1. In conferring upon nonprobationary federal employees the right not to be discharged except for 'cause' and at the same time conditioning the grant of that right by procedural limitations, the Act did not create and the Due Process Clause does not require any additional expectancy of job retention. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. Pp. 148—155.

2. The CSC and OEO post-termination hearing procedures adequately protect the liberty interest of federal employees, recognized in Roth, supra, in not being wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges. Pp. 156—158.

3. The Act's standard of employment protection, which describes as explicitly as is feasible in view of the wide variety of factual situations where employees' statements might justify dismissal for 'cause' the conduct that is ground for removal, is not impermissibly vague or overbroad in regulating federal employees' speech. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578—579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d 796. Pp. 158—163.

Mr. Justice POWELL, joined by Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, while agreeing that 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, concluded with respect to the due process issue that appellee, as a nonprobationary federal employee who could be discharged only for 'cause,' had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a property interest under the Fifth Amendment and his employment could not be terminated without notice and a full evidentiary hearing. On the other hand, the Government as an employer must have discretion expeditiously to remove employees who hinder efficient operation. Since the procedures under the Act and regulations minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision and provide for a post-removal evidentiary hearing with reinstatement and backpay should that decision be wrongful, a reasonable accommodation comporting with due process is provided between the competing interests of the employee and the Government as employer. Pp. 164—171.

Daniel M. Friedman, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

Charles Barnhill, Jr. Chicago, Ill., for appellees.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice STEWART join.

Prior to the events leading to his discharge, appellee Wayne Kennedy1 was a nonprobationary federal employee in the competitive Civil Service. He was a field representative in the Chicago Regional Office of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). In March 1972, he was removed from the federal service pursuant to the provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, after Wendell Verduin, the Regional Director of the OEO, upheld written administrative charges made in the form of a 'Notification of Proposed Adverse Action' against appellee. The charges listed five events occurring in November and December 1971; the most serious of the charges was that appellee 'without any proof whatsoever and in reckless disregard of the actual facts' known to him or reasonably discoverable by him had publicly stated that Verduin and his administrative assistant had attempted to bribe a representative of a community action organization with which the OEO had dealings. The alleged bribe consisted of an offer of a $100,000 grant of OEO funds if the representative would sign a statement against appellee and another OEO employee.

Appellee was advised of his right under regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission and the OEO to reply to the charges orally and in writing, and to submit affidavits to Verduin. He was also advised that the material on which the notice was based was available for his inspection in the Regional Office, the that a copy of the material was attached to the notice of proposed adverse action.

Appellee did not respond to the substance of the charges against him, but instead asserted that the charges were unlawful because he had a right to a trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer before he could be removed from his employment, and because statements made by him were protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 On March 20, 1972, Verduin notified appellee in writing that he would be removed from his position at the close of business on March 27, 1972. Appellee was also notified of his right to appeal Verduin's decision either to the OEO or to the Civil Service Commission.

Appellee then instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief. In his amended complaint,3 appellee contended that the standards and procedures established by and under the Lloyd-La Follette Act for the removal of nonprobationary employees from the federal service unwarrantedly interfere with those employees' freedom of expression and deny them procedural due process of law. The three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284, granted summary judgment for appellee. 349 F.Supp. 863. The court held that the discharge procedures authorized by the Act and attendant Civil Service Commission and OEO regulations denied appellee due process of law because they failed to provide for a trial-type hearing before an impartial agency official prior to removal; the court also held the Act and implementing regulations unconstitutionally vague because they failed to furnish sufficiently precise guidelines as to what kind of speech may be made the basis of a removal action. The court ordered that appellee be reinstated in his former position with backpay, and that he be accorded a hearing prior to removal in any future removal proceedings. Appellants were also enjoined from further enforcement of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and implementing rules, as 'construed to regulate the speech of competitive service employees.'4

* The numerous affidavits submitted to the District Court by both parties not unexpectedly portray two widely differing versions of the facts which gave rise to this lawsuit. Since the District Court granted summary judgment to appellee, it was required to resolve all genuine disputes as to any material facts in favor of appellants, and we therefore take as true for purposes of this opinion the material particulars of appellee's conduct which were set forth in the notification of proposed adverse action dated February 18, 1972. The District Court's holding necessarily embodies the legal conclusions that, even though all of these factual statements were true, the procedure which the Government proposed to follow in this case was constitutionally insufficient to accomplish appellee's discharge, and the standard by which his conduct was to be judged in the course of those procedures infringed his right of free speech protected by the First Amendment.

The statutory provisions which the District Court held invalid are found in 5 U.S.C. § 7501. Subsection (a) of that section provides that '(a)n individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.'

Subsection (b) establishes the administrative procedures by which an employee's rights under subsection (a) are to be determined, providing:

'(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension without pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to—

'(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;

'(2) a copy of the charges;

'(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with affidavits; and

'(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.

'Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay. Copies of the charges, the notice of hearing, the answer, the reasons for and the order of removal or suspension without pay, and also the reasons for reduction in grade or pay, shall be made a part of the records of the employing agency, and, on request, shall be furnished to the individual affected and to the Civil Service Commission.'

This codification of the Lloyd-La Follette Act is now supplemented by the regulations of the Civil Service Commission, and, with respect to the OEO, by the regulations and instructions of that agency. Both the Commission and the OEO have by regulation given further specific content to the general removal standard in subsection (a) of the Act. The regulations of the Commission5 and the OEO,6 in nearly identical language, require that employees 'avoid any action . . . which might result in, or create the appearance of . . . (a) ffecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of (OEO and) the Government,' and that employees not 'engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful or other conduct prejudicial to the Government.' The OEO further provides by regulation that its Office of General Counsel is available to supply counseling on the interpretation of the laws and regulations relevant to the conduct of OEO employees.7

Both the Commission and the OEO also follow regulations enlarging the procedural protections accorded by the Act itself.8 The Commission's regulations provide, inter alia, that the employing agency must give 30 days' advance written notice to the employee prior to removal, and make available to him the material on which the notice is based.9 They also provide that the employee shall have an opportunity to appear before the official vested with authority to make the removal decision in order to answer the charges against him,10 that the employee must receive notice of an adverse decision on or before its effective date, and that the employee may appeal from an adverse decision.11 This appeal may be either to a reviewing authority within the employing agency,12 or directly to the Commission,13 and the employee is entitled to an evidentiary trial-type hearing at the appeal stage of the proceeding.14 The only trial-type hearing available within the OEO is, by virtue of its regulations and practice, typically held after actual removal;15 but if the employee is reinstated on appeal, he receives full backpay, less any amounts earned by him through other employment during that period.16

We must first decide whether these procedures established for the purpose of determining whether there is 'cause' under the Lloyd-La Follette Act for the dismissal of a federal employee comport with procedural due process, and then decide whether that standard of 'cause' for federal employee dismissals was within the constitutional power of Congress to adopt.

For almost the first century of our national existence, federal employment was regarded as an item of patronage, which could be granted, withheld, or withdrawn for whatever reasons might appeal to the respnsibile executive hiring officer. Following the Civil War, grass-roots sentiment for 'Civil Service reform' began to grow, and it was apparently brought to a head by the assassination of President James A. Garfield on July 2, 1881. Garfield, having then held officer only four months, was accosted in Washington's Union Station and shot by a dissatisfied office seeker who believed that the President had been instrumental in refusing his request for appointment as United States Consul in Paris. During the summer, while President Garfield lingered prior to his death in September, delegates from 13 Civil Service reform associations met and formed the National Civil Service Reform League. Responding to public demand for reform led by this organization, Congress in January 1883 enacted the Pendleton Act.17

While the Pendleton Act is regarded as the keystone in the present arch of Civil Service legislation, by present-day standards it was quite limited in its application. It dealt almost exclusively with entry into the federal service, and hardly at all with tenure, promotion, removal, veterans' preference, pensions, and other subjects addressed by subsequent Civil Service legislation. The Pendleton Act provided for the creation of a classified Civil Service, and required competitive examination for entry into that service. Its only provision with respect to separation was to prohibit removal for the failure of an employee in the classified service to contribute to a political fund or to render any political service.18

For 16 years following the effective date of the Pendleton Act, this last-memtioned provision of that Act appears to have been the only statutory or regulatory limitation on the right of the Government to discharge classified employees. In 1897, President William McKinley promulgated Civil Service Rule II,19 which provided that removal from the competitive classified service should not be made except for just cause and for reasons given in writing. While job tenure was thereby accorded protection, there were no administrative appeal rights for action taken in violation of this rule, and the courts declined to judicially enforce it. Thus matters stood with respect to governmental authority to remove federal employees until the enactment of the Lloyd-La Follette Act.

The Lloyd-La Follette Act was enacted as one section of the Post Office Department appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1913. That Act guaranteed the right of federal employees to communicate with members of Congress, and to join employee organizations. It also substantially enacted and enlarged upon Civil Service Rule II in the following language:

'(N)o person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answering the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no examination of witnesses not any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the officer making the removal, and copies of charges, notice of hearing, answer, reasons for removal, and of the order of removal shall be made a part of the records of the proper department or office, as shall also the reasons for reduction in rank or compensation; and copies of the same shall be furnished to the person affected upon request, and the Civil Service Commission also shall, upon request, be furnished copies of the same. . . .'20

That Act, as now codified, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, together with the administrative regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission and the OEO, provided the statutory and administrative framework which the Government contends controlled the proceedings against appellee. The District Court, in its ruling on appellee's procedural contentions, in effect held that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited Congress, in the Lloyd-La Follette Act, from granting protection against removal without cause and at the same time—indeed, in the same sentence specifying that the determination of cause should be without the full panoply of rights which attend a trial-type adversary hearing. We do not believe that the Constitution so limits Congress in the manner in which benefits may be extended to federal employees.

Appellee recognizes that our recent decisions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), are those most closely in point with respect to the procedural rights constitutionally guaranteed public employees in connection with their dismissal from employment. Appellee contends that he had a property interest or an expectancy of employment which could not be divested without first affording him a full adversary hearing.

'Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.' 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.

Here appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than for 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of (the) service.' But the very section of the statute which granted him that right, a right which had previously existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the procedure by which 'cause' was to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not to be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an expectancy of that substantive right without the procedural limitations which Congress attached to it. In the area of federal regulation of government employees, where in the absence of statutory limitation the governmental employer has had virtually uncontrolled latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing, Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896—897, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1749—1750, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), we do not believe that a statutory enactment such as the Lloyd-La Follette Act may be parsed as discretely as appellee urges. Congress was obviously intent on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed, but was likewise intent on excluding more elaborate procedural exquirements which it felt would make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in practice. Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural mechanism for enforcing the substantive right which was simultaneously conferred, we decline to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its enforcement. The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated for the determination of cause.

The Court has previously viewed skeptically the action of a litigant in challenging the constitutionality of portions of a statute under which it has simultaneously claimed benefits. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947), it was observed:

'In the name and right of the Association it is now being asked that the Act under which it has its existence be struck down in important particulars, hardly severable from those provisions which grant its right to exist. . . . It would be intolerable that the Congress should endow an Association with the right to conduct a public banking business on certain limitations and that the Court at the behest of those who took advantage from the privilege should remove the limitations intended for public protection. It would be difficult to imagine a more appropriate situation in which to apply the doctrine that one who utilizes an Act to gain advantages of corporate existence is estopped from questioning the validity of its vital conditions.' Id., at 255—256, 67 S.Ct., at 1557.

'It is an elementary rule of constitutional law that one may not 'retain the benefits of an Act while attacking the constitutionality of one of its important conditions.' United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (60 S.Ct. 749, 84 L.Ed. 1050). As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688), 'The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits." Id., at 255, 67 S.Ct., at 1557.

This doctrine has unquestionably been applied unevenly in the past, and observed as often as not in the breach. We believe that at the very least it gives added weight to our conclusion that where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.

To conclude otherwise would require us to hold that although Congress chose to enact what was essentially a legislative compromise, and with unmistakable clarity granted governmental employees security against being dismissed without 'cause,' but refused to accord them a full adversary hearing for the determination of 'cause,' it was constitutionally disabled from making such a choice. We would be holding that federal employees had been granted, as a result of the enactment of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, not merely that which Congress had given them in the first part of a sentence, but that which Congress had expressly withheld from them in the latter part of the same sentence. Neither the language of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor our cases construing it require any such hobbling restrictions on legislative authority in this area.

Appellees urge that the judgment of the District Court must be sustained on the authority of cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). Goldberg held that welfare recipients are entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to an adversary hearing before their benefits are terminated. Fuentes v. Shevin held that a hearing was generally required before one could have his property seized under a writ of replevin. In Bell v. Burson the Court held that due process required a procedure for determining whether there was a reasonable possibility of a judgment against a driver as a result of an accident before his license and vehicle registration could be suspended for failure to post security under Georgia's uninsured motorist statute. And in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. a Wisconsin statute providing for prejudgment garnishment without notice to the debtor or prior hearing was struck down as violative of the principles of due process. These cases deal with areas of the law dissimilar to one another and dissimilar to the area of governmental employer-employee relationships with which we deal here. The types of 'liberty' and 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause vary widely, and what may be required under that Clause in dealing with one set of interests which it protects may not be required in dealing with another set of interests.

'The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.' Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S., at 895, 81 S.Ct., at 1748.

Here the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest. The Government might, then, under our holdings deal with Government employees in Roth, supra, and Sindermann, supra, constitutionally deal with appellee's claims as it proposed to do here.21

Appellee also contends in this Court that because of the nature of the charges on which his dismissal was based, he was in effect accused of dishonesty, and that therefore a hearing was required before he could be deprived of this element of his 'liberty' protected by the Fifth Amendment against deprivation without due process. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 573, 92 S.Ct., at 2707, we said:

'The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. . . . In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials.'22

The liberty here implicated by appellants' action is not the elemental freedom from external restraint such as was involved in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), but is instead a subspecies of the right of the individual 'to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). But that liberty is not offended by dismissal from employment itself, but instead by dismissal based upon an unsupported charge which could wrongfully injure the reputation of an employee. Since the purpose of the hearing in such a case is to provide the person 'an opportunity to clear his name,' a hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Here appellee chose not to rely on his administrative appeal, which, if his factual contentions are correct, might well have vindicated his reputation and removed any wrongful stigma from his reputation.

Appellee urges that the delays in processing agency and Civil Service Commission appeals, amounting to more than three months in over 50% of agency appeals,23 mean that the available administrative appeals do not suffice to protect his liberty interest recognized in Roth. During the pendency of his administrative appeals, appellee asserts, a discharged employee suffers from both the stigma and the consequent disadvantage in obtaining a comparable job that result from dismissal for cause from Government employment. We assume that some delay attends vindication of an employee's reputation throughout the hearing procedures provided on appeal, and conclude that at least the delays cited here do not entail any separate deprivation of a liberty interest recognized in Roth.

Appellee also contends that the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a), authorizing removal or suspension without pay 'for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,' are vague and overbroad. The District Court accepted this contention:

'Because employees faced with the standard of 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' can only guess as to what utterances may cost them their jobs, there can be little question that they will be deterred from exercising their First Amendment rights to the fullest extent.' 349 F.Supp., at 866.

A certain anomaly attends appellee's substantive constitutional attack on the Lloyd-La Follette Act just as it does his attack on its procedural provisions. Prior to the enactment of this language in 1912, there was no such statutory inhibition on the authority of the Government to discharge a federal employee, and an employee could be discharged with or without cause for conduct which was not protected under the First Amendment. Yet under the District Court's holding, a federal employee after the enactment of the Lloyd-La Follette Act may not even be discharged for conduct which constitutes 'cause' for discharge and which is not protected by the First Amendment, because the guarantee of job security which Congress chose to accord employees is 'vague' and 'overbroad.'

We hold the standard of 'cause' set forth in the Lloyd-La Follette Act as a limitation on the Government's authority to discharge federal employees is constitutionally sufficient against the charges both of overbreadth and of vagueness. In Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578—579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973), we said:

'(T)here are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest. '(T)he general class of offense to which . . . (the provisions are) directed is plainly within (their) terms . . ., (and they) will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.' United States v. Hariss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989) (1954).'

Congress sought to lay down an admittedly general standard, not for the purpose of defining criminal conduct, but in order to give myriad different federal employees performing widely disparate tasks a common standard of job protection. We do not believe that Congress was confined to the choice of enacting a detailed code of employee conduct, or else granting no job protection at all. As we said in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972):

'The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.' Id., at 110, 92 S.Ct., at 1957.

Here the language 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' was not written upon a clean slate in 1912, and it does not appear on a clean slate now. The Civil Service Commission has indicated that what might be said to be longstanding principles of employer-employee relationships, like those developed in the private sector, should be followed in interpreting the language used by Congress.24 Moreover, the OEO has provided by regulation that its Office of General Counsel is available to counsel employees who seek advice on the interpretation of the Act and its regulations.25 We found the similar procedure offered by the Civil Service Commission important in rejecting the respondents' vagueness contentions in Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S., at 580, 93 S.Ct., at 2897.

The phrase 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' as a standard of employee job protection is without doubt intended to authorize dismissal for speech as well as other conduct. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), makes it clear that in certain situations the discharge of a Government employee may be based on his speech without offending guarantees of the First Amendment:

'At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'

Because of the infinite variety of factual situations in which public statements by Government employees might reasonably justify dismissal for 'cause,' we conclude that the Act describes, as explicitly as is required, the employee conduct which is ground for removal. The essential fairness of this broad and general removal standard, and the impracticability of greater specificity, were recognized by Judge Leventhal, writing for a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 230, 392 F.2d 822, 835 (1968), modified, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 425 F.2d 469, aff'd en banc, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 425 F.2d 472 (1969):

'(I)t is not feasible or necessary for the Government to spell out in detail all that conduct which will result in retaliation. The most conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct of employees includes 'catch-all' clauses prohibiting employee 'misconduct,' 'immorality,' or 'conduct unbecoming.' We think it is inherent in the employment relationship as a matter of common sense if not (of) common law that (a Government) employee . . . cannot reasonably assert a right to keep his job while at the same time he inveighs against his superiors in public with intemperate and defamatory (cartoons). . . . (Dismissal in such circumstances neither) comes as an unfair surprise (nor) is so unexpected . . . as to chill . . . freedom to engage in appropriate speech.'

Since Congress when it enacted the Lloyd-La Follette Act did so with the intention of conferring job protection rights on federal employees which they had not previously had, it obviously did not intend to authorize discharge under the Act's removal standard for speech which is constitutionally protected. The Act proscribes only that public speech which improperly damages and impairs the reputation and efficiency of the employing agency, and it thus imposes no greater controls on the behavior of federal employees than are necessary for the protection of the Government as an employer. Indeed the Act is not directed at speech as such, but at employee behavior, including speech, which is detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency. We hold that the language 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' in the Act excludes constitutionally protected speech, and that the statute is therefore not overbroad. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S., at 111, 92 S.Ct., at 1957. We have observed previously that the Court has a duty to construe a federal statute to avoid constitutional questions where such a construction is reasonably possible. United States v. 12 200—ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2670, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368—369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1404—1405, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971).

We have no hesitation, as did the District Court, in saying that on the facts alleged in the administrative charges against appellee, the appropriate tribunal would infringe no constitutional right of appellee in concluding that there was 'cause' for his discharge. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S., at 569, 88 S.Ct., at 1735. Nor have we any doubt that satisfactory proof of these allegations could constitute 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' within the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a). Appellee's contention then boils down to the assertion that although no constitutionally protected conduct of his own was the basis for his discharge on the Government's version of the facts, the statutory language in question must be declared inoperative, and a set of more particularized regulations substituted for it, because the generality of its language might result in marginal situations in which other persons seeking to engage in constitutionally protected conduct would be deterred from doing so. But we have held that Congress in establishing a standard of 'cause' for discharge did not intend to include within that term any constitutionally protected conduct. We think that our statement in Colten v. Kentucky, is a complete answer to appellee's contention:

'As we understand this case, appellant's own conduct was not immune under the First Amendment and neither is his conviction vulnerable on the ground that the statute threatens constitutionally protected conduct of others.' 407 U.S., at 111, 92 S.Ct., at 1958.

In sum, we hold that the Lloyd-La Follette Act, in at once conferring upon nonprobationary federal employees the right not to be discharged except for 'cause' and prescribing the procedural means by which that right was to be protected, did not create an expectancy of job retention in those employees requiring procedural protection under the Due Process Clause beyond that afforded here by the statute and related agency regulations. We also conclude that the post-termination hearing procedures provided by the Civil Service Commission and the OEO adequately protect those federal employees' liberty interest, recognized in Roth, supra, in not being wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges. Finally, we hold that the standard of employment protection imposed by Congress in the Lloyd-La Follette Act, is not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees and therefore unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court on both grounds on which it granted summary judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice POWELL, with whom Mr. Justice BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.

For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, I agree that the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) are neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. I also agree that appellee's discharge did not contravene the Fifth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process. Because I reach that conclusion on the basis of different reasoning, I state my views separately.

* The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends in the first instance on the presence of a legitimate 'property' or 'liberty' interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Governmental deprivation of such an interest must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing.1 The Court's decisions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), provide the proper framework for analysis of whether appellee's employment constituted a 'property' interest under the Fifth Amendment. In Roth, the Court stated:

'To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.

'Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.' 408 U.S., at 577, 92 S.Ct., at 2709.

The Court recognized that the 'wooden distinction' between 'rights' and 'privileges' was not determinative of the applicability of procedural due process and that a property interest may be created by statute as well as by contract. Id., at 571, 92 S.Ct., at 2706. In particular, the Court stated that a person may have a protected property interest in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge. Id., at 576 578, 92 S.Ct., at 2708—2710.

In Sindermann, the Court again emphasized that a person may have a protected property interest in continued public employment. There, a state college teacher alleged that the college had established a de facto system of tenure and that he had obtained tenure under that system. The Court stated that proof of these allegations would establish the teacher's legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge. In these circumstances, the teacher would have a property interest safeguarded by due process, and deprivation of that interest would have to be accompanied by some form of notice and a hearing.

Application of these precedents to the instance case makes plain that appellee is entitled to invoke the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Appellee was a nonprobationary federal employee, and as such he could be discharged only for 'cause.' 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a). The federal statute guaranteeing appellee continued employment absent 'cause' for discharge conferred on him a legitimate claim of entitlement which constituted a 'property' interest under the Fifth Amendment. Thus termination of his employment requires notice and a hearing.

The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statutory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in Roth and Sindermann. Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature of an individual's statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment,2 it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970);3 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, supra.

Having determined that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applies to appellee's discharge from public employment, the question arises whether an evidentiary hearing, including the right to present favorable witnesses and to confront and examine adverse witnesses, must be accorded before removal. The resolution of this issue depends on a balancing process in which the Government's interest in expeditious removal of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263—266, 90 S.Ct., at 1018—1020. As the Court stated in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), 'consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.'

In the present case, the Government's interest, and hence the public's interest, is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline. Such factors are essential if the Government is to perform its responsibilities effectively and economically. To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. Moreover, a requirement of a prior evidentiary hearing would impose additional administrative costs, create delay, and deter warranted discharges. Thus, the Government's interest in being able to act expeditiously to remove an unsatisfactory employee is substantial.4

Appellee's countervailing interest is the continuation of his public employment pending an evidentiary hearing. Since appellee would be reinstated and awarded backpay if he prevails on the merits of his claim, appellee's actual injury would consist of a temporary interruption of his income during the interim. To be sure, even a temporary interruption of income could constitute a serious loss in many instances. But the possible deprivation is considerably less severe than that involved in Goldberg, for example, where termination of welfare benefits to the recipient would have occurred in the face of 'brutal need.' 397 U.S., at 261, 90 S.Ct., at 1017. Indeed, as the Court stated in that case, 'the crucial factor in this context—a factor not present in the case of . . . the discharged government employee . . .—is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.' Id., at 264, 90 S.Ct., at 1018 (emphasis added). By contrast, a public employee may well have independent resources to overcome any temporary hardship, and he may be able to secure a job in the private sector. Alternatively, he will be eligible for welfare benefits.

Appellee also argues that the absence of a prior evidentiary hearing increases the possibility of wrongful removal and that delay in conducting a post-termination evidentiary hearing further aggravates his loss. The present statute and regulations, however, already respond to these concerns. The affected employee is provided with 30 days' advance written notice of the reasons for his proposed discharge and the materials on which the notice is based. He is accorded the right to respond to the charges both orally and in writing, including the submission of affidavits. Upon request, he is entitled to an opportunity to appear personally before the official having the authority to make or recommend the final decision. Although an evidentiary hearing is not held, the employee may make any representations he believes relevant to his case. After removal, the employee receives a full evidentiary hearing, and is awarded backpay if reinstated. See 5 CFR §§ 771.208 and 772.305; 5 U.S.C. § 5596. These procedures minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision and provide for compensation for the affected employee should that decision eventually prove wrongful.5

On balance, I would conclude that a prior evidentiary hearing is not required and that the present statute and regulations comport with due process by providing a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests.6

Mr. Justice WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a), provides that '(a)n individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.'1 The regulations of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), at which appellee was employed, give content to 'cause' by specifying grounds for removal which include 'any action . . . which might result in . . . (a)ffecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of (OEO and) the Government' and any 'criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government.'2

Aside from specifying the standards for discharges, Congress has also established the procedural framework in which the discharge determinations are to be made. The employee is to receive 30 days' advance written notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him, a copy of the charges, and a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges. Before being terminated he may also make a personal appearance before an agency official, and implementing Civil Service Commission regulations provide that '(t)he right to answer personally includes the right to answer orally in person by being given a reasonable opportunity to make any representations which the employee believes might sway the final decision on his case, but does not include the right to a trial or a formal hearing with examination of witnesses.' The regulations further provide that the 'representative or representatives designated to hear the answer shall be persons who have authority either to make a final decision on the proposed adverse action or to recommend what final decision should be made.' The employee is entitled to notice of the agency's decision in writing, and the notice must inform the employee '(w)hich of the reasons in the notice of proposed adverse action have been found sustained and which have been found not sustained.'3 The employee may appeal from an adverse decision and is entitled to an evidentiary trial-type hearing at this stage.4 This later hearing affords the employee certain rights not available with OEO at the pretermination stage, particularly the taking of testimony under oath and the cross-examination of witnesses.

Appellee Kennedy was a nonprobationary federal employee in the competitive civil service and held the position of field representative in the Chicago Regional Office of OEO. As such, he was entitled to the protection of the statutes and regulations outlined above. On February 18, 1972, Kennedy received a 'Notification of Proposed Adverse Action' from the Regional Director of OEO, Wendell Verduin. The notice charged, among other things, that Kennedy had made slanderous statements about Verduin and another coworker charging them with bribing or attempting to bribe a potential OEO grantee and had thereby caused disharmony in his office by preventing its smooth functioning. Verduin then ruled on March 20, 1972, after Kennedy had filed a written answer objecting to the lack of certain procedures furnished at this pretermination hearing, but had declined to appear personally, that Kennedy be removed from his job with OEO, effective March 27, 1972.5

Kennedy then appealed directly to the Civil Service Commission and also instituted the present action. The first count of his complaint alleged that the discharge procedure of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and the attendant Civil Service Commission regulations, deprived him of due process by failing to provide for a full hearing prior to termination. The second count alleged that he was discharged because of certain conversations, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. The single judge who reviewed the complaint convened a three-judge court to hear the first count, and dismissed the second, without prejudice to refiling after the Civil Service Commission ruled on his appeal. It was the court's view that it should not act until the agency had the opportunity to review the rights of appellee's First Amemdnemtn claim.

After the convening of the three-judge court, appellee amended his complaint, then limited to the due process claim, to include a challenge to the Lloyd-La Follette Act on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad and violated the First Amendment.

The three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284, granted summary judgment for appellee. Kennedy v. Sanchez, D.C., 349 F.Supp. 863. It held that the discharge procedures violated due process because '(t)here was no provision .. . for the decision on removal or suspension to be made by an impartial agency official, or for Kennedy (by his own means) to present witnesses; or for his right to confront adverse witnesses.' Id., at 865. The court also held that § 7501 was unconstitutional on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. The Government was ordered to reinstate Kennedy to his former position with backpay and to conduct any future removal proceedings with a hearing consistent with its opinion. Appellants were also enjoined from further enforcement of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and implementing regulations, as 'construed to regulate the speech of competitive service employees.' Id., at 866.

* In my view, three issues must be addressed in this case. First, does the Due Process Clause require that there be a full trial-type hearing at some time when a Federal Government employee in the competitive service is terminated? Secondly, if such be the case, must this hearing be held prior to the discharge of the employee, and, if so, was the process afforded in this case adequate? Third, and as an entirely separate matter, are the Lloyd-La Follette Act and its attendant regulations void for vagueness or overbreadth? I join the Court as to the third issue.

I differ basically with the plurality's view that 'where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet,' and that 'the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which ahd accompanied the grant of that interest.' Ante, at 153—154, 155. The rationale of this position quickly leads to the conclusion that even though the statute requires cause for discharge, the requisites of due process could equally have been satisfied had the law dispensed with any hearing at all, whether pre-termination or post-termination.

The past cases of this Court uniformly indicate that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.6 The principles of due process 'come to us from the law of England . . . and their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown and place him under the protection of the law.' Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123, 9 S.Ct. 231, 234, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889). The 'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.' Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 647, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

This basic principle has unwaveringly been applied when private property has been taken by the State. A fundamental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914). 'It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Where the Court has rejected the need for a hearing prior to the initial 'taking,' a principal rationale has been that a hearing would be provided before the taking became final. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195 (1908) (seizure of food unfit for consumption); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 214, 65 L.Ed. 403 (1921) (seizure of property under Trading with the Enemy Act); Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 50 S.Ct. 94, 74 L.Ed. 378 (1930) (seizure of assets of an absconding husband); Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931) (collection of a tax); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944) (setting of price regulations); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947) (appointment of conservator of assets of savings and loan association); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950) (seizure of misbranded articles in commerce). While these cases indicate that the particular interests involved might not have demanded a hearing immediately, they also reaffirm the principle that property may not be taken without a hearing at some time.

This principle has also been applied in situations where the State has licensed certain activities. Where the grant or denial of a license has been involved, and the 'right' to engage in business has been legitimately limited by the interest of the State in protecting its citizens from inexpert or unfit performance, the decision of the State to grant or deny a license has been subject to a hearing requirement. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, supra (licensing of physicians); Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 46 S.Ct. 215, 70 L.Ed. 494 (1926) (licensing of accountant); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963) (admission to the bar). The Court has put particular stress on the fact that the absence of a hearing would allow the State to be arbitrary in its grant or denial, and to make judgments on grounds other than the fitness of a particular person to pursue his chosen profession. In the context of admission to the bar, the Court has stated: 'Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). The hearing requirement has equally been applied when the license was to be removed. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), or a licensee has been subject to state regulation, Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937).

Similar principles prevail when the State affords its process and mechanism of dispute settlement, its law enforcement officers, and its courts, in aiding one person to take property from another. Where there is a 'taking' before a final determination of rights, as in some cases when the State seizes property, to protect one of the parties pendente lite, the Court has acted on the assumption that at some time a full hearing will be available, as when there is an attachment of property preliminary to resolution of the merits of a dispute, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921); Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768 (1928); McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, 49 S.Ct. 344, 73 L.Ed. 975 (1929). The opportunity to defend one's property before it is finally taken is so basic that it hardly bears repeating. Adequate notice of the court proceeding must be furnished, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and there must be jurisdiction over the person, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878).

Since there is a need for some kind of hearing before a person is finally deprived of his property, the argument in the instant case, and that adopted in the plurality opinion, is that there is something different about a final taking from an individual or property rights which have their origin in the public rather than the private sector of the economy, and, as applied here, that there is no need for any hearing at any time when the Government discharges a person from his job, even though good cause for the discharge is required.

In cases involving employment by the Government, the earliest cases of this Court have distinguished between two situations, where the entitlement to the job is conditioned 'at the pleasure' of the employer and where the job is to be held subject to certain requirements being met by the employee, as when discharge must be for 'cause.' The Court has stated: 'The inquiry is, therefore, whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law . . .. If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by Constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.' Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425, 21 S.Ct. 842, 845, 45 L.Ed. 1162 (1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314, 23 S.Ct. 535, 536, 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903). The Court has thus made clear that Congress may limit the total discretion of the Executive in firing an employee, by providing that terminations be for cause, and only for cause, and, if it does so, notice and a hearing are 'essential.'

Where Executive discretion is not limited, there is no need for a hearing. In the latter event, where the statute has provided that employment was conditioned on "maintain(ing) the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers," Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 14, 15 L.Ed. 565 (1857) (attorney and counsellor of court), or was subject to no conditions at all, Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 225, 10 L.Ed. 138 (1839) (clerk of the court), no hearing is required. See also Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 10 S.Ct. 431, 33 L.Ed. 825 (1890) (Navy officer could be removed at will); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (district attorney could be terminated by the President at his pleasure); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900) (post office clerks removable at pleasure). To like effect is Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), where the Court held that no hearing need be provided to a cook employed by a private concessionaire of the Navy before the Government revoked her security clearance. The revocation of security clearances was within the 'unfettered control' of the Navy in order 'to manage the internal operation of an important federal military establishment.' Id., at 896, 81 S.Ct., at 1749. The Court there assumed that 'Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for her exclusion had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory . . ..' Id., at 898, 81 S.Ct. at 1750.

Where the Congress has confined Executive discretion, notice and hearing have been required. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 952 L.Ed. 817 (1951), an organization was put on the Attorney General's list, as disloyal to the United States, without a hearing before the Attorney General. The Executive Order, as defined by implementing regulations, required the executive to make an 'appropriate determination' of disloyalty. It was apparent that members of organizations employed by the Government who belonged to an organization on the Attorney General's list would be in danger of losing their jobs. The Court held, assuming the facts as alleged by the complaints were true, that it would be arbitrary, and not consistent with an 'appropriate determination,' to deny a hearing on the matter to the affected organizations. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion, '(t)he heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.' Id., at 170, 71 S.Ct., at 647.

To some extent, McGrath, and like cases, see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), depended on statutory construction—the intent of Congress to require that procedural fairness be observed in making decisions on security clearances or status, which affected employment—but it is obvious that the constitutional requirements of fairness were a guiding hand to the Court's statutory interpretation. 'Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process,' and it has been 'the Court's concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation's law-makers . . ..' Id., at 507—508, 79 S.Ct., at 1419.

The concern of the Court that fundamental fairness be observed when the State deals with its employees has not been limited to action which is discriminatory and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, as in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 91 S.Ct. 1772, 29 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971). It has been observed that 'constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or disciminatory.' Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, 344 u.S., at 192, 73 S.Ct., at 219; Slochower v. Board of Education, supra, 350 U.S., at 556, 76 S.Ct., at 640. (Emphasis added.) In Slochower, supra, New York law provided that a tenured employee taking the Fifth Amendment before a legislative committee inquiring into his official conduct could be fired. Quite apart from the Fifth Amendment 'penalty' assessed by the State, the Court was concerned with the arbitrariness of drawing a conclusion, without a hearing, that any employee who took the Fifth Amendment was guilty or unfit for employment. The Court stated:

'This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an associated professor of German at Brooklyn College. The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has been no such inquiry here.' Id., at 559, 76 S.Ct., at 641.

The Court's decisions in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), reiterate the notion that the Executive Branch cannot be arbitrary in depriving a person of his job, when the Legislative Branch has provided that a person cannot be fired except for cause, and, if anything, extend the principles beyond the facts of this case.

In Sindermann, a teacher who had held his position for a number of years but was not tenured under contract, alleged that he had de facto tenure under contract law due to 'the existence of rules or understandings' with the college which employed him, id., at 602, 92 S.Ct., at 2700. The Court held that if the professor could prove the existence of a property interest it would 'obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.' Id., at 603, 92 S.Ct., at 2700. In Roth, an assistant professor was hired for a fixed term of one academic year, and had no tenure. The Court held that the teacher had no property interest in the job, since the terms of employment allowed that his contract not be renewed. The critical consideration was that the terms 'did not provide for contract renewal absent 'sufficient cause." 408 U.S., at 578, 92 S.Ct., at 2709. The rights to continued employment were determined by state law. The Court took great pains, however, to point out that a tenured appointment, providing for entitlement to a job, absent cause, would be a far different case.

These cases only serve to emphasize that where there is a legitimate entitlement to a job, as when a person is given employment subject to his meeting certain specific conditions, due process requires, in order to insure against arbitrariness by the State in the adminstration of its law, that a person be given notice and a hearing before he is finally discharged. As the Court stated in Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172, 56 S.Ct. 400, 403, 80 L.Ed. 561 (1936):

'If (the adminsitrative officer) is authorized to determine questions of fact his decision must be accepted unless he exceeds his authority . . . by failing to follow a procedure which satisfies elementary standards of fairness and reasonableness essential to the due conduct of the proceeding which Congress has authorized.'

To be sure, to determine the existence of the property interest, as for example, whether a teacher is tenured or not, one looks to the controlling law, in this case federal statutory law, the Lloyd-La Follette Act, which provides that a person can only be fired for cause. The fact that the origins of the property right are with the State makes no difference for the nature of the procedures required. While the State may define what is and what is not property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I understand it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposition.

I conclude, therefore, that as a matter of due process, a hearing must be held at some time before a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated for misconduct. Here, the Constitution and the Lloyd-La Follette Act converge, because a full trial-type hearing is provided by statute before termination from the service becomes final, by way of appeal either through OEO, the Civil Service Commission, or both.7

A different case might be put, of course, if the termination were for reasons of pure inefficiency, assuming such a general reason could be given, in which case it would be at least arguable that a hearing would serve no useful purpose and that judgments of this kind are best left to the discretion of administrative officials. This is not such a case, however, since Kennedy was terminated on specific charges of misconduct.

The second question which must be addressed is whether a hearing of some sort must be held before any 'taking' of the employee's property interest in his job occurs, even if a full hearing is available before that taking becomes final. I must resolve this question because in my view a full hearing must be afforded at some juncture and the claim is that it must occur prior to termination. If the right to any hearing itself is a pure matter of property definition, as the plurality opinion suggests, then that question need not be faced, for any kind of hearing, or no hearing at all, would suffice. As I have suggested, the State may not dispense with the minimum procedures defined by due process, but different considerations come into play when deciding whether a pretermination hearing is required and, if it is, what kind of hearing must be had.

In passing upon claims to a hearing before preliminary but nonfinal deprivations, the usual rule of this Court has been that a full hearing at some time suffices. 'We have repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective.' 'It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination.' Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S., at 598—599, 70 S.Ct., at 872. See also Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 596—597, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611—612, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931); Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611, 631—632, 25 S.Ct. 345, 351—352, 49 L.Ed. 619 (1905); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 593—594, 26 L.Ed. 253 (1881). This has seemingly been the rule whether the State was taking property from the person, as in the above-cited cases, or whether one person was taking it from another through the process of state courts. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921); Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768 (1928); McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, 49 S.Ct. 344, 73 L.Ed. 975 (1929).

In recent years, however, in a limited number of cases, the Court has held that a hearing must be furnished at the first stage of taking, even where a later hearing was provided. This has been true in the revocation of a state-granted license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), and in suits between private parties, where summary replevin procedures, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), or garnishment procedures, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), were attacked, and when the State has sought to terminate welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).8

These conflicting lines of cases demonstrate, as the Court stated in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S., at 895, 81 S.Ct., at 1748, that 'consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1513, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S., at 263, 90 S.Ct., at 1018. In assessing whether a prior hearing is required, the Court has looked to how the legitimate interests asserted by the party asserting the need for a hearing, and the party opposing it, would be furthered or hindered.

In many cases, where the claim to a pretermination hearing has been rejected, it appears that the legitimate interest of the party opposing the hearing might be defeated outright if such hearing were to be held.9 For example, when the Government or a private party lays claim to property there is often the danger that the person in possession of the property may alienate or waste it, and the Government or private party may be without recourse. Thus, the Court has held that there is no need for a prior hearing where the Government has taken preliminary custody of alleged enemy property before actual title to the property is determined, Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 214, 65 L.Ed. 403 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 41 S.Ct. 293, 65 L.Ed. 604 (1921), or where a private creditor has sought to attach property of a debtor. See Ownbey v. Morgan, supra; Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, supra; McKay v. McInnes, supra. Of course, such summary action must be authorized in such a manner as to minimize the possibilities of a mistaken deprivation, by a public official in the case of administrative action, or a judge where the processes of the court are used. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra.

The danger that the purpose of the action may be defeated, or made exceedingly difficult, by requiring a prior hearing, is illustrated by North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195 (1908), where the Court sustained the constitutionality of an Illinois statute permitting health inspectors to enter cold-storage houses and 'forthwith seize, condemn and destroy' unfit food. The defendants in the action claimed that while it may be necessary to seize the food pending a hearing, surely destruction of that food could not be justified. Nenetheless, the Court observed:

'If a hearing were to be always necessary, even under the circumstances of this case, the question at once arises as to what is to be done with the food in the meantime. Is it to remain with the cold storage company, and, if so, under what security that it will not be removed? To be sure that it will not be removed during the time necessary for the hearing, which might frequently be indefinitely prolonged, some guard would probably have to be placed over the subject-matter of the investigation, which would involve expense, and might not even then prove effectual.' Id., at 320, 29 S.Ct., at 106.

Similar inabilities of the party claiming a right to a prior hearing, to make the moving party in the suit whole, have appeared where incompetence and malfeasance in the administration of a bank could precipitate a financial collapse in the community, which would go uncompensated, see Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S., at 250, 67 S.Ct., at 1554, or where, in the absence of a jeopardy assessment by the Tax Commissioner, a taxpayer might waste or conceal his assets, see Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra. In all such cases it is also significant that the party advancing the claim to a summary procedure stands ready to make whole the party who has been deprived of his property, if the initial taking proves to be wrongful, either by the credit of the public fisc or by posting a bond.

Of course, this principle cannot be applied with success to explain the Court's decisions in cases holding that a pretermination hearing is required; it is not true that the party entitled to the hearing stands ready to compensate the adversary for what may be the wrongful possession of the property in question during the pendency of the litigation. This is vividly illustrated in Goldberg v. Kelly where the Court observed that 'the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment proof.' 397 U.S., at 266, 90 S.Ct., at 1019. However, other considerations have proved decisive, such as: the risk that the initial deprivation may be wrongful; the impact on the claimant to a hearing of not having the property while he waits for a full hearing; the interest of the party opposing the prior hearing and asserting the need for immediate possession in not alerting the current possessor to the lawsuit; and the risk of leaving the property in possession of the current possessor between the time notice is supplied and the time of the preliminary hearing.

In Goldberg and Sniadach, the Court observed that there was a substantial chance that the claimant to the property, be it the State or garnishor, would lose in the ultimate resolution of the controversy. In Goldberg, the Court took note of the 'welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility.' 397 U.S., at 264 n. 12, 90 S.Ct., at 1019. Since the time of the decision in Goldberg, at least one study has shown that decisions to terminate benefits have been reversed with a fair degree of frequency.10 Concern was also expressed with the use of garnishment in a vast number of cases where the debt was fraudulent. Sniadach, 395 U.S., at 341, 89 S.Ct., at 1822. In Fuentes, although no such empirical evidence was available, the risk of wrongful deprivations was unnecessarily increased by allowing a clerk, rather than a judge, to pass on the creditor's claim for summary replevin. In Bell, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute requiring summary suspension of a driver's license of any uninsured motorist who was unable after an accident to post security for the amount of the damages claimed against him. The only hearing held by the State on the issue of suspension excluded any consideration of fault, the standard on which the validity would ultimately turn. Without some kind of probable-cause determination of fault, it was obvious that many suspensions would prove to be unwarranted.

As for the impact on the current property possessor of not having an early pretermination hearing, the Court has held that without possession of the property a person may be unable to exist at even a minimum standard of decency. In Goldberg, where the person would have lost the last source of support available, aside from charity, the Court observed that 'termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate.' 397 U.S., at 264, 90 S.Ct., at 1018. In fact, the magnitude of deprivation may be such as to prevent the welfare recipient from pursuing his right to a later full hearing. Ibid. In Sniadach, the seizure of an individual's wages could 'as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.' 395 U.S., at 341 342, 89 S.Ct., at 1823 (footnote omitted). In Bell, the petitioner was a clergyman whose ministry required him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities, and he was 'severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses.' 402 U.S., at 537, 91 S.Ct., at 1588. The impact of deprivation increases, of course, the longer the time period between the initial deprivation and the opportunity to have a full hearing. I