The government charged that the defendants conspired together and with others to possess and distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana between December 1986 and February 1988. The evidence against each of the defendants was gathered during the course of an undercover investigation that focused on the drug trafficking activities of Apolinar Marquez, a dealer who was indicted along with the defendants and subsequently pleaded guilty. The government set up drug buys from Marquez and tapped his home phone, along with the business phone of codefendant Luis Diaz; anyone who discussed drugs on these two phone lines was indicted as a member of the conspiracy. The indictment charged nineteen defendants as members of the conspiracy; seven are parties to this appeal. Defendants Luis Diaz, Carlos Mejia, Joseph Angel Claudio, and Orlando Nunez, the government asserted, supplied narcotics to Marquez; Dorothy Taylor and Mason Townsend purchased drugs from Marquez for distribution to their own customers. Isabel Marquez, Apolinar's wife, assisted him in his dealings with these and other codefendants who are not parties to this appeal. On appeal, the defendants argue jointly that the government's proof failed to establish the existence of a single, ongoing conspiracy, as charged in its indictment.

As will be seen, the evidence clearly demonstrated that all but one of the defendants conspired with someone to distribute drugs. Why, then, do we care whether there was one conspiracy or many; what does it matter whether the defendants conspired as one large group or several smaller groups? There are at least three reasons. First, alleging a single conspiracy enables the government to join a group of defendants together for trial, and joint trials almost always prejudice the rights of individual defendants to some degree. Some trade-off between prejudice and efficiency is, of course, necessary for the judicial system to function; otherwise "the slow pace of our court system would go from a crawl to paralysis." United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir.1990). Nevertheless, defendants are tried together only in cases where the prejudice to the defendant does not deprive him of a fundamentally fair trial and where a joint trial contributes significantly to the efficiency of the judicial system. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 2 (Rules of criminal procedure "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.").

Second, and particularly apposite to this case, by alleging a single conspiracy, the government may invoke the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), to admit evidence against defendants that would otherwise be inadmissible. Statements of any of the defendants can be used to establish not only the existence of a conspiracy but also to establish that a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc). In briefs filed before our decision in Martinez de Ortiz, the appellants jointly contested the government's use of coconspirator statements to prove each defendant's membership in a conspiracy. That argument is moot now, but the appellants' challenge underscores the potency of the coconspirator exception and the need to ensure that it is invoked only against those who have actually conspired with the declarant.

And third, coconspirators are liable for the substantive crimes committed by members of the conspiracy that are in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). A finding that a defendant joined a conspiracy therefore exposes that defendant to much more than criminal liability for joining the conspiracy; he or she also faces liability for the substantive crimes of the conspiracy. A related consideration arises in drug cases. The type of drug with which one is involved does not change the nature of crime; 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a) applies to all illicit drugs. Nevertheless, the penalties incurred vary dramatically with the type of drug involved in the offense. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b). One convicted, as were the appellants in this case, of a conspiracy to distribute a variety of drugs can be sentenced to the highest range applicable to the drugs in which the conspiracy dealt even if the evidence suggests that a defendant had nothing to do with that drug. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846.

The creation of the Sentencing Guidelines did nothing to limit a conspirator's derivative exposure, because under the Guidelines conspirators must be sentenced on the basis of the total quantity of drugs the conspiracy can reasonably be estimated to have dealt in. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 and comment. (n.1e); United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 496-97 (7th Cir.1989). Moreover, the Guidelines provide equivalency tables that effectively increase the sentence awarded for trafficking in more dangerous drugs. See Sec. 2D1.1.

The defendants style their claim as one of a fatal "variance" between the government's indictment and its proof.1 We have in the past noted that a conspiracy variance claim amounts to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding that each defendant was a member of the same conspiracy. Whether a single conspiracy exists is a question of fact; consequently "[t]he jury gets first crack at deciding 'whether there is one conspiracy or several when the possibility of a variance appears.' " United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 609 (7th Cir.1985)). This is because the jury's verdict must be interpreted as a finding that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove its indictment beyond reasonable doubt, and that is all that we require of the prosecution. The fact that the government's evidence might also be consistent with an alternate theory is irrelevant; the law does not require the government to disprove every conceivable hypothesis of innocence in order to sustain a conviction on an indictment proved beyond reasonable doubt. United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 361 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir.1989). Consequently, "even if the evidence arguably establishe[d] multiple conspiracies, there [is] no material variance from an indictment charging a single conspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment." United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 959 (11th Cir.1989).

A "sufficiency of the evidence" approach to solving the multiple conspiracy puzzle can be misleading, however, because it suggests that if the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that a defendant conspired with every defendant charged in the indictment his conviction must fall. That conclusion is incorrect. The crime of conspiracy focuses on agreements, not groups. True, it takes at least two to conspire, but the government doesn't have to prove with whom a defendant conspired; it need only prove that the defendant joined the agreement alleged, not the group. "[I]t is the grand jury's statement of the 'existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the identity of those who agree' which places the defendant on notice of the charge he must be prepared to meet." United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1239 (6th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir.1982)). Thus the government is permitted to allege in an indictment, as it did in this case, that, in addition to the defendants named in a conspiracy count, the defendants conspired "with others known and unknown to the grand jury." See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375, 71 S.Ct. 438, 443, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951); see also United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 465 (11th Cir.1982) (no fatal variance when indictment charged conspiracy among named defendants and "one other person known to grand jury" and no evidence presented at trial of any additional person's involvement). So to overturn a conspiracy conviction on the ground of variance, an appellant must show both that he did not conspire with each defendant and that he was prejudiced by being tried with defendants who were not his coconspirators. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) ("Any ... variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1241, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) ("The only question is whether petitioners have suffered substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general conspiracy by evidence which the Government admits proved not one conspiracy but some eight or more...."); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 744 (7th Cir.1969) ("Having found that two conspiracies were proved instead of the one charged, this Court must decide whether the rights of defendants have been prejudiced by all the defendants being tried together.").

To join a conspiracy, then, is to join an agreement, rather than a group. It follows that to be a conspirator you must know of the agreement, United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1985), and must intend to join it, United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 410 (7th Cir.1987). See also United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407, 414-15 (7th Cir.1990) (citing cases). Defendants, while conceding that the evidence may have shown that several agreements to distribute drugs existed among various subgroups, contend that the government presented no evidence that any of those dealing with Apolinar Marquez knew of, or intended to join, a larger agreement between Marquez and others to distribute drugs.

In evaluating these claims, we need not limit our search to direct evidence. Conspiracies, like other crimes, may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1990). If the prosecution presents enough circumstantial evidence to support, beyond reasonable doubt, an inference that the defendants agreed among themselves to distribute drugs, a jury would be justified in convicting those defendants of conspiring together. The critical question, then, is whether the jury may reasonably infer a single agreement among the defendants from the evidence of the drug transactions presented by the government.

Typically we say that if the evidence indicates that a defendant must have known that his actions were benefitting a larger conspiracy, he may be said to have agreed to join that conspiracy.2 Seizing upon this logic, the government submits that by dealing with Apolinar Marquez, who was known by each defendant to be a large-scale drug dealer, each defendant supported, and therefore conspired with, the others with whom Marquez dealt. Taken to its extreme, the government's logic suggests that anyone selling or buying drugs from any one of these defendants also could have been convicted as a coconspirator. Anyone who does so must know, so its reasoning goes, that he's dealing with someone connected to a large drug conspiracy; each benefits from dealing with the conspiracy; therefore each participant is a member of the conspiracy.3

We think the government's argument stretches the boundaries of conspiracy law to the breaking point. We recognize that, by their very nature, drug conspiracies are loosely-knit ensembles. Where drug distribution conspiracies are charged, we can often infer that "the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers, and the retailers knew that the middlemen must buy of importers of one sort or another." United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257 (1939). But the liability of members of the distribution chain is predicated upon the notion that participants at different levels in the chain know that the success of those at each level hinges upon the success of the others and therefore cooperate for their mutual benefit. Only if "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not, and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers," id., will the inference of knowledge and benefit be valid.

One may question, however, whether "the links of a narcotics conspiracy are inextricably related to one another, from grower, through exporter and importer, to wholesaler, middleman, and retailer, each depending for his own success on the performance of all the others." United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 383 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1964). The suppliers in a "chain" are not necessarily interested in the success of a particular retailer, or group of retailers, down the line. If the chain is characterized by sporadic dealings between independent dealers, what do suppliers care if the middlemen are able to unload the stuff further? As Judge Friendly noted in Borelli,

however reasonable the so-called presumption of continuity may be as to all the participants of a conspiracy which intends a single act, such as the robbing of a bank, or even as to the core of a conspiracy to import or resell narcotics, its force is diminished as to the outer links--buyers indifferent to their sources of supply and turning from one source to another, and suppliers equally indifferent to the identity of their customers.

336 F.2d at 384. We reiterated this point in Cerro, where we observed that "the viability of wholesale drug trafficking does not depend on the adherence of any single dealer. Lop off one dealer, and the wholesaler can hire another in his place...." 775 F.2d at 914.

The chain paradigm is also flawed because it does little to establish any relationship between parties tied horizontally rather than vertically--i.e. those working at the same level of distribution--when they are charged with conspiring together. To evaluate these relationships we often invoke another conspiratorial paradigm--the wheel--comprised of a group of conspirators playing similar roles--the "spokes"--each related to the activities of a single "hub" conspirator or group. Again, however, mere knowledge of the hub's activities, or those of the other spokes, is not enough to tie the conspiracy together. In Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558-59, 68 S.Ct. 248, 257, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947), for example, the Court distinguished the multiple conspiracies of Kotteakos from the single "wheel" conspiracy it was addressing:

Except for ... the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through. And none aided in any way, by agreement or otherwise, in procuring another's loan. The conspiracies therefore were distinct and disconnected, not parts of a larger general scheme.... Here the contrary is true.

Neither of these paradigms suffices, then, to show mutual support or interest among the component parts of the organizational construct. They don't eliminate the need to inquire directly into whether the defendants had a mutual interest in achieving the goal of the conspiracy and their relevance is therefore questionable. The fact that we can squeeze a group into a hypothetical organizational chart says little about whether a single agreement exists between the members of the group. As we observed in United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.1990), an enterprise "can have many divisions, programs, activities, contracts; they are not all a single agreement just because a handful of top officers is in charge of the entire firm and some of the lower-level employees may work on more than one program or contract."

It is easy to say, as we have in the past, that to be liable as coconspirators, defendants must be mutually dependent on one another, United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 607 (7th Cir.1985), or must render mutual support, Cerro, 775 F.2d at 914. But "it is a great deal harder to tell just what agreement can reasonably be inferred from the purchase, even the repeated purchase, of contraband...." Borelli, 336 F.2d at 384. By definition, market transactions--whether in legal or illegal markets--benefit both parties, but we do not assume, ab initio, that they carry with them the excess baggage of conspiracy. The agreement between the parties may not transcend the scope of the transaction itself. For example, in the absence of other evidence we would not presume that one who purchases drugs from a dealer who also runs an automobile "chop shop" intends to join the car theft ring, even if he knows about it. Neither activity necessarily, or even logically, advances the other. The analysis doesn't change when the other party confines his criminal activities to one market. For example, if a thief plans to rob two banks, with a different accomplice on each occasion, we do not presume, from this fact alone, that the three bank robbers have conspired together, even if each accomplice knows that his partner is also planning a robbery with someone else. See Note, Developments in the Law-Conspiracy, 72 HARV.L.REV. 920, 933 (1959).

By the same token, when dealer A sells drugs to dealer B, we don't presume that A has agreed to work for the benefit of everyone else with whom B deals, or that A benefits from B's other deals. If A knows of, and benefits from, B's subsequent distribution, we may infer a limited agreement to distribute between A and B. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir.1985) ("while the ultimate consumer is not himself a conspirator ... the middleman is"). But agreement to join other endeavors and distributors "cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally." Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 1268, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943) (interpreting United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940)). The scope of a conspiracy is determined by the scope of the agreement, United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1322 (7th Cir.1989), and if the jury is to infer an agreement to join a conspiracy that transcends the scope of a more limited conspiracy, there must be some additional evidence to justify taking the inference further:

A seller of narcotics in bulk surely knows that the purchasers will undertake to resell the goods over an uncertain period of time, and the circumstances may also warrant the inference that a supplier or a purchaser indicated a willingness to repeat. But a sale or a purchase scarcely constitutes a sufficient basis for inferring agreement to cooperate with the opposite parties for whatever period they continue to deal in this type of contraband, unless some such understanding is evidenced by other conduct which accompanies or supplements the transaction.

Borelli, 336 F.2d at 384 (emphasis added).

To sustain a conspiracy conviction, then, there must be "more than suspicion, more than knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, [or] lack of concern." Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713, 63 S.Ct. at 1270. Drug dealers are no more likely to be confederates than are criminals who engage in disparate activities; this is true even if A knows that B deals with others as well. In United States v. Dennis, 917 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.1990), for example, we reversed the conspiracy conviction of a defendant that was supported only by evidence that he had sold drugs to the same source as another defendant. In United States v. North, 900 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.1990), the court vacated the sentence of a defendant convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs that was based, in part, on a quantity of drugs found in the possession of his coconspirator. Remanding the case for resentencing, the court observed that "North [the defendant] admits that he knew that Murphy sold drugs to other persons.... Murphy's other sales were merely another part of Murphy's distribution practice and we cannot say that every act of distribution taken by Murphy, once North became involved with Murphy, was in the furtherance of their conspiracy." Id. at 134 (emphasis supplied); cf. United States v. Fiorito, 499 F.2d 106, 109 (7th Cir.1974) (evidence of conspiratorial conversation between two drug dealers insufficient to link the larger distribution conspiracies in which they were separately involved). Similarly, in United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.1987), the court reversed the conspiracy conviction of a defendant charged with joining a conspiracy to import and possess marijuana and hashish when the evidence revealed that, although she knew the core conspirators planned to distribute both drugs, she had only helped to smuggle hashish. The court held that her knowledge, coupled with her limited participation, was inadequate to support the inference that she had agreed to further the marijuana smuggling, noting that there was no evidence that the two operations were interdependent or that one facilitated completion of the other. Id. at 858 and 859.

Granted, one crime might aid the commission of another, but the point is that we cannot infer that both parties agreed to work together to achieve that result from the fact that they engaged together in some other crime. Id. at 859. One may know of, and assist (even intentionally), a substantive crime without joining a conspiracy to commit the crime--witness the landlord who rents to an illegal gambling den, see United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.1990), and the retailer who sells sugar to one he knows will use it to make bootleg whiskey, see United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940). We cannot, then, reasonably assume that everyone with whom a drug dealer does business benefits, directly or indirectly, from his other drug deals. In fact, any inference should probably run in the other direction. There is--hard though it may be to believe--a finite supply of drugs. Those in the market to sell or buy large quantities (for distribution) are just as likely, if not more, to be competitors as collaborators. Consider, for example, Fiorito, 499 F.2d at 109, where evidence suggesting that two drug dealers were competitors influenced our conclusion that "there was nothing to show that [the defendant dealer] was part of the larger conspiracy [of the other dealer] charged in the indictment."

To be sure, the landlord in our example might be liable under civil forfeiture provisions, and, along with the retailer, might be liable for aiding and abetting the substantive offenses, but we do not subject them to additional liability as conspirators simply because they aided the conspiracy and derived a benefit from doing so. "Aiding, abetting, and counseling are not terms which presuppose the existence of an agreement. Those terms have a broader application, making the defendant a principal when he consciously shares in a criminal act, regardless of the existence of a conspiracy." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11, 74 S.Ct. 358, 364, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); see also Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620, 69 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949) ("Aiding and abetting rests on a broader base [than does conspiracy]; it states a rule of criminal responsibility for acts which one assists another in performing.").

The reason for the distinction is simple. We punish conspiracy because joint action is, generally, more dangerous than individual action. "[W]hat makes the joint action of a group of n persons more fearsome than the individual actions of those n persons is the division of labor and the mutual psychological support that collaboration affords." L. KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1987); see also United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir.1986); Developments in the Law--Conspiracy, supra, at 924. Both the conspiracy and the market transaction are agreements, but only conspiracy poses the added danger of group action. True, aiding and abetting presupposes the existence of more than one actor, but aiders and abettors are already punished as principals. To justify imposing additional criminal liability,4 there must be some additional evidence that their actions are intended to bring about the object of the conspiracy. Conspiracies, which are really "agreements to agree" on the multitude of decisions and acts necessary to successfully pull off a crime, pose an additional risk that the object of the conspiracy will be achieved, and so warrant additional penalties.

For this reason, evidence of a buyer-seller relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. A sale, by definition, requires two parties; their combination for that limited purpose does not increase the likelihood that the sale will take place, so conspiracy liability would be inappropriate. Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1265. (By contrast, when an agreement requires something more than the simple exchange of drugs for money, such as obtaining drugs for distribution--see, e.g., Manzella--adding liability to that carried by the substantive offense may be appropriate.) The buy-sell transaction is simply not probative of an agreement to join together to accomplish a criminal objective beyond that already being accomplished by the transaction. As we explained long ago in United States v. Ford, 324 F.2d 950, 952 (7th Cir.1963), and recently reiterated in United States v. Kimmons, 917 F.2d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir.1990), "[t]he relationship of buyer and seller absent any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the mere sales agreement does not prove a conspiracy.... In such circumstances, the buyer's purpose is to buy; the seller's purpose is to sell. There is no joint objective." The mere purchase or sale of drugs (even in large quantities) does not demonstrate an agreement to join a drug distribution conspiracy "any more than a purchase of 100 tons of steel to build a skyscraper shows that the buyer has 'joined' the corporate enterprise of the manufacturer." United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 206, 112 L.Ed.2d 167 (1990).

The analogy to the corporate arena is apt. What distinguishes a conspiratorial agreement from an isolated transaction also distinguishes a decision to incorporate from one to let a contract. In the jargon of economists, business combinations--whether corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, or other variations--exist because they lower the transaction costs of legitimate profit-seeking endeavors. Conspiracies exist for the same reason--to lower the transaction costs of committing crimes. Rather than having "to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on," in order to accomplish a goal--whether legitimate or illegitimate--corporations and conspiracies "will emerge to organize what would otherwise be market transactions...." See Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW at 6-7 (1988). Conspiracies aren't necessary to the commission of crime; a single person can commit a crime without any assistance at all, or with the limited assistance of others who do not know of his goal or who have no stake in the success of his venture. But conspiracies are often convenient to the commission of crime, because they yield the benefits of group activity that make it more likely that the crime born of a conspiratorial agreement will actually occur than the crime that is the product of individual effort.

A conspiracy "is a partnership in criminal purposes," United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910), and "[c]onspirators, like partners, are mutual agents." Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d at 632. Conspiracies, like all business ventures, are typically distinguished by cooperative relationships between the parties that facilitate achievement of the goal. See, e.g., Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713, 63 S.Ct. at 1270 (evidence of "informed and interested cooperation" permitted the jury to take "the [inferential] step from knowledge to intent and agreement"); Auerbach, 407 F.2d at 415 (evidence suggested "a close working relationship that belie[d defendant's] claim that he was unaware of conspiracy"); United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 896-97 (7th Cir.1988) (evidence suggested "an ongoing business" that "contemplated other sales of marijuana ... whenever a shipment came in"); United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting Direct Sales ). True, any business combination "conceivably could be viewed as a nexus of separate transactions." Paiz, 905 F.2d at 1020 n. 4; see also L. KATZ, supra at 264-68 (cautioning that cooperation may exist in the absence of agreement). The reverse, however, is unlikely to be true; higher transaction costs will distinguish most market transactions from cooperative ventures. Evidence that the parties must negotiate the terms of every transaction, seek to maximize their gains at the expense of others, or engage in other forms of opportunistic behavior at the expense of the group, suggests that transaction costs among the group are high and counsel against a finding of conspiracy between its members.

With the foregoing in mind, we turn now to the evidence to determine whether it was sufficient to establish that the defendants agreed among themselves to distribute drugs.5

The government presented abundant evidence demonstrating that Apolinar Marquez frequently purchased drugs from defendant Luis Diaz.6 Marquez frequently turned to Diaz to fill drug orders placed by Special Agent Tommy Wofford, of the Illinois State Police, who was posing as a drug dealer from Minnesota named "Gordon." When Wofford met with Marquez on January 8, 1987, to purchase 12 ounces of heroin, Marquez told him that he had to wait for his "partner" to obtain the drugs. Marquez explained that "the brother of my partner" controlled heroin distribution, while he (Marquez) was "the boss" for cocaine deals. After telling Wofford to meet him later in the afternoon, Marquez was seen at Diaz's auto repair garage at least 3 times later that afternoon. This transaction between Marquez and Wofford never materialized, but Diaz did supply 6 grams of heroin to Marquez on March 27, 1987, enabling Marquez to sell the heroin to Agent Wofford. (Marquez had been unable to obtain the heroin from another source earlier that day.) Diaz was present in Marquez's car when the sale was made in the parking lot of a McDonald's restaurant in Chicago. When Agent Wofford sought to buy 5 ounces of heroin from Marquez in April, Marquez called a number of sources, including Diaz:

Diaz: How many?

Marquez: Five.

Diaz: Uhm!

Marquez: Five boxes.

Diaz: No, at this time, I can't.

Marquez: Hum?

Diaz: You know, it's too much, I can't do this.

Marquez: Okay.

Diaz: Maybe next time.

Marquez: Okay.

Marquez did call Diaz the next time Wofford ordered drugs, on June 17, asking for half a kilogram of cocaine. When, on the morning of June 18 Diaz failed to provide the cocaine on time, Marquez threatened to get it from someone else. Diaz responded, "Damn, no.... I've already ordered it." Marquez did call another supplier, Hugo Santos, who agreed to supply Marquez within 20 minutes. Santos also failed to show, however; Diaz may have ultimately supplied the cocaine for this deal because he was spotted later that day leaving Marquez's house carrying the bag in which Agent Wofford had placed the money he paid to Marquez. Still later that day, the government's wiretap picked up a cryptic conversation7 between Diaz and a garage employee, Luis Albert Rivera, in which Diaz told him:

Damn. Who the hell was it who told him I was doing that business? Who was it he told me--that there was someone he had told. Damn, Albert. I think--I think I'm going to jail, you know, Albert? I think we're going to jail, you know? Damn, man, with the business we did for Apolinar, brother. With the business we did for Apolinar."

Despite these concerns, Diaz continued to do business with Marquez. After Agent Wofford called Marquez on June 23 to order 2 kilograms of heroin, Diaz again agreed to supply Marquez with the drugs. Once again, however, Diaz had trouble obtaining the drugs. Diaz spent most of the day on June 26, the day Wofford and Marquez set for the buy, trying to locate the drugs; Marquez spent most of the day trying to locate Diaz. One conversation between the two is sufficient to convey the state of their relationship on that day:

Marquez: You'll be here very soon?

Diaz: Yes.

Marquez: Are you telling me the truth or a lie?

Diaz: No, this is a--a serious thing, listen.... They put a young guy to wash the car, right? And they left the hose on and everything got soaked. They are drying the rugs and all that shit there.

Marquez: No, man, I can't tell the people a story like that man! ... How long until you're here at the house, man?

Diaz: Uh, it won't take less than thirty minutes to get there.

Marquez: No, man, it can't take that long, man.

Diaz: Uh-huh. That's fine.

Marquez: But what is fine, Luis? Speak to me clearly, man. (Pause) Speak to me clearly.... Listen, I don't want this bullshit. Damn, I'm ashamed, man.

Diaz: All right. I'll be there very soon. Tell him not to worry.

. . . . .

Marquez: But listen to me Luis. This isn't a game, this is since nine, since nine this morning, Luis. Then at four, and at four, its six--five thirty. It's quarter to six now, Luis.... The next time there's not going to be anything, because I can't be having these problems, man.

Diaz: No, no, no, no. Don't say that.

Marquez: No, no. No way, I can't be looking bad with this person that--that is waiting for this car all this ti--all this time there. This is not being considerate.

Despite Marquez's best efforts, however, he failed to get the heroin to Wofford, who left the Shamrock motel, where he had been waiting, at 7:30 p.m. Diaz ultimately produced the drugs, but not until almost 8:00 p.m. This failure may have damaged the relationship between Marquez and Diaz beyond repair, because the government presented no further evidence of transactions between the two.

This evidence clearly establishes that Diaz conspired with Marquez to distribute drugs. Diaz had no interest in Marquez's activities, however, beyond occasionally obtaining drugs for Marquez. He knew that Marquez had extensive drug dealings beyond those in which he was involved (and he had separate dealings as well), but that knowledge alone did not make him a coconspirator with those involved in Marquez's other deals. The evidence does not suggest that Diaz was in league with Marquez's other suppliers, for example; rather, it shows that he was competing with them.8 Their gain was his loss. Marquez frequently threatened to take his business elsewhere, a prospect Diaz did not view with the equanimity of a partner. Instead, Diaz protested emphatically: "No, no, no, no. Don't say that." On other occasions he pleaded with Marquez to give him another chance. On still another he protested: "Damn, no.... I've already ordered it." Diaz was clearly concerned about his own financial prospects, not those of Marquez and his other suppliers. The government presented no countervailing evidence to suggest that, his protests notwithstanding, Diaz somehow benefitted when Marquez took his business elsewhere, and we can think of none. Yes, by utilizing other suppliers, Marquez survived to buy again another day, but probably not from Diaz. After Diaz failed to deliver the drugs to Marquez on June 26, Marquez told him: "Never in my life. Never in my life will a thing like this ever happen to me. Never again. You can be sure that it won't happen again." The government suggests that Diaz was the "partner" Marquez spoke of to Agent Wofford, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Partnership implies a joint stake in the success of an enterprise, and it is clear that Diaz's interest in Marquez did not extend to Marquez's future or his other confederates.

Part of the difficulty Diaz encountered when supplying Marquez with drugs stemmed from the problems he experienced with his own supply source. Joseph Angel Claudio was Diaz's primary, if not exclusive, source of drugs. Claudio was part of a chain of supply that ultimately extended to Marquez and his customers, but that chain hardly fits the picture of the ongoing distribution chain that gave rise to the paradigm of chain liability. Claudio's involvement was sporadic, and the government presented no evidence suggesting that he knew anything of, or had any interest in, the success of Marquez's operations. Indeed, there is nothing from which a jury could have inferred that Claudio knew that the distributor with whom Diaz was dealing also dealt with suppliers other than Diaz.

At the same time, the evidence suggests that Claudio had little interest in forging the distribution chain into a more cohesive operation; he showed a curious lack of concern about the predicaments his delays imposed on Marquez--an indifference that belies any inference that Claudio was in a partnership with Marquez. Claudio's responses to Diaz's efforts to obtain drugs to sell to Marquez on June 26 demonstrate the latter's seeming indifference to Marquez's problems:

Claudio: Well, that'll have to be taken care of, because I don't have that amount.

Diaz: How long ... eh ... You think that ... eh?

Claudio: For when?

Diaz: For now.

Claudio: For right now? Right now?

Diaz: He's been calling since this morning.

. . . . .

Claudio: Well, if--if you tell him four in the afternoon, that's fine.

Diaz: All right.

Claudio: But tell him, because I'm not going to--to waste--go there to waste--make that waste.

Diaz: Well, let me call him and tell him at--at four.

Claudio: If he says yes, tell him yes. If not, then, no.

Diaz: And how much could those people be paid per hour?

. . . . .

Claudio: Well--I'll--I'll let it go to you--that is--if you--you--I'll give you the contract, and you talk to them--See if you can make two or three bucks.... And I'll give it to you for twenty bucks.

After this conversation, Diaz called Marquez and told him that he could not get the drugs before 4:00 p.m. and that the 2 kilos would cost "twenty-two" each, or "forty-four" together. Marquez had quoted Wofford a price of "twenty-nine" for each kilo, leaving a substantial profit on each sale, but he nonetheless protested about the price to Diaz, who was unwilling to lower it much more:

Marquez: --when those people called me they said they'd be here at nine. That's why I told you to be here at nine. I could have taken another route, but now--look at the time it is and I'm stuck in this mess--and you know--I even counted those people's pieces/parts [money] already--which they have in their hands. Because I had already given the same price you gave me before.

Diaz: Look, sir--do you remember that I had based it on that? It can't be done for that. It would be--uh--at least forty three.

Later, at 6:00 p.m., Diaz was still trying to get the drugs from Claudio:

Diaz: But he is waiting for me.

. . . . .

Claudio: Oh! I'm going over there now. No--uh--give me another 30 minutes. Okay?

Diaz: Uh--the man shit in his pants. Anyway ... I told him thirty. All right.

Claudio: I'll call you right back.

Claudio, however, never called back; an associate finally called Diaz almost two hours later to tell him that the drugs were ready for him to pick up.

Claudio obviously knew that Diaz was reselling the drugs in bulk, but the government presented no evidence indicating that he had any stake in the subsequent distribution of those drugs. As with Diaz, the government's evidence proved only that Claudio knew that the drugs he sold to Diaz were going to continue on in the stream of commerce; it does not establish that he had any interest in whether those with whom Diaz dealt--principally Marquez--were successful or not. In fact, his advice to Diaz that he try and "make two or three bucks" on the sale of each kilo suggests that he, like Diaz, was unconcerned with the interests of those further down the chain of distribution.3. Orlando Nunez

Someone named Orlando Nunez supplied drugs to Marquez. The government says that it was the defendant by that name; the defendant says that it was his cousin, Jose Orlando Nunez, who went by the same name, "Orlando," and who was employed as a manager of the defendant's business, the Old Style Body Shop. Nunez contends that the evidence linking him to the conspiracy was insufficient, in part because of the possibility that the voice identified as his on the tape actually belonged to his cousin, Jose Orlando. We are ill-equipped to review this aspect of the dispute, since it rests largely on the credibility of the witnesses who identified the voice at trial.9 Both sides presented witnesses supporting their view as to the identity of the speaker, and the jury chose to believe the government's. Since we cannot say, on the basis of the record, that it was unreasonable for the jury to have done so, we will not disturb its conclusion.

Accepting that it was the defendant's voice on the tape, it seems clear that he conspired with Marquez to distribute drugs. During a five day period in June, from the 11th until the 16th, the government recorded a number of conversations between Nunez and Marquez. Some of these clearly involved drug transactions:

Marquez: Tell me.

Nunez: I couldn't find that man.

Marquez: Oh, no?

Nunez: No. I can't find him anywhere--the man. I failed you without wanting to.

Marquez: Huh?

Nunez: I failed you without wanting to.

Marquez: Oh. You think you could see him today?

Nunez: Yes. Maybe tonight I'll see him, but since I failed you, I don't want to fail you, you see.

Marquez: Yes, so, you'll call me then, when--

Nunez: As soon as I locate him.

Marquez: And the white car?

Nunez: We'll--it's also the same man.

Nunez characterizes his conversations with Marquez as preliminaries to a drug deal, and cites United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.1980), for the proposition that such conversations are insufficient to establish a conspiracy. But Melchor-Lopez, like our own opinion in United States v. Podolsky, 798 F.2d 177 (7th Cir.1986), dealt with conditional agreements, and there was nothing conditional about Nunez's agreement to work with Marquez. True, in his own words, he "failed" Marquez, but he did so "without wanting to." Nunez is confusing failure to perform with reluctance to perform; only the latter is relevant to the question of whether a conspiracy existed, because the offense of conspiracy is complete at the time of agreement, whether or not its object is ever achieved. United States v. Rosengarten, 857 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 799, 102 L.Ed.2d 790 (1989).

Although the evidence established that, at some point, Nunez conspired with Marquez, it fell short of establishing that their conspiracy was ongoing or that it involved everyone else with whom Marquez did business. Like defendant Claudio, Nunez had apparently had little concern about Marquez's business troubles. On June 12, for example, Marquez placed an order with Nunez:

Marquez: I need the white one. One by six o'clock. ... A little bitty one.... For eight.

Nunez: Well, that bastard doesn't get in until night time.

Marquez: Listen--but Orlando--listen to me. I can't fail these people. If I fail these people after I already spoke with those people, that's a fuck up, man.

Nunez: Well, it's just that they're fucking with me over here--on this side, you see?

Marquez hounded Nunez for several days; by the 15th, Nunez was getting hostile:

Marquez: Listen.

Nunez: Listen, don't fuck with me any more.

Marquez: I'm on my way over there. Wait for me there. Don't go anywhere.

Nunez: What the hell are you coming over here for?

Perhaps recognizing the need to demonstrate some form of continuing interdependence between Marquez and Nunez, the government claims that this and other conversations show that Marquez owed Nunez money. There is nothing in these conversations, however, to support that characterization.10 At most, this evidence shows that Nunez was a potential source of cocaine to whom Marquez turned periodically. None of their conversations suggest any degree of mutual interest in the affairs of the other beyond their agreement to obtain drugs on several different occasions. These conversations suggest just the opposite; Marquez and Nunez each had distinct problems--Marquez in customer relations, and Nunez with his suppliers--but it does not suggest that the problems of one were of concern to the other beyond their impact on the transaction at hand.

The government did present evidence that defendant Luis Diaz owed Nunez money, but failed to introduce any evidence at all that the debt was drug-related. Since there was no evidence tying this debt to a drug transaction, it does little to establish Nunez's membership in a drug conspiracy. The mere fact that Nunez knew both Diaz and Marquez adds little to the force of the government's argument, because it does nothing to establish that Nunez knew that Diaz also supplied Marquez with drugs. We might suspect this, but mere suspicion cannot sustain a criminal conviction. And even had the government shown that Nunez did in fact know of deals between Marquez and Diaz, it did nothing to show that Nunez had any interest in furthering the success of those ventures.

Her protests notwithstanding, the government provided ample evidence to prove that defendant Taylor bought marijuana from Marquez to resell to her own customers. A snippet from one of their conversations suffices to make the point:

Taylor: Make it, make it twelve, I want twelve.

Marquez: Twelve?

Taylor: Yeah.... O.K., listen Marquez.... Tell him, the last time that weight wasn't right.

Marquez: Oh, I tell him now.

Taylor: O.K. Wait a minute, I had a lot of complaints, about the weight. Tell him to make sure that weight's right, if they ain't going to give ...

Marquez: O.K., I tell him right now, now, put it, let it be more.

Taylor: O.K., tell him, make sure it's right now, because I'm, I'm way behind, and them people be calling back.

Marquez: No, I don't like you complain, because you know you, you lose, me I lose you, too.

This evidence was sufficient to establish an agreement between Taylor and Marquez to distribute marijuana. Taylor placed orders for drugs, which Marquez then had to obtain through his own sources; the scope of the transaction therefore transcended the exchange of drugs for money that characterizes a simple buy-sell transaction that, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. Moreover, although Marquez was little more to Taylor than--in Learned Hand's words--"an independent peddler of narcotics," selected because he was "the most immediately available source of supply," see United States v. Reina, 242 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1957), he knew that she was buying for resale and acknowledged his own interest in her success. In turn, Taylor's own success hinged on Marquez's ability to obtain the marijuana from his suppliers.

Taylor's relationship with Marquez, however, did not last long. After their first deal, for example, Marquez tried to increase the price; Taylor would have none of it, and Marquez had to back down:

Marquez: Let it be more, you know. Let it be my special price. Let it be more money. I don't know. See how you like it.

Taylor: Uh, I ain't got no more money, man. I'll go get it from my old dude. I'm not gonna pay no more. Fuck that.

Marquez: Yeah, I know, but it is a piece good.

Taylor: No--

Marquez: Like he got it good.

Taylor: No--I'm not gonna--

Marquez: No! I no (UI) for the piece because you do it!

Taylor: Uh-huh!

Marquez: I tell another guy!

Taylor: Uh-huh. I don't want it then.

Marquez: Oh--

Taylor: I'll go get it from somebody else. ' Cause I can get it from--

Marquez: No, no, no baby! You no understand what me said.

Taylor: No--

Marquez: Everything is all right! He got the same price!

Taylor: Oh, same price, huh?

Marquez: Yeah, yeah. No, no don't confuse.

Taylor: Oh, oh, I'm confused (laughs), oh, okay.

Marquez: (Laughs) Don't confuse--

Taylor: Don't confuse me that way--

Marquez: No, no, I don't confuse you, no, no (laughs).

Taylor: (Laughs) Hell, no, don't confuse me, 'cause I'll go somewhere else (laughs).

Marquez: (Laughs) No, no, no, I know! You become rough now! (Laughs). You come rough! (Laughs). You need to make it quick.

Later, when she wasn't satisfied with the quality of marijuana Marquez obtained for her, Taylor decided to carry through with her threats to take her business elsewhere:

Taylor: I don't want this shit, I don't like that, man, I told you I don't like it.

Marquez: Man, you wrong, you check it out right!

Taylor: No, man ...

Marquez: You wrong!

Taylor: No, you wrong.

Marquez: No!

Taylor: I don't want this shit.

Marquez: (UI) 'cause you wouldn't pay!

. . . . .

Taylor: You all, you all losing a good customer, man, fucking around; you losing ...

Marquez: ... You losing my business.

Taylor: Hm, I lose a customer ... You lost a good customer.

Marquez: You losing my business ...

Taylor: Hmm, I'm not going to mess with you no more, man, cause ...

Marquez: No, no, but you're losing me ...

Taylor: ... Mix that shit ...

Marquez: No, no, hey ... hey ...

Taylor: ... mix it with that garbage ...

. . . . .

Taylor: OK. Then I'll go with (UI) deal with my people. I'll deal with the people I been dealing with ...

Marquez: Oh, OK, for go ahead.

These conversations with Marquez graphically demonstrated that Taylor's commitment to Marquez and his marijuana suppliers did not carry over from one deal to the next. Her conspiracy with Marquez was more limited in scope. Compare Auerbach, 913 F.2d at 415, where we held that the defendant conspired with a large distribution organization, in part, because "[h]is purchases were not discrete transactions ... [but] required an ongoing relationship that soured only when [the defendant] failed to move the marijuana fast enough...." In contrast, the Taylor-Marquez partnership soured after their first deal; the second brought new negotiations, complaints, and a parting of the ways. Conspirators, of course, may come and go; the fact that they withdraw from an ongoing conspiracy does not mean that their original agreement was limited in scope. See, e.g., United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1081 (7th Cir.1990). But limited participation can be probative of limited agreement, and in this case it is. Taylor's transactions with Marquez do not evidence any intent to cooperate in the larger, ongoing conspiracy described in the indictment, and it would therefore be unreasonable to infer that she conspired with each of her codefendants.

The government's evidence against Taylor fell short in another respect. Taylor clearly had nothing to do with the distribution of cocaine or heroin. Nevertheless, citing United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.1990), the government contends that Taylor's conviction is valid even though her activities were limited to marijuana. We will discuss Beverly in conjunction with defendant Townsend's challenge to his telephone facilitation conviction, but find it unnecessary to do so here. Taylor was not charged with separate acts in a single count; she was charged with the single act of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. The type of drug charged in the count is immaterial; the critical fact is that the substance is controlled, not that it is one variety or another. Taylor could have been convicted of conspiring to violate Sec. 841(a) had the government failed to prove that she was involved with cocaine, heroin, or marijuana, had it proved she was involved with some other illegal substance.

That assumes, of course, that the evidence showed that others were involved with the same substance. The breadth of Sec. 841(a) does not obviate the government's obligation to show that Taylor conspired to violate Sec. 841(a) with the group named in the indictment. In that regard, the government failed, and failed dramatically. The government presented no evidence to tie Taylor to those with whom Marquez conspired to distribute cocaine and heroin. In this respect the government's case against Taylor is even weaker than was its case in United States v. Glenn, supra. There the First Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant found not to have joined an agreement with a group of conspirators to distribute marijuana, even though she had conspired with the same group to distribute hashish, because the record did not reveal that the defendant shared the dual objective of the core conspirators. 828 F.2d at 859. We applied the same reasoning in United States v. Pallais, supra, to uphold the convictions of two defendants who were each charged for participating in separate conspiracies to import marijuana and cocaine rather than in a single conspiracy to import both. Taylor's appeal in this case proves the point we made there, namely, that had all the defendants "been joined in one giant conspiracy, they would have howled." Id. 921 F.2d at 686. At argument, the government asserted that Taylor should have known that Marquez also dealt in drugs other than marijuana, but we see no basis for imputing that knowledge to her. See id. ("Marijuana and cocaine are different drugs in terms of sources, channels of distribution, methods of shipment and processing, and customers.") And even if we did, that knowledge alone is not probative of her agreement to join those other ventures; the record is simply barren as to Taylor's interest in Marquez's cocaine and heroin ventures. We conclude, therefore, that although Taylor conspired with Marquez to distribute marijuana, she did not join the multifaceted, ongoing conspiracy detailed in the indictment.

As Townsend candidly concedes, the eight phone calls between Marquez and him "support the proposition that Mr. Townsend knew Marquez was selling drugs." No other conclusion is possible since, on June 11, 1987, Townsend himself told Marquez that he knew some people who wanted to buy some heroin:

Townsend: Uh, uh, that brown. I got some people that, that want some. You, you got it?

Marquez: What kind, what I think, uh, the cigarette? ... The Winston?

Townsend: The brown Buick.... You got it?

Marquez: By tomorrow. Not now! ... You, you got glass?

Townsend: I don't know what, they, they, they's from out of town.

Marquez: You want it now?

Townsend: Yeah, they wanted it now.

Marquez: Ah, you got it if you want it now! ... You got it!

Townsend: Uh, the brown Buick?

Marquez: Yeah, the brown Lincoln!

Townsend: The Lincoln, yeah!

Marquez: You say the people ready.

Townsend: The only about it that they want to check it out, you know?

Marquez: Yeah, but the people ready?

Townsend: No, yeah, they ready.

Marquez: Eh, they ready for buy the Lincoln?

Townsend: Right.

The parties disagree, however, about whether this conversation establishes that Townsend intended to purchase heroin to resell to his friends or whether he was merely acting as an intermediary between a willing buyer and seller, a status some circuits have found inadequate to support a conspiracy conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.1985). Even giving the government the benefit of the doubt, as we now must in light of the jury's verdict, we cannot say that it would be reasonable to infer from this conversation that Townsend was seeking to purchase heroin to resell to his own customers. As the last few lines of the conversation reveal, the mystery customers, not Townsend, were going to buy the heroin. Marquez wanted to make sure that they were ready to deal, not Townsend. Townsend's role was confined to bringing the parties together.

We have affirmed conspiracy convictions in the past where the defendant played a significant role in facilitating a drug transaction between others. See, e.g., United States v. Cea, 914 F.2d 881, 886-87 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1265-66 (7th Cir.1986). Even under this less exacting standard, however, the evidence was insufficient to convict Townsend of conspiring to distribute drugs. In both Cea and Manzella we emphasized the lengths to which the defendant went to assure that the transaction took place. "No one," we said of defendant Cea, "could have tried any harder ... to culminate the deal." 914 F.2d at 887. By contrast, Townsend was positively indifferent. After initially broaching the subject with Marquez, Townsend seemed unwilling to do anything to bring the parties together. Marquez was eager to accommodate, and repeatedly suggested a meeting, but Townsend demurred:

Marquez: Uh, what time you want?

Townsend: Uh ... call me after the ball game.

Marquez: Oh, I don't know mother fucker goddamn about a game. I don't watch them goddamn ...

. . . . .

Marquez: Okay, for you get, what time you want to go? It's now about nine-thirty ...

Townsend: Uh, well, uh ...

Marquez: About what time?

Townsend: About ten-thirty.

Marquez: About ten-thirty you call me?

Townsend: Yeah.

Townsend never called Marquez, however, and the government presented no evidence that the sale ever took place. Given this evidence we cannot say that Townsend played a significant role in facilitating the transaction; indeed, he seems to have been largely responsible for preventing it.

Townsend's lack of interest in bringing the deal off may have been due, in part, to the fact that he initially brought the subject up in order to deflect Marquez's anger over Townsend's nonappearance at a rendezvous the two had scheduled for the previous evening:

Marquez: What happened you last night, big nigger. Me get home at ten o'clock, see you in the Mercedes. I come over there. I wait for you, goddamn it, till twelve o'clock.

. . . . .

Townsend: I, I forgot about it....

. . . . .

Marquez: I need a help, man, I need a fix the goddamn, fucking problem I got, man.

Townsend: Hey!

Marquez: Yeah?

Townsend: Uh, uh, that brown. I got some people that, that want some. You got it?

We conclude, therefore, that Townsend did not conspire to distribute heroin. We also note that, even were we to conclude that the government's interpretation of Townsend's conversations with Marquez was reasonable, we would still be compelled to conclude that Townsend did not conspire with each of Marquez's suppliers and customers. The government failed to establish any connection between Townsend and the conspirators charged in the indictment. Townsend knew that Marquez was a member of a narcotics distribution chain, but there was no evidence that he was working to further their interests as well as his own:

Marquez: Yeah ... where are you ... wanna ... you ready, something, today, I want to go warehouse for the 'nother, for the, the another thing; you remember me telling you? ... I wanna hear si [if] you got something for six o'clock; I wanna go to warehouse.... I supposed to take care of the warehouse rent.... You beeping me six o'clock?

Townsend: Yeah.

. . . . .

Marquez: Okay. Try ... maybe, 'cause I wanna go warehouse today.

Townsend: You want to go away?

Marquez: No, in a warehouse, warehouse! Another, another paint, white paint.

Townsend: Oh, huh?

Marquez: Ah, white paint, you remember me telling you?

Townsend: Yeah.

Marquez: So me wanna go get ah, my, my, my white paint.... But I'm supposed to go and take care of the warehouse rent.

We agree with Townsend's characterization of this conversation,11 admitting that it is reasonable to infer that Marquez was telling Townsend that he needed money to pick up cocaine. But there was nothing in this conversation to suggest that Townsend had any stake in the successful distribution of Marquez's cocaine; "the conversation evidenced Marquez's sense of urgency, contrasted with Mr. Townsend's indifference to that sense of urgency." Townsend Br. at 14. Townsend bought from Marquez sporadically, when he had cash and needed drugs, and knew little of Marquez's dealings with others:

Marquez: You know how much me pay today?

Townsend: What?

Marquez: Fifty-two hundred.

Townsend: You're lying.

Marquez: In the warehouse. In the warehouse; I go in the bank, taking my wife, pick it up fifty-two hundred dollars, pay the warehouse, you know the ... for merchandise, for picking up my big piece tomorrow.

Townsend: Uh, yeah?

Marquez: I getting my big piece tomorrow, see, 'cause if you needing something, you let me know.

Townsend: I, I ...

Marquez: The white?

Townsend: The white?

Marquez: Yeah.

Townsend: Alright.

Marquez: The white car.

Townsend: Uh huh.... Well, I, I, I'll probably see you tomorrow then, some time. Call me, call me early in the morning.12

Moreover, it is not clear whether Townsend generally bought for resale or personal use; the only evidence that Townsend resold drugs he purchased from Marquez was the ambiguous conversation of June 11, quoted above. Evidence of personal purchases from Marquez adds little weight to the government's case. Cf. United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 880 (7th Cir.1974). And even if it could be said that Townsend's purchases somehow inured to the benefit of all of Marquez's drug sources, the government would still have to prove that Townsend was in league with Marquez's other customers, like defendant Dorothy Taylor. The government hasn't explained any link between Townsend and Taylor, other than the fact that both used Marquez as a source of drugs. Neither was a Marquez employee; neither distributed drugs at Marquez's behest.

Marquez also obtained drugs from defendant Carlos Mejia. The government recorded numerous conversations concerning drug transactions between the two, they met together frequently, and Mejia made a drug pick-up at Marquez's home. When Mejia was arrested at his home on February 18, 1988, someone threw a bag containing over $90,000 in cash out of a second story window. A search of the house revealed another $22,000 in cash.

Unlike the evidence relating to other Marquez suppliers like Diaz and Nunez, the conversations between Marquez and Mejia suggest that the two coordinated their respective activities to a large extent, and their deals seemed to run smoothly. On April 3, 1987, Mejia called Marquez, who told him that he was "going to see the people I told you about.... Because they told me last night that it was a little high, and this--and--that, but then they agreed to see me at two." A few days later, Marquez informed Mejia:

Marquez: I'm waiting for the people to call me--some people from Minnesota [Agent Wofford].... And they left word for me at home, but I wasn't in.... So, I don't know what time they'll get here. They said they had left for here. Because the people from Las Vegas haven't arrived yet.... But don't worry because all that is leaving this week."

Mejia: Oh, I hope so, because--

Marquez: I'll call you right away, don't worry, because the thing is there are people who have the money in cash, and what other people do is move it fast.

Mejia: Okay. Call me today so we can begin with the other thing because the thing is that it's arriving on Friday."

Marquez: [I]n a while I'll be going to--at 1:30 I'm heading south to see the other people. ... But first I want to bring you some money.... Then, I'm going to check out two people that called me last night.... Then, whatever I pick up today, I'll call you right away so you can pick it up.

Mejia: Oh, I was going to ask you whatever happened to the man with the car? With the friend, Tony?

Marquez: I don't know. I see him around. He is going to pay. He is going to pay.... I'm in a hurry because the other people of the white paint are calling me all the time."

Mejia: Ah, no, but within two days--we already--we already ordered it, so, in two days I'll take care of you.

Marquez: No, no, don't worry about that; that will go right away now, but the thing is that the people have me dry, and the man over there--I will talk to him. I'll--I'll also tell you how much he is going to pay you weekly.

Later the same day, Marquez and Mejia continued to coordinate their affairs, including payments for drugs:

Marquez: So, I'm going to arrange with them to see what they need for tomorrow.... But don't worry, the other thing is all right.

Mejia: No, I was calling you because--it's just that I didn't understand you. Tell me something, do you still have some over there?

Marquez: Of what?

Mejia: Money.

Marquez: No, man, that just started yesterday.

Mejia: No, the thing is that I need a little money to send it right now, because that other thing is about to come in.

Marquez: Well, but then wait until tomorrow.

Mejia: No, because it has to be today. But I'll try to get it somewhere else.

Marquez: I'll call you in an hour--a couple of hours.

Mejia: Yes.

Marquez: To tell you what I picked up there. Or if not, I'll take one of the parts back or--or how do you want to handle this? Should I wait until Monday--after the weekend, or what?

. . . . .

Marquez: So, I'll call you so you can pick it up and, if you want to--give people a chance--three or four days more, because some people like the car and others don't.

Mejia: Alright. But pick up something for me anyways because--

Marquez: Yes, yes, no, no, no forget it, that's on its way.

Mejia: That guy is here.

Marquez: So, I'll call you because I want to start with the other one today because I'm--I'm in a noose.

Mejia: I need to go. So, I need to leave you my car so you can fix it.

Marquez: Yes, I'm in a noose. Well, that's what I want to go pick up.

Particularly when contrasted with the often heated exchanges Marquez had with Diaz and Nunez when pressured, the exchanges between Marquez and Mejia suggest that more cooperation and mutual involvement characterized their relationship than those of Marquez and some of his other suppliers, like Diaz and Nunez. When Marquez was rushing to find marijuana to replace the "weed" Dorothy Taylor rejected, for example, Marquez called Mejia:

Marquez: Listen, I'm going to need ten, and not too late.