptions of goods.

1st. Of goods of which they were the sole owners.

2d. Of goods of which they owned one undivided morety, the other being owned by British merchants.

3d. Of goods in which they claimed an interest of one-fourth, the residue being British property.

As to this last claim he is charged with mala fides, because in his examination in preparatorio he stated without qualification that he was the owner of one-fourth part of those goods, whereas in his claim and test affidavit he states the fact to be that he had agreed with certain British merchants, that if they would give him 10 per cent. upon the sales, he would select for them such goods as would sell, at Buenos Ayres, at an advance of 150 per cent. upon their cost and charges; that he selected these goods under that contract; that his commissions would have amounted to one-fourth of the original cost, and to that extent he believed himself interested therein.

There was no attempt to impose upon the Court, he voluntarily explained the nature of his interest; if he was mistaken as to the legal effect of such a contract, yet no improper motive can be attributed to him.

Neither Pinto, nor any person connected with him, joined in the battle. If he had done so, he might have been considered as taking part in the war, and thereby excluding himself from the protection to which he is now entitled by the law of nations. He remained in the cabin during the whole engagement, and had no concern whatever in the defence of the ship. It is true that he states upon his examination in preparatorio, 'that he belonged to the ship at the time of her capture, and had control of said ship and cargo.' But his answers were written by the commissioner, and he being a foreigner, probably did not abserve the force of the expression. The nature of his control is explained by all the other circumstances of the case to be a control within the limits of the charter party. It is evident he could have no lawful control over the management of the ship from the time of her sailing from London until her arrival at Buenos Ayres. The letter of instructions from the owner of the ship to the master, shows that the master was under the direction of Pinto so far only as the charter party required.

It has been heretofore said that Pinto bad acquired a hostile character arising from domicil. There is, however, no ground for such a pretence. It is true that in the charter party he is said to be 'of Buenos Ayres, but 'now residing in the city of London;' and in his examination in preparatorio, he states 'that for seven years last past he has lived and resided in England and Buenos 'Ayres.' But he at the same time states that he is a native of Buenos Ayres, that he now lives there, and has generally lived there for 35 years, and has been admitted a freeman under the new government of Buenos Ayres. Even if he had acquired a domicil in England, which is not true, yet he had turned his back on that country and was on his voyage home. 5 Ves. Jun. 787 Somerville v. Somerville. Pinto's test affidavit shows particularly that his birth, residence, and commercial establishment had always been at Buenos Ayres, except during his occasional temporary absences in his commercial pursuits. The test affidavit is always good evidence in prize causes. The party is obliged to put in his claim upon oath, and it is to be taken as true until contradicted by better evidence.

The Court is now for the first time called upon to decide the question whether neutral property forfeits its character of neutrality by being put on board an armed ship of the enemy?

The general rule is that the property of a friend in a hostile vessel is not liable to condemnation.

There are but two exceptions to the neutral right to trade.

1. He shall not carry contraband of war.

2. He shall not violate a blockade.

If the sailing in an armed vessel of the enemy had been also an exception, it would unquestionably have been noticed by some writer upon the law of nations. But no such exception is to be found in the books.

If such be the doctrine, what degree of force will be sufficient to forfeit the neutral character of the goods? If she carried a single musket, the principle must be the same as if she mounted fifty cannon. And sailing under convoy would be still more clearly within the rule.

Vattel, b. 3, c. 5, § 75, lays down the general principle thus: 'Since it is not the place where a thing is, which determines the nature of that thing, but the quality of the person to whom it belongs; things, belonging to neutral persons, which happen to be in an enemy's country, or the enemy's ships, are to be distinguished from those belonging to the enemy.'

No hint is given that a distinction is to be taken between the armed and unarmed ships of the enemy. Again in b. 3, c. 7, § 116, he says, 'the effects of neutrals found in an enemy's ship, are to be restored to the owners, against whom there is no right of confiscation.' See also Duponceau's Bynkershoek, 102, 108. 2 Azuni, 194. Chitty, 111. Ward, 21. Mr. Jefferson's letter to M. Genet, 24th January, 1793, among our own state papers, in the department of state.

This Court will not, in contradiction to all these authorities, make a new exception to the rights of neutral commerce. The policy of this country is to extend, not to impair them. A neutral aids the belligerent much more by carrying belligerent property, than by employing a belligerent vessel to carry neutral goods; yet the neutral vessel carrying the belligerent goods, is always restored, and with freight, unless she forfeit her neutral character by her hostile conduct. The neutral character may be forfeited by fraudulent conduct of the master—by violation of blockade—by carrying contraband goods—by false destination and by resisting search. These are the only exceptions to the general rule that the property of a friend must be restored. But there must be an actual or an implied connivance between the master of the vessel, and the neutral owner of the goods in order to subject the neutral cargo to condemnation for the acts of the master. 1 Rob. 67, (Am. ed.) the Mercurius. Id. 130, the Columbia. Id. 277, the Jonge Tobias. 5 Rob. 234, the Shepherdess. In the case of the Maria (the Swedish convoy) the merchant vessels had received orders from the convoy to resist search.

The unneutral character of a master shall not forfeit neutral property on board a neutral vessel. Can you then punish the innocent neutral for the legal exercise, by the hostile master of a belligerent vessel, of his rights of war?

If this property is to be condemned, it must be on the ground of resistance; for it is understood that it has been decided by this Court that shipping neutral property on board an armed neutral vessel even, will not subject it to condemnation. If resistance be not the ground on which condemnation is claimed, then in a case where no resistance is made, if neutral property be found on board an enemy's ship armed merely for resisting the piratical boats of South America, it is liable to condemnation.

It is true that a neutral cannot lawfully rescue his ship captured by a belligerent, because he has redress by the law of nations if he has been improperly captured, 3 Rob. 227 (Am. ed.) the Dispatch. 1 Rob. 287, the Maria. But here the force was not used by a neutral. The ship owner and the master were open and avowed enemies, and as such had a perfect right to defend their ship by force. It was a lawful force. 5 Rob. 206, Catharina Elizabeth.

But it will be said that the right to search is impaired.

The right of search is applicable only to a neutral ship. In case of a belligerent ship, the right of search is superseded by the right of capture. The privateer had a right to capture the Nereide, but, strictly speaking, had no right to search her. Pinto, by placing his goods on board a hostile ship, made them certainly liable to capture, although not to condemnation. He gave us the right of capture in lieu of the right of search.

The putting of neutral goods on board an armed vessel of the enemy, is analagous to the placing them in a fortified town. If they are placed there before investment, they are not liable to condemnation, if captured; but if placed there after investment they are liable.

But it will be contended that the fifteenth article of the treaty of 1795, between Spain and the United States, (Laws of the United States, vol. 2, p. 526,) has altered the rule of the law of nations on this subject, and that neutral Spanish goods found on board an enemy's ship are liable to condemnation as enemy's goods.

The words of the article are, 'And it is hereby stipulated that free ships shall also give freedom to goods; and that every thing shall be deemed free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the contracting parties, although the whole lading, or any part thereof, should appertain to the enemies of either; contraband goods being always excepted.'

It will be contended, that if free ships make free goods, enemy's ships must make enemy's goods.

But we contend, that although by the treaty free ships make free goods, yet the rule of the law of nations still remains in full force, that free goods found in an enemy's ship are also free. Nothing but an express stipulation in a treaty can deprive the Spanish subject of his rights under the law of nations. The treaty contains no such express stipulation. The article stipulated does not necessarily imply its converse. The two rules are not inconsistent with each other. The neutral nation is entitled to the benefit of both. Ward, 145.

In some of our treaties will be found express stipulations as to both points; in others as to one of the points only; which fact shows that the two propositions are not considered as inseparable. The treaty of 1782, with Holland, adopts both rules—free ships are to make free goods, and hostile ships, hostile goods. So also does the convention of 1800 with France. Vol. 6, appendix, p. 22.

As to the Spanish ordinance of Spain, cited in 2 Azuni, 139, which declares even the goods of Spanish subjects to be good prize if found on board an enemy's ship, it is a mere municipal regulation and does not appear to have been adopted in practice against the citizens of the United States, even if it were in its terms applicable to them.

It is said that Spain would condemn our goods found on board her enemy's ships, and therefore, upon the principle of reciprocity, we ought to condemn her goods found on board the ships of our enemy. But the principle of reciprocity applies only to the case of salvage. It is not a rule of the law of nations as to prize of war.

The proprietary interest of Pinto, his father and sister, and of the other merchants of Buenos Ayres in whose behalf he has interposed a claim, cannot be disputed. Their national character is clearly made out. The goods are not liable to forfeiture, either on account of his residence in London, or the character of the ship, or the opposition which she made, or by the treaty of Spain, or the principle of reciprocity. They ought therefore to be restored; and without payment of the duties, inasmuch as it was not a voluntary importation.

DALLAS, contra, for the captors,

Contended, that there was evidence tending to show that Pinto, had caused the ship to be armed, and had caused sundry British passengers to be taken on board, some of whom fought in the battle. That he had acquired a British character by domicil; and that he had not renounced that character by turning his back on England, inasmuch as he meant to return.

That Pinto must be considered as the owner of the vessel for the voyage, and as having a control over her in regard to her resistance.

He admitted that neutrals have a right to carry on their accustomed trade in the usual manner, and to employ the merchant vessels of the enemy for that purpose; but not to arm a hostile vessel, nor to hire a hostile vessel already armed.

1. That the property cannot be restored without further proof, both on the subject of domicil and on that of proprietary interest. And that, under the circumstances of this case, Pinto is not entitled to time for further proof.

2. That by force of the treaty between Spain and the United States, taken in connexion with the existing law of Spain, the property is liable to condemnation.

3. That a neutral connot lawfully hire an armed vessel of our enemy, and in the course of that trade engage in battle with the United States.

1. As to further proof respecting his domicle.

In his examination in preparatorio he states, that for the last seven years he resided in England and Buenos Ayres. This fact stood unexplained upon the record for nearly month. He then states in his test affidavit that he was then a resident of Buenos Ayres, where he had generally resided for 35 years; but says nothing in explanation of his former assertion, that he had resided the last seven years in England and Buenos Ayres. Why did he not state how long he had resided in each place? This leaves a doubt, which the Court would permit him to explain, if he stood fair in Court. The charter party also states him to be then a resident in England.

Then as to his proprietary interest, he first swears that he is the sole owner; but afterwards contradicts himself, and says he made a mistake, and that his father and sister are jointly interested with him in the property. Again, he first states the printing aparatus to be his property, and afterwards admits that it belonged to British subjects.

With regard to the one-fourth which he claimed of sundry parcels of goods, he first swears that it belongs to him absolutely, and afterwards states that he was only entitled to a commission upon the sales of them. So also with regard to an invoice of buttons, be first claimed them as his own, and afterwards disclaimed them as British property.

Again his testimony is contradicted by Puzey, his confidential clerk, who testifies that part of the property claimed by Pinto, belonged to the government of Buenos Ayres.

It is certain then that the evidence is not clear in his favor, as to his domicil, and as to his proprietary interest.

Is he entitled to further proof?

He has hired an armed vessel of the enemy which has fought an American vessel, and would have captured her if she had been able. There is no case in which restitution has been awarded under such circumstances. Suppose an American frigate had captured a British frigate laden with specie belonging to the Spanish government, would it have been restored? How was it in the case of the Peacock and the Epervier?

Pinto chartered the whole ship. He permitted every thing to be put on board; the hostile property as well as the neutral. He was to receive freight for the hostile property, and a higher freight on account of the armament. He knew that if this armament was employed to protect the neutral property it would protect the hostile also. He impliedly undertook that the enemy's property should be protected. He was therefore interested in so doing, and identified his interest with that of the belligerent. The armament was clearly intended to be used against the Americans, as all the cruizers of France had been driven from the ocean, and never appeared in those southern latitudes.

He says in his examination that he was interested in the vessel and cargo and freight; and in a subsequent answer he states that he had the control of the ship and cargo. It is clear therefore that he participated in the belligerent character, and is not entitled to further proof. See 6 Rob. 460, the Atlantic.

2. As to the effect of the Spanish treaty, in connexion with the existing law of Spain.

The treaty says that 'free ships shall make free goods.' This implies the converse proposition that hostile ships shall make hostile goods.

This treaty followed the memorable discussion which took place between this government and Genet, 1793. At that time we had a treaty with Prussia, (2 Vot. Laws U. S. 308, art. 12.) which contains the same stipulation that free ships shall make free goods; but is silent as to the converse proposition. The two treaties are to be construed alike. Genet complained that we permitted the British to take French goods out of our vessels. Mr. Jefferson was one of the negotiators of that treaty, and it is clear that he understood it as implying that enemy ships should make enemy goods. See his letters as secretary of state to Mr. Genet, of 24th July, 1793, and to Mr. Morris of the 16th of August, 1793. The administration of our government constituted, at that time, perhaps as wise a cabinet as ever existed. This treaty was their act. The proper construction must be that the converse rule is implied. Ward, 144 145.

But when the treaty is taken in connexion with the existing law of Spain at the time of making the treaty, there can be no doubt. By that law enemy ships make enemy goods. 2 Azuni 139. The Mr. Debron there mentioned was a Spaniard. There were two ordinances one in 1704, the other in 1718. They are referred to in 2 Valin, 252. b. 3. tit. 9. art. 7. As to these ordinances, it is singular that they do not say that the goods of a friend in an enemy's ship shall be liable to confiscation; but that the goods of a Spanish subject in an enemy's ship shall be so liable. This however implies the other proposition; for if the goods of their own subjects were so liable, the goods of a friend would, a fortiori, be liable.

It is said that these ordinances have not been enforced against us. But we are not bound to show that fact. It is sufficient for us that the law exists.

Reciprocity is the permanent basis of the law of nations.

3. If a neutral hire an armed vessel of our enemy, and with armed force resist our belligerent rights, he forfeits his neutral character.

A neutral may pursue his accustomed trade in his usual manner; but the law of nations allows nothing further.

It has been said that the only test of neutrality is impartiality to the belligerents. This is true only in a national point of view. But when individuals are concerned, a very different test applies. (See the case of the Tulip.) A neutral cannot justify furnishing one belligerent with transports, by furnishing them to the other also. (See Vattel, b. 3. ch. 7. § 109. 110, where will be found the whole doctrine of the law of nations on this subject.)

The general rule is that nothing shall be done by a neutral to invigorate the belligerent.

A right of peaceful commerce is not a right to set forth a warlike expedition. On that principle a government might be neutral and all its subjects belligerent. The words of the elementary writers are to be construed according to the subject upon which they treat. They all speak of a peaceable merchant vessel, not an armed vessel.

Neutrals, says sir W. Scott, may trade in the same manner as before the war, provided they take no direct part in the contest. It is not necessary to show that the party actually put a match to the guns. This vessel was forced into action by Pinto; at all events she was brought into action by means of Pinto. He had a direct part in the contest.

The authority cited from Bynkershoek, is in our favor, if we interpret the words according to the subject matter. He says a neutral may let as well as hire a vessel, but it must be a lawful letting and hiring. He did not mean to say that a neutral may carry on a peaceful trade in a hostile manner. In the next sentence he says you may employ the vessel and the labor of the belligerent.

It is clear that he means an unarmed vessel.

What are the rights of the belligerent in regard to the neutral?

He may search the vessel, the cargo and the papers. We have reason to complain of a neutral who puts a cargo like this (a great part being belligerent) on board a belligerent armed vessel, whereby our right of search is eluded, without a battle. A neutral may, indeed, if he can, elude the right of search by superior sailing, but he cannot lawfully prevent it by force.

In the case cited from 5 Rob. 206, there is not evidence that the vessel was armed. If the fact had been so it would undoubtedly have been mentioned by the reporter, or the judge. Their silence shows that it was not armed.

The slightest recourse to belligerent force in support of neutral rights is fatal. A neutral vessel may arm, but she cannot resist belligerent rights. A neutral must not directly nor indirectly contribute to the force of an enemy. In 1 Rob. 287, the Maria, it is decided that resistance of the convoy ship is the resistance of the whole convoy; and that the resistance of the ship affects the cargo. In the case of the Elsebe, 5 Rob. 174, (Eng. Ed.) one of the questions was whether the cargoes, belonging to subjects of the Hans Towns, laden on board Swedish vessels, and sailing under Swedish convoy, were liable to condemnation? the convoying ships having resisted search by the Britsh fleet. It was contended on their behalf that they were not involved in the penalties of Swedish resistance, which was an act of the Swedish government, and did not bind the subjects of other powers; that the proprietors of these cargoes were not privy to this fact; and that the masters of the vessels were not the agents of the cargoes, so as to bind them. Sir William Scott, after stating that there was in the charter party an express stipulation that the ship should sail with convoy, says, 'But I will take the case on the supposition that there was no such engagement. The master associates himself with a convoy, the instructions of which he must be supposed to know; he puts the goods under unlawful protection, and it must be presumed that this is done with due authority from the owners, and for their benefit. It is not the case of an unforeseen emergency happening to the ship at sea, where the fact itself proves the owners to be ignorant and innocent; and where the Court has held, that being proved innocent by the very circumstances of the case, they shall not be bound by the mere principle of law which imposes on the employer a responsibility for the acts of his agent. On the contrary it is a matter done antecedently to the voyage, and must therefore be presumed to be done on communication with the owners and with their consent; and the effect of this presumption is such that it cannot be permitted to be averred against; in as much as all the evidence must come from the suspected parties themselves, without affording a possibility of meeting it, however prepared. The Court has, therefore, thought it not unreasonable to apply the strict principle of law, in a case not entitled to any favor, and holds, as it does in blockade cases of that description, that the master must be taken to be the authorized agent of the cargo, that he has acted under powers from his employer, and that if he has exceeded his authority, it is barratry, for which he is personally answerable, and for which the owner must look to him for indemnification. I pass over many considerations which have been properly pressed in argument; but I cannot omit to observe that this is not merely a question arising on a single fact of limited consequence; it is a pretention of infinite importance, and of great extent, being nothing less than an opposition to the general law of search, by which, if it could in one instance be admitted, the whole provisions of the law of nations on that head might be effectually defied; for if this principle could be maintained, by an interchage of convoys the whole unlawful business might be carried on with security. To put the goods of one country on board the ships of another, would be a complete recipe for the safety of the goods with a trifling alteration, easily understood, and easily practiced, while the mischief itself would exist in full force.'

The same principle was afterwards advanced by the Danish government, in relation to American ships sailing under British convoy, and acquiesced in by the American government. See the letter from our minister, Mr. Irvin, to the secretary of state of 23d June, 1811, and the letter from the Swedish minister, Rosencrantz, to Mr. Irvin, of the 28th of June, 1811. State papers, p. 224, 235.

A neutral cannot employ the force of his own government, nor that of another neutral, much less that of a belligerent, to protect himself from search. If you cannot make use of the convey, you cannot take the guns of that convoy and protect yourself. It is not the modification of the force, but the force itself that is unlawful. If a neutral, insured as such, range himself under convoy, the policy is vacated.

This case is not like that of neutral goods put into a fortified town before investment: it is more like that of goods placed there after investment. They were put on board with a full knowledge that the vessel would be invested, (if a land term may be permitted in speaking of a naval transaction) that is, that she would be liable to search.

PINKNEY, on the same side,

Contended that this property ought to be condemned upon three grounds.

1. The treaty with Spain.

2. The principle of reciprocity; and,

3. The conduct of Pinto in hiring an armed vessel of the enemy, which made resistance1. As to the Spanish treaty. It contains the stipulation that 'free ships shall make free goods,' and it does not negative the converse proposition that enemy ships shall make enemy goods. Hence we are at liberty to give the stipulation its full extent and scope.

This principle was first attempted to be established by Holland immediately after the treaty of Munster. They sought to establish by treaty that the flag should communicate its character to the cargo. This was the original form of the proposition. It necessarily involved the principle that hostile ships should make hostile goods. How preposterous would it be to say that neutral ships should make neutral goods, but enemy's ships should not make enemy's goods.

It is the universal understanding among nations that the two propositions are mutually connected, and the one implies the other. It might have been necessary in the outset to express both, but when the principle was generally understood, that necessity ceased. The United States had no interest in extending the range of the principle; and in all her treaties, except those with Spain and Prussia, she has stipulated for both parts of the rule. There is no reason, either in the commercial or belligerent policy of the United States, which should induce her to stop short with the proposition that free ships should make free goods, and not go on to adopt the converse.

Spain had no motive to adopt the principle with the limitation under consideration. In her treaties with France, Holland and England, she adopts the principle in its whole extent. She took it with the qualification that neutrals should not put their goods on board a belligerent vessel. In her treaty with England she expresses only the converse, viz: that 'enemy ships shall make enemy goods.'

It has been said that she limited the principle by according to the armed neutrality; but that was a mere ephemeral act, and its validity depended upon an event which never happened—the accession of England.

2. As to the law of Spain and the principle of reciprocity. In the ordinance of 1702 it appears to be her favorite principle that 'enemy ships shall make enemy goods.' In the ordinance of 1718 the same principle is adopted and ordered to be carried into execution. These ordinances were re-enacted in 1739, 1756, 1779, 1794 and 1796. The treaty now under consideration was wedged in between two of these ordinances; those of 1794 and 1796. Is it possible that Spain, the declared enemy of neutral rights, meant to recognize a principle like this, which had never before been taken under the protection of any nation? Are we to suppose that Spain, by this treaty, meant to abandon her own local law? Spain has had this principle in abhorrence. By her ordnance of 1718 she says that if any part of the cargo is hostile it shall communicate its character to the ship and all the residue of the cargo. This principle cannot be understood but in the manner for which we contend.

By the law of Spain, therefore, this property would be liable to condemnation.

By the rule of reciprocity it ought to be condemned here.

But it is objected that the Spanish law has never been enforced against us. It is sufficient for us to show that it exists. In the absence of contrary proof the presumption is that it has been executed.

It is said also that the rule of reciprocity applies only to the case of re-capture and salvage. But sir W. Scott, in the Santa Cruz, (1 Rob. 53, Am. Ed.) says that 'this principle of reciprocity is by no means peculiar to cases of re-capture: it is found also to operate in other cases of maritime law: at the breaking out of a war it is the constant practice of this country to condemn property seized before the war, if the enemy condemns, and to restore if the enemy restores. It is a principle sanctioned by the great foundation of the law of England, magna charta itself; which prescribes that at the commencement of a war the enemy's merchants shall be kept and treated as our own merchants are treated in their country.'The principle of reciprocity has been distinctly recognized and adopted by the law of Spain. Holland remonstrated, but Spain answered that Holland had not resisted the maritime principles of England. The same answer was received from France when we complained of the Berlin and Milan decrees. The British orders in council also were founded upon the same principle. Great Britain attempted to justify them by the assertion that we acquiesced in the Berlin and Milan decrees. The assertion was not true; but it shows that Great Britain acknowledged the rule of reciprocity as a rule of the law of nations.

3. As to the armament and resistance.

The undisputed facts are that Pinto hired the whole vessel, and took in goods on freight for his own benefit. That the vessel was armed, sailed, resisted, and was captured.

It is contended that he could lawfully do all this. If he could, he was a 'chartered libertine.' Can a neutral surround himself 'with all the pomp and circumstance of war?' The idea of our opponents exhibits a discordia rerum—an incongruous mixture of discordant attributes; a centaur-like figure—half man, half ship; a phantastic form, bearing in one hand the spear of Achilles, in the other the olive branch of Minerva; the frown of defiance on her brow, and the smile of conciliation on her lip, entwining the olive branch of peace around the thunderbolt of Jupiter, and hurling it, thus disguised, indiscriminately at friends and foes.

From the authorities cited on the other side, an inference is attempted to be drawn that a neutral may lawfully employ an armed merchant vessel of the enemy to transport his goods. But none of those authorities speak of an armed vessel. Such a vessel unquestionably has power to make captures. If she has a commission, the captures are for her own benefit; if she has no commission, she captures for the crown. Her prizes are droits of admiralty. It is true that if she sails without a pass, or some document to show her national character, she would be considered as a pirate; but this vessel had a British pass. If all neutrals may lawfully hire such vessels, the ocean may be covered with them, and they might more effectually aid the enemy than his own navy.

Bynkershoek says the neutral must do nothing to the prejudice of the belligerent. It is incumbent, therefore, upon Pinto to show that he did us no prejudice by chartering such an armed vessel. We say he thereby infringed our right of search. It is said that the right of search is a right to search the ship only. But why search the ship? To see what sort of a cargo she has. The cargo, therefore, must be searched as well as the ship. A neutral cannot carry contraband goods, nor violate blockade, nor carry his own property if it be the produce of his estate in the enemy's country. To prevent this the belligerent has a right to stop and search his cargo. In this case it is the hostile character of the vessel which constitutes the offence, in as much as it prevented our right of seach.

In the case of the Elsebe the cargo was forfeited by sailing under convoy which resisted search. Pinto falls by the fate of war. He identified himself with a hostile armament; he knew the necessary consequence of his act; he knew it would be the duty of the ship to resist; and that resistance would be made if there should be any chance of escape thereby. He must be either at peace or war. He cannot claim the advantages of both conditions at the same time.

EMMETT, in reply,

After removing the objections which had been raised as to the British domicil of Pinto, and as to some variations between his testimony in preparatorio and his test affidavit, &c. observed,

As to the treaty with Spain, that the maxim 'free ships shall make free goods,' does not imply the converse, that hostile ships shall make hostile goods. There is certainly no necessary connexion between the two maxims, nor have they ever been supposed to be necessarily connected. The one is the claim of a neutral, the other of a belligerent. What is the rule of justice? That free ships should make free goods, and that free goods, in belligerent ships, should be free also. Whenever the two maxims have been connected in a treaty, it has been where one of the maxims was important to one of the parties as a neutral nation, and the other to the other party as a belligerent nation.

In the treaty of the armed neutrality in 1780, the interest of the Dutch was to have the benefit of both maxims. The Dutch idea however was discarded by the northern confederacy, and the two maxims completely separated. The empress of Russia in her manifesto of the 26th of February, 1780, declaring the principles which she intended to follow, states this principle in the following words, 'That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandize.' But she says nothing respecting neutral goods found on board belligerent vessels. It cannot be supposed that she meant to surrender her neutral rights by mere implication. The principle is expressed in nearly the same words in the treaty of armed neutrality of 1780; nothing is there said respecting neutral goods in belligerent vessels. The king of Prussia, however, in his answer to the Russian manifesto, explicitly claims the freedom of neutral goods on board belligerent ships, as well as of belligerent goods on board of neutral ships. These facts show that in the general understanding of all Europe, the two maxims were entirely distinct and independent. See also Martens's Law of Nations, transtated by Cobbet, 318. The United States did not exist as a nation until after the two maxims were thus completely separated.

Only three of the treaties by the United States have been produced on the other side. There are in fact eight in which the principle is mentioned. 1. The treaty with France of the 6th of February, 1778, vol. 1, p. 398, which expressly adopts both maxims; the United States having in that instance yielded to the belligerent claim of France. 2. The treaty with Holland of the 8th of October, 1782, vol. 1, p. 456. 3. The treaty with Sweden of 3d April, 1783, vol. 2, p. 256, adopts only the maxim that free ships shall make free goods. 4. The treaty with Prussia of 1785, vol. 2, p. 320, which adopts the principle free ships, &c. only. 5. The treaty with Morocco, 1787, vol. 2, p. 369, which stipulates that free ships shall make free goods, and that neutral goods on board of belligerent vessels shall be free. This latter stipulation was necessary, in as much as the Barbary powers pay little respect in practice to the law of nations. 6. The treaty of 1795, with the Dey of Algiers, vol. 2, p. 500, which adopts the maxim, free ships, free goods. 7. The treaty with Spain of 1795, vol. 2, p. 526, adopts the same maxim. 8. The treaty with Tripoli, of 1796, vol. 4, p. 41, adopts the same maxim and further stipulates that neutral goods shall be free in belligerent vessels. It was not necessary that such a stipulation should be inserted in the treaty with Spain, because Spain knew the law of nations and professed to respect it.

If there be no doubt, then, as to the construction to be given by the Spanish treaty, there is no necessity to dismiss the ordinance which is supposed to be connected with it. The principle which they call the rule of reciprocity ought more properly to be called the rule of retaliation.

But there is no such ordinance of Spain as is pretended. The ordinance applies only to Spanish goods found on board the vessels of the enemy, and was a mere temporary provision to continue only during the war. It appears by the extract from D'Habreu, found in 2 Azuni, 139, that the liability of the goods of neutrals found on board the vessels of the enemy depended upon treaties and not upon that ordinance.

The rule of retaliation is not a rule of the law of nations. The violation of the law of nations by one nation does not make it lawful for the offended nation to violate the law in the same way. It is true that states may resort to retaliation as a means of coercing justice from the other party. But this is always done as an act of state, and not as the mere result of a judicial execution of the law of nations. It is the effect of policy, not of law. Such were the measures adopted by the orders in council of Great Britain, and the offensive decrees of France, and of other nations under the control of France, which have been mentioned on the other side. The government of a state always undertakes to punish the violation of its rights and it chooses its own means. But the tribunals of justice must decide according to law.

The cases alluded to by sir W. Scott in the Santa Cruz, are cases in which the government could lawfully exercise its discretion in receding from its acknowledged rights. Thus in the case of property seized at the breaking out of a war, the government would have an unquestioned right to condemn or to release it. It was not the right to condemn which depended upon the rule of reciprocity, but the inexpediency. It was not a question of law, but of policy.

As to armament, and the resistance.

It is difficult to say in what fact the opposite party consider the criminality to exist. Is it that Pinto took unarmed passengers on board? This was lawful. Was it the taking on board enemy goods? This was innocent. Was it in chartering an armed vessel? There is no rule of the law of nations against it. Was it in arming the vessel? The fact it not proved. Was it in joining in the combat? It is fully proved that he took no part in the contest.

But it is said that chartering the vessel makes him owner for the voyage. This is not the rule in a Court of admiralty. Even if an enemy charter a neutral vessel he is not owner for the voyage. The vessel is always restored. Bynkershock says it is not unlawful for a neutral to hire a vessel from the enemy, for commercial purposes. But it said that he means an unarmed vessel. There is nothing to support that idea. The natural presumption is that an enemy's ship would be armed.

It is said also that a neutral may deposit his goods in an armed belligerent vessel under a bill of lading, but not under a charter-party. That is, that several neutral merchants may severally occupy the whole ship, but that one cannot. A distinction founded upon no difference of principle cannot alter the case. How does he call the belligerent faculties of the ship into action, more in one case than in the other? Does the neutral add to her belligerent faculty, by lading her deeply and giving her a destination from which she dare not depart in quest of her enemy?This is not a commissioned vessel. That case might be different. The Epervier was a comissioned vessel, and it is said was coming from Bermuda with bullion for the British troops in Canada; otherwise probably a claim for the bullion would have been interposed. In the case of the British packets captured during the present war, was the property of the neutral passengers confiscated? These vessels were armed and commissioned. But there is no distinction taken in the books between commissioned and uncommissioned vessels, except that the latter cannot make captures, under the penalty of being treated as pirates. 2 Azuni, 233.

If the doctrine be true in regard to an armed vessel, it must be equally true with regard to convoy; yet they do not pretend that this vessel is liable to condemnation because she sailed with convoy. The law of England is now that no vessel shall sail without convoy. Such a doctrine would go to prevent neutral property from being laden on board an English merchantman. Did England suppose, when she was passing the law requiring all vessels to said with convoy, that she was cutting herself off from all neutral freight?

When writers on the law of nations speak of a belligerent vessel, what do they mean? They speak of it as of a wolf which you can only hold by the ears—Lupum auribus tenere. They mean a vessel carrying on war. But can a vessel carry on war without arms? What degree of armament is sufficient to make it unlawful for a neutral to employ her? One musket, or two, or twenty?

The Consolato del Mare, was written long before the knowledge of fire arms, and does not speak of the distinction between armed and unarmed. In all the battles in which England has been engaged, and in all her commercial transactions, has such a case never occurred before? If it has, why are the books silent upon the subject. Why has not a single writer in the world mentioned the difference between neutral goods found in an armed and in an unarmed vessel of the enemy? See 2 Azuni, 194, 195, 196, 197, and the authorities there cited.

The owner of the ship was an enemy. He had a perfect right to arm and defend his ship. The master, for this purpose was his exclusive agent. His act in defending the ship cannot be attributed to the innocent owner of the cargo, who also had a perfect right to put his goods on board such a ship; and who did not interfere in the combat. But it is said that a neutral has only a right to carry on his accustomed trade in his accustomed manner. Where is it said that it must be carried on in his accustomed manner? There is no authority for such a restriction, nor any principle to justify it.

But this trade from London to Buenos Ayres was always carried on in British ships, and often of not generally armed. This was a voyage carried on in the accustomed way.

It is said also that by putting these neutral goods on board an armed vessel our right of search, as a belligerent nation, was impaired.

But how is the right of search applicable to this case? This is a secondary right, auxiliary to the belligerent right of capturing the enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel. It is applicable only to a vessel bearing a neutral flag. The belligerent has a right to know whether the cargo be really neutral, and for that purpose must examine it at sea. But if the vessel bears the flag of an enemy, there is no necessity to search the nature of the cargo at sea. You have the right to capture at once, and bring her in, when the cargo may be examined; the neutral must make out his claim, and is never entitled to damages for the delay or the detention.

Why does neutral resistance of search forfeit the cargo as well as the vessel, although the owner of the cargo had no concern in the vessel nor in the resistance? it is because the act of resistance was wholly unlawful; and the owner of the cargo can recover damages from the owner of the vessel or the master. But here the resistance was lawful; Pinto could never recover damages against the master for defending his ship.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court as follows.

'In support of the sentence of condemnation in this case, the captors contend,

1. That the Claimant, Manuel Pinto, has neither made sufficient proof of his neutral character nor of his property in the goods he claims.

2. That by the treaty between Spain and the United States the property of a Spanish subject in an enemy's vessel is prize of war.

3. That on the principles of reciprocity this property should be condemned.

4. That the conduct of Manuel Pinto and of the vessel has impressed a hostile character on his property and on that of other Spaniards laden on board of the Nereide.

1. Manuel Pinto is admitted to be a native of Buenos Ayres, and to carry on trade at that place in connexion with his father and sister, who are his partners, and who also reside at Buenos Ayres; but it is contended that he has acquired a domicil in England, and with that domicil the English commercial character.

Is the evidence in any degree doubtful on this point? Baltaza Ximenes, Antonio Lynch, and Felix Lynch, three Spaniards, returning with Pinto in the Nereide, all depose that Buenos Ayres is the place of his nativity and of his permanent residence, and that he carries on trade at that place.

In his test affidavit Manuel Pinto swears in the most explicit terms to the fact that Buenos Ayres is, and always has been the place of his permanent residence; that he carries on business there on account of himself, his father, and sister, and that he has been absent for temporary purposes only. His voyage to London, where he arrived in June, 1813, was for the purpose of purchasing a cargo for his trade at Buenos Ayres, and of establishing connexions in London for the purposes of his future trade at Buenos Ayres.

This plain and direct testimony is opposed.

1. By his examination in preparatorio.

In his answer to the first interrogatory he says that he was born at Buenos Ayres, that for seven years last past, he has lived and resided in England and Buenos Ayres, that he now lives at Buenos Ayres, that he has generally lived there for thirty-five years last past, and has been admitted a freeman of the new government.

Whatever facility may be given to the acquisition of a commercial domicil, it has never heretofore been contended that a merchant having a fixed residence, and carrying on business at the place of his birth, acquires a foreign commercial character by occasional visits to a foreign country. Had the introduction of the words 'seven years last past' even not been fully accounted for by reference to the interrogatory, those words could not have implied such a residence as would give a domicil. But they are fully accounted for.

In his answer to the 12th interrogatory he repeats that he is a Spanish American; now lives and carries on trade at Buenos Ayres, and has generally resided there.

2. The second piece of testimony relied on by the counsel for the captors is the charter party. That instrument states Manuel Pinto to be of Buenos Ayres now residing in London.

The charter party does not state him to have been formerly of Buenos Ayres, but to be, at its date, of Buenos Ayres. Nothing can be more obvious than that the expression, now residing in London, could be intended to convey no other idea than that he was then personally in London.

As little importance is attached to the covenant to receive the return cargo at the wharf in London. The performance of this duty by the consignee of the cargo as the agent of Pinto, would be a complete execution of it.

Had the English character been friendly and the Spanish hostile, it would have been a hardy attempt indeed in Mr. Pinto to found, on these circumstances, a claim to a domicil in England.

The question respecting ownership of the goods is not so perfectly clear.

The evidence of actual ownership, so far as the claim asserts property existing, at the time, in himself and partners, is involved in no uncertainty. The test affidavit annexed to the claim is full, explicit, and direct. It goes as far as a test affidavit can go in establishing the right which the claim asserts. All the documentary evidence, relating to this subject, corroborates this affidavit. The charter party shows an expectation that, of a freight of 700l. the goods of Mr. Pinto would pay 400l. The very circumstance that he chartered the whole vessel furnishes strong inducement to the opinion that a great part of her cargo would be his own.

The witnesses examined in preparatorio, so far as they know any thing on the subject, all depose to his interest. William Puzey was clerk to Pinto, and he deposes to the interest of his employer, on the knowledge acquired in making out invoices and other papers belonging to the cargo. His belief too is, in some degree, founded on the character of Pinto in London, where he was spoken of as a man of great respectability and property; and from the anxiety he discovered for the safety of the property after the Nereide was separated from her convoy.

The bills of lading for that part of the cargo which is claimed by Pinto, are filled up, many of them with his name, some to order, and the marginal letters in the manifest would also denote the property to be his. Where he claims a part of a parcel of goods the invoice is sometimes to order, and the marginal letters would indicate the goods to be the property of Pinto and some other person.

This testimony proves, very satisfactorily, the interest of Pinto's house in the property he claims. There is no counter testimony in the cause, except the belief expressed by Mr. Puzey, that for a part of the goods Pinto was agent for the government of Buenos Ayres. This belief of Mr. Puzey is supposed to derive much weight from his character as the clerk of Mr. Pinto. The importance of that circumstance, however, is much diminished by the fact that he had seen Pinto only a week before the sailing of the Nereide, and that he does not declare his belief to be founded on any papers he had copied or seen; or on any communication made to him by his employer. There are other and obvious grounds for his suspicion. A part of the cargo consisted of arms and military accoutrements; and it was not very surprising that Puzey should conjecture that they were purchased for a government about to sustain itself by the sword. But this suspicion is opposed by considerations of decisive influence, which have been stated at the bar. The demand for these articles in Buenos Ayres by the government would furnish sufficient motives to a merchant for making them a part of his cargo. In a considerable part of this warlike apparatus, British subjects were jointly concerned. It is extremely improbable, that, if acting for his government, he would have associated its interests with those of British merchants. Nor can a motive be assigned for claiming those goods for himself instead of claiming them for his government. They would not by such claim become his if restored. He would still remain accountable to his government, and the truth would have protected the property as effectually as a falshood, should it remain undetected. By claiming these goods for himself, instead of his government, he would commit a perjury from which he could derive no possible advantage, and which would expose to imminent hazard, not only those goods but his whole interest in the cargo. The Court, therefore, must consider this belief of Mr. Puzey as a suspicion, which a full knowledge of the facts ought entirely to dissipate. If there was nothing in the cause but this suspicion, or this belief of Mr. Puzey, the court would not attach any importance to it. But Mr. Pinto himself has, in his examination in preparatorio, been at least indiscreet in asserting claims not to be sustained; and in terms which do not exhibit the real fact in its true shape. In his answer to the 12th interrogatory he says 'And this deponent also has one-fourth interest as owner of the following goods, &c. viz. 15 bales of merchandize,' &c. In his claim he thus states the transaction under which his title to the one-fourth of these goods acorued. He had agreed with certain persons in England to select for them a parcel of goods for the market of Buenos Ayres, of which he was to be the consignee, and which he would sell on a commission of 10 per cent. on the amount of sales at Buenos Ayres. These goods were selected, purchased, and consigned to Manuel Pinto. The bills of lading were in his possession, and he considered his interest under this contract as equal to one-fourth of the value of the goods, 'wherefore,' he says, 'he did suppose that he was interested in the said goods and merchandize for himself, his father, and sister, and well entitled, as the owner thereof, or otherwise, to an equal fourth part of the said goods, inasmuch as his commissions as aforesaid, would have been equal to such fourth.'

It is impossible to justify this representation of the fact. The reasoning might convince the witness, but the language he used was undoubtedly calculated to mislead the Court, and to extricate property to which the captors were clearly entitled, although the witness might think otherwise. Such misrepresentations must be frowned on in a prize Court, and must involve a claim, otherwise unexceptionable, in doubt and danger. A witness ought never to swear to inferences without stating the train of reasoning by which his mind has been conducted to them. Prize Courts are necessarily watchful over subjects of this kind, and demand the utmost fairness in the conduct of Claimants. Yet prize Courts must distingnish between misrepresentations which may be ascribed to error of judgment, and which are, as soon as possible, corrected by the party who has made them, and wilful falsehoods which are detected by the testimony of others, or confessed by the party when detection becomes inevitable. In the first case there may be cause for a critical and perhaps suspicious examination of the claim and of the testimony by which it is supported; but it would be harsh indeed to condemn neutral property, in a case in which it was clearly proved to be neutral, for one false step, in some degree equivocal in its character, which was so soon corrected by the party making it.

The case of Mr. Paul's printing press is still less dubious in its appearance. It would require a very critical investigation of the evidence to decide whether this press is stated in his answer to the 12th interrogatory to be his property or not. Four presses are said in that answer to belong to him; but he also says in his answer to another interrogatory, perhaps the 26th, that Mr. Paul had one printing press on board. Whether there were five presses in the cargo, or only four, has not been decided, because the declaration made in his examination in preparatorio that one of the presses belonged to Mr. Paul proves unequivocally that the mistake, if he made one, was not fraudulent.

That he should state as his, the property which belonged to a house in Buenos Ayres, whose members all resided at the same place, and of which he was the acting and managing partnar, was a circumstance which could not appear important to himself, and which was of no importance in the cause. These trivial and accidental inaccuracies are corrected in his claim and in his test affidavit. The Court does not think them of sufficient importance to work a confiscation of goods, of the real neutrality of which no serious doubt is entertained.

2. Does the treaty between Spain and the United States subject the goods of either party, being neutral, to condemnation as enemy property, if found by the other in the vessel of an enemy? That treaty stipulates that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods, but contains no stipulation that enemy bottoms shall communicate the hostile character to the cargo. It is contended by the captors that the two principles are so completely identified that the stipulation of the one necessarily includes the other.

Let this proposition be examined.

The rule that the goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are prize of war, and that the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are to be restored, is believed to be a part of the original law of nations, as generally, perhaps universally, acknowledged. Certainly it has been fully and unequivocally recognized by the United States. This rule is founded on the simple and intelligible principle that war gives a full right to capture the goods of an enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend. In the practical application of this principle, so as to form the rule, the propositions that the neutral flag constitutes no protection to enemy property, and that the belligerent flag communicates no hostile character to neutral property, are necessarily admitted. The character of the property, taken distinctly and separately from all other considerations, depends in no degree upon the character of the vehicle in which it is found.

Many nations have believed it to be their interest to vary this simple and natural principle of public law. They have changed it by convention between themselves as far as they have believed it to be for their advantage to change it. But unless there be something in the nature of the rule which renders its parts unsusceptible of division, nations must be capable of dividing it by express compact, and if they stipulate either that the neutral flag shall cover enemy goods, or that the enemy flag shall infect friendly goods, there would, in reason, seem to be no necessity for implying a distinct stipulation not expressed by the parties. Treaties are formed upon deliberate reflection. Diplomatic men read the public treaties made by other nations and cannot be supposed either to omit or insert an article, common in public treaties, without being aware of the effect of such omission or insertion. Neither the one nor the other is to be ascribed to inattention. And if an omitted article be not necessarily implied in one which is inserted, the subject to which that article would apply remains under the ancient rule. That the stipulation of immunity to enemy goods in the bottoms of one of the parties being neutral does not imply a surrender of the goods of that party being neutral, if found in the vessel of an enemy, is the proposition of the counsel for the Claimant, and he powerfully sustains that proposition by arguments arising from the nature of the two stipulations. The agreement that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods is, he very justly remarks, a concession made by the belligerent to the neutral. It enlarges the sphere of neutral commerce, and gives to the neutral flag a capacity not given to it by the law of nations.

The stipulation which subjects neutral property, found in the bottom of an enemy, to condemnation as prize of war, is a concession made by the neutral to the belligerent. It narrows the sphere of neutral commerce, and takes from the neutral a privilege he possessed under the law of nations. The one may be, and often is, exchanged for the other. But it may be the interest and the will of both parties to stipulate the one without the other; and if it be their interest, or their will, what shall prevent its accomplishment? A neutral may give some other compensation for the privilege of transporting enemy goods in safety, or both parties may find an interest in stipulating for this privilege, and neither may be disposed to make to, or require from, the other the surrender of any right as its consideration. What shall restrain independent nations from making such a compact? And how is their intention to be communicated to each other or to the world so properly as by the compact itself?

If reason can furnish no evidence of the indissolubility of the two maxims, the supporters of that proposition will certainly derive no aid from the history of their progress from the first attempts at their introduction to the present moment.

For a considerable length of time they were the companions of each other—not as one maxim consisting of a single indivisible principle, but as two stipulations, the one, in the view of the parties, forming a natural and obvious consideration for the other. The celebrated compact termed the armed neutrality, attempted to effect by force a great revolution in the law of nations. The attempt failed, but it made a deep and lasting impression on public sentiment. The character of this effort has been accurately stated by the counsel for the Claimants. Its object was to enlarge, and not in any thing to diminish the rights of neutrals. The great powers, parties to this agreement, contended for the principle, that free ships should make free goods; but not for the converse maxim; so far were they from supposing the one to follow as a corollary from the other, that the contrary opinion was openly and distinctly avowed. The king of Prussia declared his expectation that in future neutral bottoms would protect the goods of an enemy, and that neutral goods would be safe in an enemy bottom. There is no reason to believe that this opinion was not common to those powers who acceded to the principles of the armed neutrality.

From that epoch to the present, in the various treaties which have been formed, some contain no article on the subject and consequently leave the ancient rule in full force. Some stipulate that the character of the cargo shall depend upon the flag, some that the neutral flag shall protect the goods of an enemy, some that the goods of a neutral in the vessel of a friend shall be prize of war, and some that the goods of an enemy in a neutral bottom shall be safe, and that friendly goods in the bottom of an enemy shall also be safe.

This review which was taken with minute accuracy at the bar, certainly demonstrates that in public opinion no two principles are more distinct and independent of each other than the two which have been contended to be inseparable.

Do the United States understand this subject differently from other nations? It is certainly not from our treaties that this opinion can be sustained. The United States have in some treaties stipulated for both principles, in some for one of them only, in some that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods and that friendly goods shall be safe in the bottom of an enemy. It is therefore clearly understood in the United States, so far as an opinion can be formed on their treaties, that the one principle is totally independent of the other. They have stipulated expressly for their separation, and they have sometimes stipulated for the one without the other.

But in a correspondence between the secretary of state of the United States and the minister of the French republic in 1793, Prussia is enumerated among those nations with whom the United States had made a treaty adopting the entire principle that the character of the cargo should be determined by the character of the flag.

Not being in possession of this correspondence the Court is unable to examine the construction it has received. It has not deferred this opinion on that account, because the point in controversy at that time was the obligation imposed on the United States to protect belligerent property in their vessels, not the liability of their property to capture if found in the vessel of a belligerent. To this point the whole attention of the writer was directed, and it is not wonderful that in mentioning incidentally the treaty with Prussia which contains the principle that free bottoms make free goods, it should have escaped his recollection that it did not contain the converse of the maxim. On the talents and virtues which adorned the cabinet of that day, on the patient fortitude with which it resisted the intemperate violence with which it was assailed, on the firmness with which it maintained those principles which its sense of duty prescribed, on the wisdom of the rules it adopted, no panegyric has been pronounced at the bar in which the best judgment of this Court does not concur. But this respectful defference may well comport with the opinion, that an argument incidentally brought forward by way of illustration, is not such full authority as a decision directly on the point might have been.

3. The third point made by the captors is, that whatever construction might be put on our treaty with Spain, considered as an independant measure, the ordinances of that government would subject American property, under similar circumstances, to confiscation, and therefore the property, claimed by Spanish subjects in this case, ought to be condemed as prize of war.

The ordinances themselves have not been produced, nor has the Court received such information respecting them as would enable it to decide certainly either on their permanent existence, or on their application to the United States. But be this as it may, the Court is decidedly of opinion that reciprocating to the subjects of a nation, or retaliating on them, its unjust proceedings towards our citizens, as a political not a legal measure. It is for the consideration of the government not of its Courts. The degree and the kind of retaliation depend entirely on considerations foreign to this tribunal. It may be the policy of the nation to avenge its wrongs in a manner having no affinity to the injury sustained, or it may be its policy to recede from its full rights and not to avenge them at all. It is not for its Courts to interfere with the proceedings of the nation and to thwart its views. It is not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the devious and intricate path of politics. Even in the case of salvage, a case peculiarly within the discretion of Courts, because no fixed rule is prescribed by the law of nations, congress has not left it to this department to say whether the rule of foreign nations shall be applied to them, but has by law applied that rule. If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government will manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.

Thus far the opinion of the Court has been formed without much difficulty. Although the principles, asserted by the counsel, have been sustained on both sides with great strength of argument, they have been found on examination to be simple and clear in themselves. Stripped of the imposing garb in which they have been presented to the Court, they have no intrinsic intricacy which should perplex the understanding.

The remaining point is of a different character. Belligerent rights and neutral privileges are set in array against each other. Their respective pretensions, if not actually intermixed, come into close contact, and the line of partition is not so distinctly marked as to be clearly discernible. It is impossible to declare in favor of either, without hearing, from the other, objections which it is difficult to answer and arguments, which it is not easy to refute. The Court has given to this subject a patient investigation, and has endeavored to avail itself of all the aid which has been furnished by the bar. The result, if not completely satisfactory even to ourselves, is one from which it is believed we should not depart were further time allowed for deliberation.

4. Has the conduct of Manuel Pinto and of the Nereide been such as to impress the hostile character on that part of the cargo which was in fact neutral?

In considering this question the Court has examined separately the parts which compose it.

The vessel was armed, was the property of an enemy, and made resistence. How do these facts affect the claim?

Had the vessel been armed by Pinto, that fact would certainly have constituted an important feature in the case. But the Court can perceive no reason for believing she was armed by him. He chartered, it is true, the whole vessel, and that he might as rightfully do as contract for her partially; but there is no reason to believe that he was instrumental in arming her. The owner stipulates that the Nereide 'well manned, victualled, equipped, provided and furnished with all things needful for such a vessel,' shall be ready to take on board a cargo to be provided for her. The Nereide, then, was to be put, by the owner, in the condition in which she was to sail. In equipping her, whether with or without arms, Mr. Pinto was not concerned. It appears to have been entirely and exclusively the act of the belligerent owner.

Whether the resistance, which was actually made, is in any degree imputable to Mr. Pinto, is a question of still more importance.

It has been argued that he had the whole ship, and that, therefore, the resistance was his resistance.

The whole evidence upon this point is to be found in the charter party, in the letter of instructions to the master, and in the answer of Pinto to one of the interrogatories in preparatorio.

The charter party evinces throughout that the ship remained under the entire direction of the owner, and that Pinto in no degree partiolpated in the command of her. The owner appoints the master and stinulates for every act to be performed by the ship, from the date of the charter party to the termination of the voyage. In no one respect, except in lading the vessel, was Pinto to have any direction of her.

The lotter of instructions to the master contams full directions for the regelation of his conduct, without any other reference to Mr. Pinto than has been already stated. That reference shows a positive limitation of his power by the terms of the charter party. Consequently he had no share in the government of the ship.

But Pinto says in his answer to the 6th interrogatory that 'he had control of the said ship and cargo.'

Nothing can be more obvious than that Pinto could understand himself as saying no more than that he had the control of the ship and cargo so far as respected her lading. A part of the cargo did not belong to him, and was not consigned to him. His control over the ship began and ended with putting the cargo on board. He does not appear ever to have exercised any authority in the management of the ship. So far from exercising any during the battle, he went into the cabin where he remained till the conflict was over. It is, then, most apparent that when Pinto said he had the control of the ship and cargo, he used those terms in a limited sense. He used them in reference to the power of lading her, given him by the charter party.

If, in this, the Court be correct, this cause is to be governed by the principles which would apply to it had the Nereide been a general ship.

The next point to be considered is the right of a neutral to place his goods on board an armed belligerent merchantman.

That a neutral may lawfully put his goods on board a belligerent ship for conveyance on the ocean, is universally recognized as the original rule of the law of nations. It is, as has already been stated, founded on the plain and simple principle that the property of a friend remains his property wherever it may be found. 'Since it is not,' says Vattel, 'the place where a thing is which determines the nature of that thing, but the character of the person to whom it belongs, things belonging to neutral persons which happen to be in an enemy's country, or on board an enemy's ships, are to be distinguished from those which belong to the enemy.'

Bynkershoek lays down the same principles in terms equally explicit; and in terms entitled to the more consideration, because he enters into the enquiry whether a knowledge of the hostile character of the vessel can offect the owner of the goods.

The same prmciple is laid down by other writers on the same subject, and is believed to be contradicted by none. It is true there were some old ordinances of France declaring that a hostile vessel or cargo should expose both to condemnation. But these ordinances have never constituted a rule of public law.

It is deemed of much importance that the rule is universally laid down in terms which comprehend an armed as well as an unarmed vessel; and that armed vessels have never been excepted from it. Bynkershoek, in discussing a question suggesting an exception, with his mind directed to hostilities, does not hint that this privilege is confined to unarmed merchantmen.

In point of fact, it is believed that a belligerent merchant vessel rarely sails unarmed, so that this exception from the rule would be greater than the rule itself. At all events, the number of those who are armed and who sail under convoy, is too great not to have attracted the attention of writers on public law; and this exception to their broad general rule, if it existed, would certainly be found in some of their works. It would be strange if a rule laid down, with a view to war, in such broad terms as to have universal application, should be so construed as to exclude from its operation almost every case for which it purports to provide, and yet that not a dictum should be found in the books pointing to such construction.

The antiquity of the rule is certainly not unworthy of consideration. It is to be traced back to the time when almost every merchantman was in a condition for selfdefence, and the implements of war were so light and so cheap that scarcely any would sail without them.

A belligerent has a perfect right to arm in his own defence; and a neutral has a perfect right to transport his goods in a belligerent vessel. These rights do not interfere with each other. The neutral has no control over the belligerent right to arm—ought he to be accountable for the exercise of it? By placing neutral property in a belligerent ship, that property, according to the positive rules of law, does not cease to be neutral. Why should it be changed by the exercise of a belligerent right, universally acknowledged and in common use when the rule was laid down, and over which the neutral had no control?

The belligerent answers, that by arming his rights are impaired. By placing his goods under the guns of an enemy, the neutral has taken part with the enemy and assumed the hostile character.

Previous to that examination which the Court has been able to make of the reasoning by which this proposition is sustained, one remark will be made which applies to a great part of it. The argument which, taken in its fair sense, would prove that it is unlawful to deposit goods for transportation in the vessel of an enemy generally, however imposing its form, must be unsound, because it is in contradiction to acknowledged law.

It is said that by depositing goods on board an armed belligerent the right of search may be impaired, perhaps defeated.

What is this right of search? Is it a substantive and independent right wantonly, and in the pride of power, to vex and harass neutral commerce, because there is a capacity to do so? or to indulge the idle and mischievous curiosity of looking into neutral trade? or the assumption of a right to control it? If it be such a substantive and independent right, it would be better that cargoes should be inspected in port before the sailing of the vessel, or that belligerent licenses should be procured. But this is not its character.

Belligerents have a full and perfect right to capture enemy goods and articles going to their enemy which are contraband of war. To the exercise of that right the right of search is essential. It is a mean justified by the end. It has been truely denominated a right growing out of, and ancillary to the greater right of capture. Where this greater right may be legally exercised without search, the right of search can never arise or come into question.

But it is said that the exercise of this right may be prevented by the inability of the party claiming it to capture the belligerent carrier of neutral property.

And what injury results from this circumstance? If the property be neutral, what mischief is done by its escaping a search. In so doing there is no sin even as against the belligerent, if it can be effected by lawful means. The neutral cannot justify the use of force or fraud, but if by means, lawful in themselves, he can escape this vexatious procedure, he may certainly employ them.

To the argument that by placing his goods in the vessel of an armed enemy, he connects himself with that enemy and assumes the hostile character; it is answered that no such connexion exists.

The object of the neutral is the transportation of his goods. His connexion with the vessel which transports them is the same, whether that vessel be armed or unarmed. The act of arming is not his—it is the act of a party who bas a right so to do. He meddles not with the armament nor with the war. Whether his goods were on board or not, the vessel would be armed and would sail. His goods do not contribute to the armament further than the freight he pays, and freight he would pay were the vessel unarmed.

It is difficult to perceive in this argument any thing which does not also apply to an unarmed vessel. In both instances it is the right and the duty of the carrier to avoid capture and to prevent a search. There is no difference except in the degree of capacity to carry this duty into effect. The argument would operate against the rule which permits the neutral merchant to employ a belligerent vessel without imparting to his goods the belligerent character.

The argument respecting resistance stands on the same ground with that which respects arming. Both are lawful. Neither of them is chargeable to the goods or their owner, where he has taken to part in it. They are incidents to the character of the vessel; and may always occur where the carrier is belligerent.

It is remarkable that no express authority on either side of this question car be found in the books. A few scanty materials, made up of inferences from cases depending on other principles, have been gleaned from the books and employed by both parties. They are certainly not decisive for or against either.

The celebrated case of the Swedish convoy has been pressed into the service. But that case decided no more than this, that a neutral may arm, but cannot by force resist a search. The reasoning of the judge on that occasion would seem to indicate that the resistance condemned the cargo, because it was unlawful. It has been inferred on the one side that the goods would be infected by the resistance of the ship, and on the other that a resistance which is lawful, and is not produced by the goods, will not change their character.

The case of the Catharine Elizabeth approaches more nearly to that of the Nereide, because in that case as in this there were neutral goods and a belligerent vessel. It was certainly a case, not of resistance, but of an attempt by a part of the crew to seize the capturing vessel. Between such an attempt and an attempt to take the same vessel previous to capture, there does not seem to be a total dissimilitude. But it is the reasoning of the judge and not his decision, of which the Claimants would avail themselves. He distinguishes between the effect which the employment of force by a belligerent owner or by a neutral owner would have on neutral goods. The first is lawful, the last unlawful. The belligerent owner violates no duty. He is held by force and may escape if he can. From the marginal note it appears that the reporter understood this case to decide in principle that resistance by a belligerent vessel would not confiscate the cargo. It is only in a case without express authority that such materials can be relied on.

If the neutral character of the goods is forfeited by the resistance of the belligerent vessel, why is not the neutral character of the passengers forfeited by the same cause? The master and crew are prisoners of war, why are not those passengers who did not engage in the conflict also prisoners? That they are not would seem to the Court to afford a strong argument in favor of the goods. The law would operate in the same manner on both.

It cannot escape observation, that in argument the neutral freighter has been continually represented as arming the Nereide and impelling her to hostility. He is represented as drawing forth and guiding her warlike energies. The Court does not so understand the case. The Nereide was armed, governed, and conducted by belligerents. With her force, or her conduct the neutral shippers had no concern. They deposited their goods on board the vessel, and stipulated for their direct transportation to Buenos Ayres. It is true that on her passage she had a right to defend herself, did defend herself, and might have captured an assailing vessel; but to search for the enemy would have been a violation of the charter party and of her duty.

With a pencil dipped in the most vivid colours, and guided by the hand of a master, a splendid portrait has been drawn exhibiting this vessel and her freighter as forming a single figure, composed of the most discordant materials, of peace and war. So exquisite was the skill of the artist, so dazzling the garb in which the figure was presented, that it required the exercise of that cold investigating faculty which ought always to belong to those who sit on this bench, to discover its only imperfection: its want of resemblance.

The Nereide has not that centaur-like appearance which has been ascribed to her. She does not rove over the ocean hurling the thunders of war while sheltered by the olive branch of peace. She is not composed in part of the neutral character of Mr. Pinto, and in part of the hostile character of her owner. She is an open and declared belligerent; claiming all the rights, and subject to all the dangers of the belligerent character. She conveys neutral property which does not engage in her warlike equipments, or in any employment she may make of them; which is put on board solely for the purpose of transportation, and which encounters the hazard incident to its situation; the hazard of being taken into port, and obliged to seek another conveyance should its carrier be captured.

In this it is the opinion of the majority of the Court there is nothing unlawful. The characters of the vessel and cargo remain as distinct in this as in any other case. The sentence, therefore, of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the property claimed by Manuel Pinto for himself and his partners, and for those other Spaniards for whom he has claimed, be restored, and the libel as to that property, be dismissed.

JOHNSON, J.

Circumstances, known to this Court, have imposed upon me, in a great measure, the responsibility of this decision. I approach the case with all the hesitation which respect for the opinion of others and a conviction of the novelty and importance of some of the questions are calculated to inspire. The same respect imposes upon me an obligation briefly to state the course of reasoning by which I am led to my conclnsion.

On the minor points I feel no difficulty. There is nothing to support the charge of English domiciliation; the charges of prevarication are satisfactorily explained; and on the question of national character, we must yet awhile reluctantly yield to the acknowledgement that Buenos Ayres is not free.