Defendants Roberto Jose Maldonado-Rivera ("Maldonado"), Antonio Camacho-Negron ("Camacho"), Juan Segarra-Palmer ("Segarra"), and Norman Ramirez-Talavera ("Ramirez") appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut after a jury trial before T. Emmet Clarie, Judge, convicting them principally on one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery and transport the proceeds in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 659, 2113, and 2314 (1988) (count 16). In addition to the conspiracy count, Camacho was convicted on one count of transporting stolen money in foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2 (1988). Segarra was convicted on four counts of aiding and abetting the robbery of a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2113(a) and 2; one count of aiding and abetting a theft from an interstate shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 and 2; three counts of transporting stolen money in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2; one count of obstructing interstate commerce through robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 (1988), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; and one count of conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce through robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951.

Ramirez and Maldonado, convicted only of the conspiracy charged in count 16, were sentenced principally to five years' imprisonment. Camacho was sentenced principally to consecutive prison terms of five years and 10 years, respectively, on his conspiracy and foreign transportation convictions. Segarra was sentenced principally to a total of 65 years' imprisonment: four concurrent 20-year terms on the Sec. 2113(a) robbery counts; to be followed by 10 years on the Sec. 659 interstate theft count; to be followed by three concurrent 10-year terms on the Sec. 2314 money transportation counts; to be followed by two concurrent 20-year terms on the Hobbs Act counts; to be followed by five years on the Sec. 371 conspiracy count (count 16). Segarra was also ordered to pay fines totaling $500,000.

Defendants jointly or individually make numerous arguments on appeal, including (1) challenges to the district court's refusals to suppress surveillance tapes, post-arrest statements, and eyewitness identification, (2) claims of erroneous evidentiary rulings, (3) challenges to the trial court's instructions to the jury with respect to the count 16 conspiracy, (4) challenges to venue, and (5) claims of improper sentencing. The government concedes that it was error to sentence Segarra on both the Sec. 659 count and the Hobbs Act substantive count, and we accordingly vacate Segarra's Sec. 659 conviction. In all other respects we affirm the defendants' convictions.

The present prosecution arises out of the September 1983 robbery of a Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford, Connecticut. A total of $7,017,151.98 was stolen. Most of this sum belonged to four banks located in Connecticut or Massachusetts, all of which were federally insured. In October 1984, a Puerto Rican independence group calling itself "Los Macheteros" ("the machete wielders") claimed responsibility for the robbery.

Following a lengthy investigation that included extensive physical and wire surveillance and the execution of numerous search warrants, more than 15 persons, including Segarra, Ramirez, Maldonado, and Camacho, were arrested and charged in connection with the robbery. The government proceeded to trial first against these four and one other. The evidence at trial was presented principally through (1) surveillance tapes made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"); (2) the testimonies of (a) Kenneth Cox, an old friend of Segarra, and (b) unindicted coconspirator Anne Gassin, a girlfriend of Segarra; and (3) various documents, including telephone toll records, a Los Macheteros' communique claiming credit for the robbery, and documents written by and seized from one or another of the alleged coconspirators. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, showed the following.

A. The Planning and Execution of the Robbery

Gassin testified that she first met Segarra in the late summer or early fall of 1983. When she next met him in May 1984, he apologized for not remembering her, telling her that the late summer of 1983 had been a very busy and engrossing time for him. Gassin soon entered into an intimate relationship with Segarra, and in the summer of 1984, they took a vacation during which he gave her a manuscript he had written, telling her it was an accurate account of the events surrounding the September 1983 Wells Fargo robbery.

According to this evidence, prior to August 1983 Segarra met Victor Gerena, a Wells Fargo guard who described in detail the routes he followed and the amounts of money he transported; Gerena told Segarra he was willing to do something for their cause or their organization. Segarra and Gerena traveled to Puerto Rico where Gerena "learn[ed] about the island, the history and the independence movement and who the members of the organization were and what their objectives were." The members of the organization agreed to a plan whereby Gerena would subdue the other guards, at which point other members of the organization would seize the money. Gerena would escape by motorcycle and later be transported out of the country to remain in hiding. Documents revealed that codefendant Filiberto Ojeda-Rios, whose title was "First Person In Charge" of Los Macheteros operations outside of Puerto Rico, purchased a motorcycle in Massachusetts near the time of the robbery.

Telephone toll records revealed numerous calls between March and September 1983 from Segarra's home in Puerto Rico to Gerena's home in Hartford, and from a pay phone near Segarra's home to Gerena's home and to a pay phone near Gerena's home. A compendium of documents seized at the home of Maldonado included July 1984 notes authored by "Jr.," a code name for Segarra; the notes discussed "AB," short for "Aguila Blanca," a code name for the Wells Fargo robbery and its aftermath. Segarra's notes stated, "I was assigned the planning and organization of AB and I leave on August 3, 1983. After doing the task, I return on September 30."

Cox testified that he was recruited by Segarra in August 1983 to assist in what Segarra predicted would be "one of the biggest robberies in the United States." Cox asked to be paid part of the proceeds but was persuaded to "[d]o it for the revolution." On the night of August 29, 1983, Cox was to wait at a McDonald's restaurant in Hartford from 7 to 10 p.m. for one of the robbery participants, whom Cox was then to take to Boston. On that evening, Cox arrived at the McDonald's at about 6:40 p.m. and waited as instructed. Just before 7 p.m., Segarra stopped by briefly with another man, whom he admonished to remember the color of Cox's car, and told Cox this was the man who would arrive later to be taken to Boston. Cox waited as instructed, but no one returned because the robbery did not take place that night.

The robbery took place on the night of September 12, 1983, after Gerena and another guard, Timothy Girard, returned to the Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford to unload money picked up on their regularly scheduled run. Gerena held a gun on Girard and the depot supervisor, and he bound, gagged, and blindfolded them. He then loaded the money from the vault into a rented car and departed.

Gerena was met after the robbery by Segarra, who helped him to escape to Springfield, Massachusetts, by motorcycle. From Springfield, Gerena was taken to Boston, and later that month he was transported, along with a portion of the proceeds of the robbery, to Mexico in a motor home. At the time of trial, Gerena remained at large.

B. The Movement of the Proceeds of the Robbery

The stolen money was taken to Springfield by car. Segarra later told Cox that a Winnebago-type vehicle was then used to transport the money to Mexico. Documentary evidence showed that Ojeda-Rios and Segarra had purchased such a vehicle four days after the robbery. Segarra told Cox that the purpose of the Wells Fargo robbery had been to fund the activities of Los Macheteros.

In March 1984, approximately $2 million more of the stolen Wells Fargo money was taken to Mexico in the same motor home, driven by members of the Macheteros organization. Several members of Los Macheteros, including codefendant Avelino Gonzalez-Claudio, organized this transport. On March 22, a member of this team, observed by FBI agents, flew from Puerto Rico to New York City and was met at the airport by Avelino Gonzalez-Claudio and two others. An April 1984 letter authored by Avelino Gonzalez-Claudio, a copy of which was seized from the home of Maldonado, described this phase and noted, inter alia, that this team had contacted Segarra so that he could deliver the money to them for transport.

In a July 13, 1984 conversation taped by the FBI, a transfer of the rest of the money was planned. At that time, Segarra advised or reminded Ojeda-Rios how much had been transferred in March (approximately "two million twenty-four"), and how much remained:

SEGARRA: .... It's not three, it's not three million. It's not three million. Because there was, two million plus were sent the last time, two million twenty-four, if I'm not mistaken. That means there is two million nine hundred sixty plus left....

Virtually all of the remaining proceeds of the Wells Fargo robbery, apparently about $2,960,000, were removed from the mainland United States in September 1984. Originally, this transfer was to be carried out in August by a non-Hispanic couple driving a pick-up truck with a camper trailer attached. When one of the couple had health problems, the plan was changed. Segarra, Camacho, and another codefendant began the drive; Gassin and codefendant Paul S. Weinberg were recruited to fly to Texas, and from there to drive the truck and trailer into Mexico. This second plan too aborted, however, when the truck and trailer overturned on a Pennsylvania highway. Weinberg received an S.O.S. call from Segarra and went to help him and the others bring the money back to Boston.

In mid-September, Segarra purchased a motor home for another attempt to move the money to Mexico. Part of the preparation of this motor home for concealment of the money took place behind Gassin's house in Boston. Camacho, who Segarra described as skilled and experienced in that kind of work, came to Massachusetts from Puerto Rico for that purpose. Camacho removed the vehicle's interior panels, stashed the money inside, and replaced the panels. As discussed in greater detail in Part V.C.2. below, Gassin identified Camacho at trial.

After the money was hidden in the mobile home, Segarra, Camacho, and an unidentified woman who had arrived from Puerto Rico, drove the money to Mexico. Prior to crossing the border on September 23, the group was joined by Maldonado. The Mexican government had issued, consecutively, an entry permit for the motor home and an entry permit for a 1980 Oldsmobile station wagon driven by Maldonado. Maldonado, who had just purchased the station wagon in Texas, promptly shipped it to Puerto Rico; the motor home was returned to Massachusetts. Segarra later told Gassin that everything on the Mexico trip had gone according to plan.

It was after this last transfer of money that Los Macheteros issued their October 19, 1984 communique to the press, taking credit for the Wells Fargo robbery. Using the term "operative" in the sense of "operation," the communique stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

This operative of economic recuperation contributed approximately seven million dollars to the revolutionary movement's funds.

The P.R.T.P.--MACHETEROS reports that all of the phases of said operative took a year and a half to complete. For that reason it has been decided to make it public at this time. We recognize the enemy's investigative capability, and that is why said operative needed a total guarantee of confidentiality with regard to those who carried it out. The P.R.T.P.--MACHETEROS publicly acknowledges the outstanding participation of comrade Victor Gerena.

We want to report that comrade Gerena is in a perfect state of health and has joined the struggle which our people carry out to obtain our liberation.

Today we are able to say that the economic resources obtained are in a state of maximum security according to our forces.

And that, in the same manner in which we have seized seven million dollars from the very bowels of American imperialism, the organized force of the Puerto Rican people will know how, in its own time, to seize the liberty which will allow us to choose our destiny as a people.

In December 1984, the Macheteros organization decided to make what it termed its first use of the proceeds from the Wells Fargo robbery: gift giveaways in Hartford and in Puerto Rico, designed as a celebration of Three Kings' Day. In a recorded conversation, Segarra and Ramirez decided that $50,000 would be spent on a celebration that would include parties on January 6, 1985, and $40,000 worth of gifts. In late December, Ramirez and codefendant Carlos Ayes-Suarez flew from Puerto Rico to New York; they were followed by FBI agents to a toy store in Milford, Connecticut, where they spent more than $5,000 on toys. On January 6, Ramirez and two others, dressed as Wise Men, gave out toys on a street in Hartford; Segarra participated in a similar celebration in Puerto Rico.

Two days later, a reporter in Puerto Rico received a call from a man who identified himself as a press contact for Los Macheteros. He told the reporter that the organization "had given away toys to poor children, both ... in Hartford and in Puerto Rico and that this was the first use that they had made of any of the money that had been stolen from West Hartford." The caller also stated that this was an activity of which Gerena approved. Segarra later told Gassin that he had been rebuked by other members of Los Macheteros for having told the press that the organization was responsible for the giveaway.

Segarra and Ramirez, along with 11 others, were arrested in August 1985; Maldonado and Camacho were arrested in March 1986. Appellants and 15 others were indicted in a 17-count superseding indictment. All four of the appellants were charged with obstruction of interstate commerce through robbery, and conspiracy to so obstruct, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1951 and 2 (counts 15 and 14, respectively); and with having conspired to commit bank robbery and transport the proceeds in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 659, 2113, and 2314 (count 16). In addition, to the extent pertinent here, Camacho and Maldonado were charged with foreign transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2, in connection with the September 1984 transfer of money to Mexico (count 13); and Ramirez and Carlos Ayes-Suarez were charged with interstate transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2, in connection with the transfer of money from Puerto Rico to Connecticut in December 1984 for the January 6, 1985 Three Kings' Day celebration (count 17). Segarra was named in all 17 counts. To the extent pertinent here, in addition to counts 14, 15, and 16 as mentioned above, he was charged with aiding and abetting the robbery of the four federally insured banks in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2113(a) and 2 (counts 1, 3, 5, and 7); aiding and abetting the assaults on the Wells Fargo guard and supervisor during the robbery (counts 2, 4, 6, and 8); theft from interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 and 2 (count 9); interstate transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2, in connection with the initial transfer of the Wells Fargo money from West Hartford to Springfield (count 10), and the later transfer of funds from Puerto Rico to Connecticut for the Three Kings' Day giveaway (count 17); and foreign transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2314 and 2, in connection with the transfers of money to Mexico in March 1984 (count 12), and September 1984 (count 13).

As discussed in Parts II and V below, defendants made a variety of pretrial motions seeking, inter alia, suppression of some 1,000 FBI surveillance tapes, suppression of certain postarrest statements, and change of venue. Except for the court's suppression of 378 of the surveillance tapes, these motions were denied.

The government's trial proof included the evidence described above. With the exception of Maldonado, who called a number of character witnesses, none of the defendants presented a defense. At the close of the government's case, the court dismissed the Hobbs Act counts (counts 14 and 15) against all of the appellants except Segarra.

The jury, after deliberating for nine days, returned verdicts convicting appellants of some charges and acquitting them of others. All four appellants were convicted on the bank robbery and transportation conspiracy count (count 16). Camacho was also convicted on the count 13 charge of foreign transportation of stolen money. Maldonado was acquitted on the count 13 charge, and Ramirez was acquitted on the count 17 interstate transportation charge. In addition to the count 16 conspiracy, Segarra was found guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery (counts 1, 3, 5, and 7); theft from interstate commerce (count 9); transporting stolen money in foreign and interstate commerce (counts 10, 12, and 13); obstructing interstate commerce through robbery (count 15); and conspiring to obstruct commerce through robbery (count 14). Segarra was acquitted on five counts (counts 2, 4, 6, 8, and 17). Ayes-Suarez was acquitted of all charges.

Appellants were sentenced as indicated above, and these appeals followed.

On appeal, appellants make numerous claims of error. They contend principally (1) that all of the FBI surveillance tapes should have been suppressed on account of violations of their statutory and constitutional rights, (2) that the court made a number of errors in its evidentiary rulings, including admitting the Los Macheteros communique, and (3) that the trial court's instructions on the count 16 conspiracy charge erroneously (a) allowed the jury to convict them of a conspiracy other than that charged in the indictment and (b) failed to advise the jury to acquit if it found that the proof showed several conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Individual claims of error include Camacho's challenges to the admission of certain of his postarrest statements and of Gassin's identification of him; Maldonado's contentions that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him; and Segarra's contentions that several of his cumulative punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We have considered all of defendants' contentions on these appeals and, with the exception of Segarra's double jeopardy challenge to his conviction and sentence under the Hobbs Act and Sec. 659, have found them to be without merit.

In the spring of 1984, following a rocket attack on the federal building and United States Courthouse in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, the government commenced electronic surveillance of Ojeda-Rios's home and automobile and of a nearby bank of public telephones. During this surveillance, agents came to believe that those involved in the rocket attack had also been involved in the September 1983 Wells Fargo robbery, and the government obtained court orders authorizing the interception of conversations concerning that matter. Thus, from April 1984 through August 1985, the FBI conducted surveillance directed toward the Wells Fargo robbery, and 1,011 original surveillance tapes were made.

Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress the tapes, contending, inter alia, that their rights under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510-2521 (1988) ("Title III"), and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution were violated by (a) the government's delays in having the original reel-to-reel surveillance tapes judicially sealed, and (b) the government's use and destruction of cassette work tapes. The district court, ruling that certain of the sealing delays violated Title III, granted the motion to suppress as to 378 tapes. See United States v. Gerena, 695 F.Supp. 649, 675, 682 (1988), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Ojeda Rios, 875 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.1989), vacated and remanded sub nom., United States v. Rios, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) ("Rios"). In other respects, the motion was denied. See 695 F.Supp. at 687. On appeal, appellants pursue their statutory and constitutional contentions with respect to the unsuppressed tapes. For the reasons below, we reject their appeal.

During the 16-month-long electronic surveillance directed at the Wells Fargo robbery, the FBI recorded conversations at or near several locations in Puerto Rico, including (1) Ojeda-Rios's residence in Levittown (the "Levittown tapes"), (2) Ojeda-Rios's subsequent residence in nearby El Cortijo (the "El Cortijo tapes"), (3) Segarra's residence in Vega Baja (the "Vega Baja tapes"), and (4) a "safe house" at the El Centro Condominium in Hato Rey (the "El Centro tapes"). Authorization for the El Cortijo interceptions expired on September 24, 1984; those tapes were judicially sealed on October 13, 1984. To the extent pertinent here, authorization for the Vega Baja interceptions expired on May 30, 1985; those tapes were judicially sealed on June 15, 1985. The El Centro interceptions ended on August 30, 1985; those tapes were judicially sealed on September 14, 1985.

Defendants moved prior to trial to suppress all of the surveillance tapes on the ground, inter alia, that the government had violated the requirement in Title III that surveillance tapes be submitted to the court for sealing "[i]mmediately." See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). Following evidentiary hearings that extended from September 1987 to June 1988, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Though the court ruled that 378 tapes, largely focusing on Levittown, should be suppressed because of inexcusable sealing delays ranging from 82 to 118 days, it ruled that the sealing delays of 15-19 days with respect to the El Centro, Vega Baja, and El Cortijo tapes had been satisfactorily explained by the government. Concluding also that the government's procedures had been "sufficient to preserve the accuracy of recordings and deter alteration of those recordings pending a judicial order sealing the tapes," 695 F.Supp. at 664, the court ruled that the remaining 633 tapes should not be suppressed. On appeal, appellants contend that the government failed to establish the integrity of the tapes and that the district court erred in determining that the government's explanations for these delays in sealing were satisfactory. We reject these contentions.

Title III establishes the procedures to be followed by the government in connection with electronic surveillance in the course of an investigation. In addition to setting out the procedures to be followed by agents when applying for an electronic surveillance order, by judicial officers when issuing such orders, and by monitoring agents when acting on such orders, Sec. 2518 provides for the "[i]mmediate[ ]" judicial sealing of authorized recordings when the authorized surveillance period is over:

Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions.... The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom....

18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). We have stated that sealing "within one or two days" will normally be deemed immediate, but that "any delay beyond that certainly calls for explanation." United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). Thus, we have held that sealing was not immediate within the meaning of Sec. 2518(8)(a) where there were delays of 15 days, see United States v. Massino, 784 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir.1986), or 14 days, see United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir.1986), or 13 days, see United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 2041, 32 L.Ed.2d 337 (1972), or even less, see, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 42-43 (2d Cir.1980) (three-to-eight days).

If surveillance tapes have not been sealed immediately, they must be suppressed unless the government furnishes an explanation for the delay that is "satisfactory" within the meaning of the statute. See Rios, 110 S.Ct. at 1850; United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d at 477. In Rios, the Supreme Court rejected an argument by the government that the "satisfactory explanation" requirement will be satisfied if the government simply states the reason for the delay and shows that the tapes are authentic. The Court stated that "the 'satisfactory explanation' language in Sec. 2518(8)(a) must be understood to require that the Government explain not only why a delay occurred but also why it is excusable." 110 S.Ct. at 1850.

In reviewing the proffered reasons for the delay and the questions of historical fact, such as "the date on which authorization for the wiretap expired, the date on which presentation was made for judicial sealing, [and] the methods used by [law enforcement] agents to secure the tapes," we will not disturb the district court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d at 476; see also United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1131 (2d Cir.1989) (clearly erroneous test applies to finding on government agency's adherence to internal procedures). The matter of whether the government's reasons are satisfactory, however, is a question of law subject to plenary review. See United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d at 476.

In general, explanations have been ruled satisfactory where the government advanced a bona fide reason, there was no reason to believe there was any deliberate flouting of the Title III requirements, no reason to doubt the tapes' integrity, and no basis for inferring any other prejudice to the defendants. Thus, in United States v. Rodriguez, we observed that

[i]n most cases when (1) the government has advanced reasons for the delay, such as the need to perform administrative tasks relating to the tapes prior to sealing, (2) there is no basis for inferring that the government sought by means of the delay to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant or that it had any other improper motive, and (3) there has been no showing that there has been tampering with the tapes or that the defendant has suffered any other prejudice as a result of the delay, the government's explanation has been accepted as satisfactory.

786 F.2d at 477; see id. at 477-78 (listing cases and explanations deemed satisfactory); United States v. Massino, 784 F.2d at 157 (same). Bona fide administrative obstacles may provide an acceptable excuse. See, e.g., id. at 158 (where possibility of leak that threatened large-scale organized crime investigation could not be foreseen, insufficient resources to handle leak and prepare tapes for sealing was satisfactory explanation for 15-day delay); United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d at 42-43 (explanation that tapes had to be moved from Binghamton to Albany to Auburn, New York, deemed satisfactory excuse for "relatively short" delays of three-to-eight days that included a weekend); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d at 1279-80 (explanation that there were equipment breakdowns, a shortage of Spanish-speaking agents to translate conversations, and a large number of tapes needing duplication, labeling, and checking was deemed satisfactory excuse for 7- to 13-day delay where there was no evidence of bad faith or lack of diligence); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.1977) (explanation that prosecutor was preoccupied with imminent trial deemed satisfactory for seven-day delay where there was no indication of bad faith or attempt to evade statutory requirements), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 2231, 56 L.Ed.2d 400 & 401 (1978).

In addition, delays based on the government's erroneous understanding of Title III's requirements may be excusable if the law has not been settled and the misunderstanding is not otherwise unreasonable. In Rios, which concerned the satisfactoriness of the government's explanation for the delays in sealing certain Levittown and Vega Baja public telephone tapes in the present prosecution, the excuse advanced by the government was that the supervising attorney believed he did not have to seek a judicial sealing of the tapes until "there was a meaningful hiatus in the investigation as a whole," i.e., until not only the original order but also all extensions of that order had expired. 110 S.Ct. at 1851. The Supreme Court noted that

[i]n establishing a reasonable excuse for a sealing delay, the Government is not required to prove that a particular understanding of the law is correct but rather only that its interpretation was objectively reasonable at the time.

Id. Noting that the government's interpretation was not unreasonable in light of the then-state of the law of this Circuit, (which we note remains undefined, see, e.g., United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d at 1278 n. 21; see also United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863 n. 4 (1st Cir.1987)), the Rios Court remanded for a determination of whether the excuse proffered by the government in the Supreme Court was the explanation that had been offered at the suppression hearing. In United States v. Rodriguez, we similarly ruled that an explanation based on a mistaken view of the law could nonetheless be satisfactory within the meaning of Title III if the mistaken belief was genuine. 786 F.2d at 478.

In the present case, the delays in sealing the tapes were 19 days for the El Cortijo tapes, 16 days for the Vega Baja tapes, and 15 days for the El Centro tapes. Though the government's reasons for these delays were based on misunderstandings that should not be allowed to recur, we are persuaded that the district court did not err in concluding that as to these 633 tapes, the explanations were "satisfactory" within the meaning of Title III and that the integrity of the tapes was sufficiently established to warrant denial of the motion to suppress.

In seeking to explain the El Cortijo 19-day delay, the government offered the testimony of Department of Justice ("DOJ") attorney Frank Bove, who supervised most of the Title III compliance in this case. Bove testified that the delay resulted from his belief that the requirement for immediate sealing "upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof," 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a), meant that if the interceptions at various locations were interrelated, the statute required sealing only when there existed a hiatus in the electronic surveillance orders considered as a group. Bove testified that he had read the Title III statute prior to commencing the investigation, that he had had access to treatises on Title III, and that he had spoken with other DOJ attorneys, none of whom had indicated that this interpretation of Title III was in error. Since the last surveillance order for Ojeda-Rios's automobile expired on October 10, 1984, Bove believed the government was allowed until that date to present for sealing all of the tapes with respect to both that vehicle and Ojeda-Rios's home.

Though this was an incorrect understanding of the law, the district court found that Bove had acted in good faith with respect to his understanding of the deadline and that there was no indication that the unwarranted delay was deliberate. This finding was based on the facts, inter alia, that Bove alerted the court one week before what he presumed was the deadline; he coordinated the sealing process with other government employees so that the tapes could be presented to the court on the day after the expiration of the order for the car; and the sealing of the El Cortijo tapes was in fact completed on the third day after the expiration of that order.

The explanation offered by the government for the 16-day delay in presenting the Vega Baja tapes was somewhat different. One day prior to the May 30 expiration of the last Vega Baja authorization, Bove sent a memo to FBI Supervisory Special Agent George Clow, informing Clow of the approaching expiration date and asking him to "[a]dvise [Bove] as soon as the tapes are ready for sealing so that we can coordinate with the Judge's schedule." When Bove received no immediate response from Clow, he assumed it was because the FBI agents could not spare the time from their preparation of affidavits in support of the imminent applications for search warrants. When he had heard nothing for a week, he contacted liaison agent Marlene Hunter and got the process moving. In fact, however, the reason for the delay was not that the agents were too busy but that there was a misunderstanding on the part of the pertinent FBI agents. Hunter had just been placed in charge of coordinating the sealing process for the Vega Baja tapes and had never before served as liaison between the FBI and the prosecutor's office. She testified that she had been told by the departing liaison that she was to wait for a call from the prosecutor's office before beginning the sealing process. Hunter testified that while she was aware of the sealing requirement, she was not aware of the need for expedition in completing the task, and she thus waited for a call from the attorneys.

A third explanation was offered for the 15-day delay in connection with the El Centro tapes. The final authorization for surveillance at the El Centro "safe house" expired on September 22, 1985. The agents actually ended surveillance of that location, however, with no intent to resume, on August 30, 1985, because on that date a search warrant was executed there. By this time Bove had departed from Puerto Rico, and the person responsible for presenting these tapes to the sealing judge was Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Roberto Moreno. Moreno testified that it had been his belief that the sealing requirement was triggered by the end of the 30-day extension order and not by the earlier cessation of surveillance. Based on this understanding, Agent Moreno simply did not rush to have the tapes sealed immediately after the surveillance ceased on August 30; he did, however, manage to present them for sealing well in advance of what he thought the deadline was.

The district court found that each of these explanations, though founded on interpretations of the law that were erroneous, was credible. If found that there was no bad faith on the part of the agents or the supervising attorneys and that all government personnel involved had acted expeditiously within the framework of their understandings of what was required. It is within the province of the district court to make determinations as to credibility, and we conclude that its findings as to the reasons for the delay and the lack of bad faith are not clearly erroneous.

Nor do we find any error in the court's determination that the government established the tapes' integrity. The record revealed that the monitoring agents faithfully followed the FBI's written guidelines for safeguarding the integrity of the tapes. At the start of each shift, the monitoring agents filled out special chain-of-custody envelopes, showing, inter alia, their names, the date, and the time. On the leader of each tape, the agents noted the location involved, the date, time, and reel number, and their initials. At the conclusion of a monitoring shift, the agents placed the completed tapes in the custody envelopes and normally took them immediately to FBI headquarters in Hato Rey. On occasion, because of the lateness of the hour and the distance of the monitoring site, agents left the completed tapes in the custody of the FBI security agent on the premises, and the latter agent turned the tapes in the following morning.

Upon delivery to FBI headquarters, the tapes were deposited in a locked, restricted-access room. An electronic surveillance clerk ("the Clerk"), assigned to maintain custody of the tapes and to control access to the evidence room, had the only set of keys to that room except for one set kept in a safe in the supervising agent's office. Before sealing a chain-of-custody envelope, the Clerk verified that the tape was properly labeled and required any discrepancy between the information on the envelope and the information on the tape leader to be resolved by the responsible agent.

Once the information on the tape had been checked, the Clerk sealed the envelope and placed it in a bar-locked filing cabinet. Only the Clerk had a key to the cabinet. If an agent wished to remove a tape from the evidence room, the Clerk required him to produce authorization from the supervisor. Any release of a tape was noted on its chain-of-custody envelope, along with the signature of the person accepting custody of the tape. Any opening of a sealed chain-of-custody envelope was also noted on the envelope. The Clerk never released a tape that had been judicially sealed.

The government also presented expert testimony that the sealed tapes were originals, not copies, and that they had not been edited or tampered with. Though defendants' expert witness offered his opinion to the contrary, the decision as to which view to credit was the province of the district court and we find in the record no basis for disturbing its decision to credit the government's expert.

In sum, we see in the record no basis for overturning the district court's finding that the integrity of the tapes had been assured, its rulings that the government's explanations for the 15- to 19-day intervals were satisfactory, or its conclusion that these delays did not warrant suppression of the tapes.

B. The Use and Destruction of Work Cassettes

The FBI agents monitoring the surveillance in Puerto Rico were instructed to make one set of original and one set of duplicate original reel-to-reel tapes, and to deliver both sets to FBI headquarters in Hato Rey. They were instructed not to replay either the originals or the duplicates in the course of interception. As a result, in order to assist them in making accurate written log summaries of the intercepted conversations, the agents used cassette recorders, plugged into the reel-to-reel recorders, to make cassette copies of the recordings. Some of these cassette work tapes, particularly those that discussed the travel plans of Segarra, were sent to supervisory agents for expedited review. Most of the other cassette work tapes were reused after the logs were prepared; reuse erased existing material on the tapes. In addition, at the conclusion of each surveillance, many of the work tapes were sent through a bulk eraser in order to maintain confidentiality. The use of these cassette work tapes was revealed during the court hearings on the sealing of the reel-to-reel tapes. It was also revealed that 39 cassette tapes remained unerased. A comparison of these 39 work tapes against the corresponding reel-to-reel tapes revealed that four work tapes in fact contained a total of 11 minutes of unauthorized material, i.e., material that was neither on the reel-to-reel tapes nor permissibly recorded while the reel-to-reel tapes were being changed. Defendants contended that their rights under Title III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated by these procedures because, inter alia, (1) the agents' use of the cassette work tapes was unauthorized, and (2) the erasures of the work cassettes denied them due process and violated their discovery rights, prejudicing their ability to litigate the Title III issues.

The district court conducted an extensive hearing. Sixty-five Spanish-speaking FBI agents from various parts of the United States had been assigned to Puerto Rico temporarily to act as Title III monitoring agents; each of the 65 submitted to the court two affidavits addressing (a) the general procedures and (b) the creation of the work cassettes. In addition, 25 of the agents, as a representative sample chosen by defendants, testified. The agents stated in their affidavits that, to the best of their knowledge, at no time had they recorded anything on a work cassette tape that was not also on an original and a duplicate original reel-to-reel tape. Monitoring agents explained that the unauthorized material found on the work tapes resulted from periodic sound checks during which the agents adjusted the tape/input switch on the reel-to-reel recorders but failed to make a corresponding adjustment to the cassette recorder, causing the latter to record independently of the reel-to-reel recorder.

After the hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress on this ground. In a published opinion, United States v. Gerena, 695 F.Supp. 1369 (1988), the district court found that the use of work cassettes was necessary and justified. As to the unauthorized 11 minutes of intercepted material on the work cassettes, the court credited the testimony of the agents and found that "no monitor deliberately created a situation where the cassette recorder was operating independently of the reel-to-reel recorders in order to record more information on a work cassette than was on the reel-to-reels." Id. at 1376. Since the agents had no knowledge of the "extra" information on the tapes, their subsequent reuse and erasure of the tapes was not a deliberate destruction of evidence. Accordingly, though the court found that the government should have preserved all such cassettes and should have disclosed this facet of the operation earlier in the discovery stages of the prosecution, it concluded that defendants were not prejudiced by the government's lapses. Id. at 1377.

Defendants contend that the district court's refusal to suppress the reel-to-reel tapes should be reversed because the government's use and destruction of the cassette work tapes violated Title III and their rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

Insofar as is pertinent to the issue of the work tapes, Title III provides as follows:

The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording ... shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations.... [S]uch recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a). Subsections (1) and (2) of Sec. 2517 allow law enforcement officials who have permissibly gained knowledge of the contents of authorized interceptions to use those contents and disclose them to another officer to the extent necessary for the performance of official duties. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(1) and (2). The contents of a communication that was "unlawfully intercepted" are to be suppressed. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(10)(a); see generally United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-29, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1831-33, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974).

We doubt, given the structure of Sec. 2518(8)(a), that that section was intended to prohibit the erasure of work tapes that are merely duplicates. Though the section provides for the preservation and sealing of the recordings of intercepted communications, all of those requirements are specified before there is any mention of duplicate tapes. The section gives no indication that Congress intended that duplicate tapes be subject to the same requirements as original tapes. For example, it would seem that duplicate tapes need not be judicially sealed, for the section envisions their use by law enforcement officials but makes no provision for their unsealing. Nor is there any indication in the legislative history that Congress intended that duplicate tapes be subject to the same requirements as original tapes.

The fact that the work tapes contained material that was not on the reel-to-reel tapes means that there was some failure to follow the procedures established by Title III and that some of the work cassettes were not merely duplicates. The district court found that the discrepancy was de minimis since of the 39 surviving work cassettes, only four had excess material, and that the unauthorized material totaled only 11 minutes. These findings must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1131; United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 292-93 (2d Cir.1975). In light of the record, the court's findings that the capture of this excess material was inadvertent, and that the destruction of the excess material was unknowing, and hence not deliberate, are not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the court's rulings that defendants were not prejudiced by either this accidental over-recording or the inadvertent erasure of the material, and that Title III did not require suppression of the reel-to-reel tapes were not an abuse of discretion.

We find no greater merit in appellants' contentions that the reel-to-reel tapes should have been suppressed on due process or other constitutional grounds or for interference with their discovery rights, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 (1988). Though those provisions impose on the government duties independent of Title III to preserve discovery materials, we do not think they required suppression of the reel-to-reel recordings in the present case. We have generally declined to conclude that suppression was warranted where the interception operation itself was lawful and the district court found that there was no sufficient indication that the government's destruction of recordings was in bad faith and found that the destruction did not prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1021 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 449-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 314, 58 L.Ed.2d 321 (1978); United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1326 (2d Cir.1975) (court must " 'weigh the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, the importance of the evidence lost and the evidence of guilt adduced at the trial' ") (quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C.Cir.1971)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821, 97 S.Ct. 69, 50 L.Ed.2d 82 (1976); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) ("unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law"); United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir.1973) (where there had been unlawful taping and willful destruction of the tapes, contempt order was reversed).

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that, given the apparently minimal extent to which the work cassettes contained material that was not on the reel-to-reel tapes and the inadvertence of the interception and destruction of that excess material, suppression of the reel-to-reel tapes would have been inappropriate.

Appellants raise a number of challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Their principal contentions are that the court (a) improperly restricted their cross-examination of FBI agents on the issue of the work cassettes, and (b) erred in admitting in evidence the Los Macheteros October 1984 communique claiming credit for the Wells Fargo robbery. They also contend that admission of the communique violated their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation. We reject all of these contentions.

A. Restrictions on the Scope of Cross-Examination

Defendants contend that the district court improperly "preclude[d] any and all cross-examination into the irregularities of the electronic surveillance operation--including the credibility of the testifying agents," particularly on the subject of the work cassettes. (Segarra-Ramirez-Camacho brief on appeal at 136.) They contend that this "wholesale preclusion" (id. at 137 (emphasis in original)) violated their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation. We reject this contention because it does not accurately reflect the record and because the court's actual rulings were within the bounds of discretion.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses against him. This "means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically," for " '[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.' " Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (quoting 5 Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original)); see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1434-35, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The court should avoid any blanket prohibition on exploration of an area that is central to an assessment of the witness's reliability. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 677, 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435; see also United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 195-96 (2d Cir.1984).

The Confrontation Clause does not deprive the trial judge of all discretion in setting limits on the cross-examination. The Federal Rules of Evidence instruct the trial court to supervise the "mode ... of interrogating witnesses" so as to make the presentation effective for "the ascertainment of the truth" and to "avoid needless consumption of time." Fed.R.Evid. 611. Rule 403 permits the court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... [inter alia ] confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." Fed.R.Evid. 403. Thus, the trial judge has "wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, ... interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435; see United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir.1987) (scope and extent of cross-examination are within sound discretion of trial court); United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d at 195 (same). The decision of the trial court to restrict cross-examination will not be reversed on appeal unless its broad discretion has been abused. United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 827 (2d Cir.1990); see United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1140 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1139, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990).

We find no deviation from these principles or abuse of discretion in the present case. While it is true that early in the trial the court ruled that "[c]ounsel shall not refer to the cassettes again in his cross-examination," (November 3, 1988 trial transcript ("Tr.") at 124), the court did not adhere to this ruling. Thus, it did permit cross-examination on a wide variety of topics surrounding the FBI's electronic surveillance, including the use and reuse of work cassettes. For example, on cross-examination by counsel for Segarra, one agent testified as follows:

Q. ... [Y]esterday you affirmed that it was your opinion that if FBI agents made cassette recordings intentionally and put information on a cassette tape that was not put on the official reel-to-reel, that that would be a violation of the law?

A. That is correct, Mr. Weinglass.

Q. And yet it's a fact, is it not, Agent Balizan, that you and your partner, Agent Aponte, made at least one cassette recording with information that isn't contained on a reel-to-reel?

A. That is correct.

Q. And the fact that you did that came to light after you had assured this Court, when you first testified, that all the information that you recorded on the reel-to-reel, on the cassette, sorry, could be found on the reels?

A. Is that the question?

Q. Yes.

A. That is correct, Mr. Weinglass.

Q. And it turned out you were wrong?

A. That is correct.

Q. And you really don't know today how many times you did that?

A. That is the only instance that I know of, that 439A tape.

Q. Well, that was the only time you were found out because we had the cassette, but you--

MR. DANAHER [AUSA]: Objection. This is argumentative. It's been covered yesterday.

MR. WEINGLASS: I'll withdraw that.

Q. (By MR. WEINGLASS) Isn't it a fact that you destroyed all the other cassettes so we can't find out?

A. I don't know how many of my work cassettes came into Court, Mr. Weinglass.

(November 30, 1988 Tr. at 12-13.) This subject was explored repeatedly during the trial in the cross-examinations of several agents. Given this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the scope of cross-examination.

At trial, defendants sought to forestall the government's introduction of the Los Macheteros October 1984 communique quoted in Part I.B.2. above, which claimed credit for the Wells Fargo robbery. Defendants contended principally (a) that the communique was not properly authenticated pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 901, and (b) that it was inadmissible hearsay because it was not shown to be a statement by a coconspirator "in furtherance of" the alleged conspiracy, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The district court denied defendants' motion. It ruled that the communique was adequately authenticated, noting that the document bears the Los Macheteros logo, that it was found at the home of one of the coconspirators, and that it contained information that only a conspirator would know. The court concluded that all of the circumstances suggested that the document "is what the proponent claims it is--a statement by a co-conspirator." Ruling on Admissibility of Search Documents dated March 6, 1989, at 14. The court ruled that the communique was in furtherance of the conspiracy, noting that "[t]he document informs readers of the status of the conspiracy--Victor Gerena is 'in a perfect state of health', having 'joined the struggle' for liberation, and the 'economic resources obtained are in a state of maximum security.' " Id. at 15. We find no basis for overturning these rulings.

1. Authentication as a Coconspirator Document

In general, a document may not be admitted into evidence unless it is shown to be genuine. See, e.g., 7 Wigmore on Evidence Secs. 2129, 2130 (3d ed. 1940). The requirement that the document be authenticated may be satisfied "by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Fed.R.Evid. 901. This evidence may be direct or circumstantial, see United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976), and the latter category may include distinctive characteristics of the document itself, such as its "[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances," Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4).

With respect to a document attributed to the defendant, the prosecution need only provide a rational basis from which the jury could infer that the document did, in fact, belong to him. United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d at 1173; see United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213, 105 S.Ct. 1184, 84 L.Ed.2d 331 (1985). In accordance with Rule 901(b)(4), "the contents of a writing may be used to aid in determining the identity of the declarant," United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 644 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846, 97 S.Ct. 128, 50 L.Ed.2d 117 (1976), if, for example, the writing "deal[s] with a matter sufficiently obscure or particularly within the knowledge of the persons corresponding so that the contents of the [writing] were not a matter of common knowledge," 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, p 901(b)(4), at 901-49 (1990).

Preliminary questions as to the admissibility of evidence are to be determined by the trial court; in making its determination, the court may consider evidence, other than that subject to a privilege, that would not necessarily be admissible at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). The trial court's ruling that a particular item of evidence has been properly authenticated will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d at 167.

There was no abuse of discretion here in the ruling that the communique was sufficiently shown to be a document written by one or more of the coconspirators. The communiquee's appearance, contents, substance, timing, and provenance, together with other evidence, all suggested that it was such a document. First, there was strong evidence that the communique was in fact a Los Macheteros document. It bore a Los Macheteros logo that was indistinguishable from the Los Macheteros logo that appeared on other documents whose authenticity was not challenged. It claimed responsibility for the Wells Fargo robbery, which was consistent with Segarra's telling Cox that the robbery had been a Los Macheteros operation. And the proposition that the communique was a Los Macheteros document was consistent with other evidence that Los Macheteros frequently sought publicity for their acts. For example, Segarra himself had called the press about the Three Kings' Day celebrations. The resulting news report mentioned that Los Macheteros had publicly claimed credit for 10 other acts of violence in Puerto Rico; though this report was not admitted into evidence at trial, it was nonetheless a source that the trial court was entitled to consider in determining the question of the likelihood that members of Los Macheteros had authored the October 1984 communique. In addition, a Los Macheteros document entitled "Report of the Central Committee to the Congress," a copy of which was found in the same place as the Wells Fargo communique noted that "[t]he news agencies are attentive to our communiques...."

Though the precise identity of the author of the October 1984 communique was unknown, there was also a sound basis for inferring that it had been authored by one or more of the coconspirators, for it contained information unlikely to be known by others. For example, this document stated that it was now safe to claim responsibility for the robbery; and indeed, the last large portion of the robbery proceeds had been secretively transported to Mexico less than a month before. The communique also revealed that the whole operation had taken 18 months to plan and execute; and indeed, telephone toll records showed that Segarra had been in contact with Gerena in March 1983, precisely 18 months before the final September 1984 money move. Though the September 12, 1983 date of the robbery was public knowledge, only coconspirators were likely to have known that the planning phase of the robbery had taken six months. The inference that the communique was a coconspirator document was further supported by the fact that a copy was found at the home of a codefendant, Avelino Gonzalez-Claudio (author of the April 1984 letter mentioned in Part I.B.1. above, which described the planning and execution of the March 1984 money move), along with several other coconspirator documents, including Segarra's July 1984 notes describing the planning of the robbery, and a document entitled "Political-Ideological Document Regarding the Organization's Problem," which noted that conflicts within the organization had come to a head as a result of "Aguila Blanca," the code name for the Wells Fargo operation.

Defendants' challenges to the authenticity of the communique, such as their argument that the "logo could have been constructed by someone outside the Macheteros organization" (Segarra-Ramirez-Camacho brief on appeal at 61), go more to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility. The district court did not err in ruling that the document's contents and the surrounding circumstances provided a rational basis for concluding that the document was what the government claimed it was, i.e., the statement of a coconspirator.

Nor did the court err in finding that the communique was a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy and hence admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). In order to admit a statement under this Rule, the court must find (a) that there was a conspiracy, (b) that its members included the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered, and (c) that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). To be in furtherance of the conspiracy, a statement must be more than a "mere[ ] narrative" description by one coconspirator of the acts of another. United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 324, 107 L.Ed.2d 314 (1989); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir.1980); see also United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir.) (mere "idle chatter" does not satisfy Rule 801(d)(2)(E)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986). Rather, the statements must be such as to prompt the listener--who need not be a coconspirator--to respond in a way that promotes or facilitates the carrying out of a criminal activity. United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1199. In addition to the more obvious types of communications to implement a conspiratorial operation, statements between coconspirators that may be found to be in furtherance of the conspiracy include statements that provide reassurance, or seek to induce a coconspirator's assistance, or serve to foster trust and cohesiveness, or inform each other as to the progress or status of the conspiracy. United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d at 35-36; United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983).

Preliminary questions as to whether a proffered statement meets the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are to be determined by the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. at 2781-82; United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1198; United States v. DeJesus, 806 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090, 107 S.Ct. 1299, 94 L.Ed.2d 155 (1987); see generally Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). The finding that a given statement was uttered by a coconspirator "in furtherance" of a conspiracy will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d at 36. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the court's choice between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

While we regard the question of whether the document was "in furtherance of" the conspiracy as closer than the question of whether it was authored by a coconspirator, we find no clear error in the district court's conclusion that the communique satisfied the "in furtherance" element of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Though defendants argue that the communique could not have been in furtherance of the conspiracy because it stated that "all of the phases of said operative took a year and a half to complete," thereby indicating that the conspiracy had ended, and this was perhaps an arguable view, it was also permissible to draw the contrary inference. The tone of the communique reflected an ongoing operation contemplating the use of the robbery proceeds. The document stated that the September 1983 robbery had made a $7 million contribution to the organization's funds, and the money was "in a state of maximum security." The government's evidence, including conversations intercepted through August 1985 and documents seized from the homes of various codefendants on August 30, 1985, likewise showed a continuing conspiracy that encompassed not just the robbery of the Wells Fargo depot and transportation of the money from the mainland United States, but also plans for the use of the robbery proceeds. See Part IV.B. below.

The communique also stated that Gerena, whose contribution to the operation was described as "outstanding," was in good health and had joined the revolutionary struggle. Though Gerena had been publicly suspected of perpetrating the robbery, it had not previously been revealed that he was affiliated with Los Macheteros. Thus, the communique provided coconspirators with reassurance as to the organization's status and solvency, new information as to the membership of the conspiracy, and encouragement for future organizational activities. Finally, since the "Report of the Central Committee to the Congress" suggested that the organization's prestige was enhanced through the use of press communiques, this communique could properly be viewed as an effort to gain public approbation for the conspirators' prior actions and their future use of the robbery proceeds.

In all the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the communique was in furtherance of the conspiracy was not clearly erroneous.

Finally, we reject defendants' argument that admission of the communique deprived them of their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation. Where, as here, the Rule 801(d)(2)(E) preconditions are met, "the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of [the] statements." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 183-84, 107 S.Ct. at 2783.IV. THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE COUNT 16 CONSPIRACY CHARGE

Count 16 of the indictment charged the defendants with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, the taking from banks, by force, violence, and intimidation, of money that was part of an interstate shipment of property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 and 2113, and the transportation of the stolen money in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314. Appellants contend that the trial court's charge to the jury with respect to count 16 was flawed principally because it (1) permitted the jury to convict on the basis of proof of any conspiracy, not solely the conspiracy alleged in count 16, or even to convict merely on the basis of membership in Los Macheteros, and (2) failed to instruct the jury that it should acquit if it found several conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. We are unpersuaded.

It is fundamental that in order to find a given defendant guilty of conspiracy, the jury must find that he was a member of the conspiracy that was charged in the indictment; membership only in some other conspiracy will not suffice. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 625 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975). Further, the government must prove that each defendant charged with conspiracy has entered an agreement to violate the law; mere membership in a lawful organization cannot suffice. United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988). It is also established that, in reviewing claims of error in the trial court's jury charge, we must consider the challenged portions not in isolation but in light of the instructions as a whole. See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 61-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987).

In their brief on appeal, appellants state that the court "explicitly" and "repeatedly invited the jury to convict upon a finding of any conspiracy whatsoever," and "not necessarily the one alleged in count sixteen." (Segarra-Ramirez-Camacho brief on appeal at 1, 31.) They have not, however, pointed us to any such invitation in the record. Rather, appellants quote portions of the instructions that referred to "a" conspiracy, and they rest their argument entirely on the court's use of that indefinite article:

"The first element is the requirement that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons conspired to commit an offense. In short, that a conspiracy existed. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.... In determining whether a conspiracy existed, you should consider the actions and declarations of all the alleged participants." ...

Later, the district court reiterated that some conspiracy needed to be found, again without reference to the need to find the single conspiracy specified in count sixteen: "In other words, if you find that there was a conspiracy and if you find that a particular Defendant was a member of that conspiracy, then you may consider [his co-conspirators' declarations]."

(Segarra-Ramirez-Camacho brief on appeal at 30, quoting jury charge, March 28, 1989 Tr. at 154-55, 160 (emphasis in brief).) Such use of the indefinite article is common, however, in the course of educating a jury as to general principles of law, and indeed, we note that the charge proposed by defendants themselves referred on occasion to "a" conspiracy or "an" existing conspiracy. The quoted excerpts of the charge actually given by the court cannot properly be assessed in isolation; they must be considered in the context of the charge as a whole, and when so considered, the charge was appropriate. Prior to the statements emphasized by appellants, the court's charge had in fact focused the jury's attention precisely on the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The court had begun by stating that in count 16, "[a]ll five Defendants are charged with conspiracy to violate federal law," and by tracking the language of that count:

Paragraph 3 states that between on or about March 19, 1983 and August 30, 1985, the Defendants, except Paul Weinberg, were members of a group that called itself the Macheteros and funded its operations and activities, in part, through economic expropriations, including robbery.

Paragraph 4 alleges that said Defendants did willfully, unlawfully and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other, as well as others, to commit offenses against the United States; that is: Paragraph one, "To unlawfully take by force, violence and intimidation, from the person and presence of another, money belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of Title 18, U.S.Code Section 2113(a).

"Two, to embezzle, steal, unlawfully take and unlawfully carry away goods, that is money, moving as and which were part of and which constituted an interstate shipment of freight and property in violation of Title 18 U.S.Code, Section 659."

And three, "To transport in interstate and foreign commerce money of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing that the money had been stolen in violation of Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 2314."

It was part of the conspiracy that the Defendants would and did devise and approve a plan whereby Victor Gerena also known as "Aguila," an employee guard for the Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation, would rob Wells Fargo in West Hartford to obtain money for the Macheteros and its members to be used to fund its operations.

(March 28, 1989 Tr. at 147-48.) Thereafter, the court repeatedly instructed the jury to focus on the conspiracy thus alleged in the indictment:

[i]n the present case the Defendants are charged with conspiracy to violate Section[s] 659, 2113 and 2314 of Title 18, U.S.Code. In short, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to rob the Wells Fargo and then transport the stolen money safely out of the United States in an effort to fund Macheteros operations.

The essential elements of the offense of conspiracy, each of which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are, one, that two or more persons conspired to commit an offense against the United States; namely, violations of Sections 659, 2113, 2114 [sic ] of Title 18.

Paragraph two, that the Defendant knowingly participated in this conspiracy with the intent to commit the offenses that were the object of the conspiracy.

And three, that during the existence of the conspiracy, at least one of the overt acts set forth in the indictment was committed by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy.

(Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added).) And again, after the excerpts quoted by appellants,

[i]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed as charged in the indictment, and that during the existence of the conspiracy one or more of the overt acts alleged was knowingly done by one or more of the conspirators in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy, proof of the conspiracy offense is then complete.

(Id. at 165 (emphasis added).)

In sum, appellants' contention that the court's instructions allowed the jury to convict on the basis of some conspiracy other than the one alleged in count 16 is unsupportable.

Further, to the extent that appellants contend that there was error in the court's failure to refer specifically to the count 16 conspiracy when it instructed the jury that if it " 'f[oun]d that there was a conspiracy and ... that a particular defendant was a member of that conspiracy, then [it could] consider [his co-conspirators' declarations]' " (Segarra-Ramirez-Camacho brief on appeal at 30, quoting jury charge, March 28, 1989 Tr. at 160 (emphasis in brief)), the criticism is doctrinally flawed. Though, as discussed in Part III.B.2. above, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) requires proof that both the declarant and the party against whom a declaration is offered be members of the same conspiracy, it does not require that the conspiracy be one charged in the indictment, United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 24 (1st Cir.1988). Indeed, coconspirator statements are admissible if the prerequisites of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met even where no conspiracy offense is charged. See United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 343 (1st Cir.1987); see also United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986): "[I]t is not necessary that the Government charge a conspiracy to take advantage of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The Government merely needs to demonstrate that the declarant and the defendants against whom the statements are offered are members of a conspiracy in furtherance of which the statements are made...." 779 F.2d at 829.

Nor can we accept appellants' contention that the court's instructions permitted the jury to convict a defendant merely because he was a member of Los Macheteros. Appellants can point to no part of the instructions that so stated. Rather, the court properly advised the jury, inter alia, that "a conspiracy involves an agreement to violate the law," with the intent "to either do something which the law forbids or fail to do something which the law requires to be done" and that the "[m]ere association of alleged conspirators without any evidence of participation does not permit an inference of guilt." Nor, plainly, did the jury understand that it was to convict defendants of conspiracy on the basis of their membership in Los Macheteros. Ayes-Suarez had conceded that he was a member of Los Macheteros, and he was acquitted.

In sum, we reject appellants' contention that the trial court's instructions impermissibly permitted the jury to convict them on count 16 on the basis of proof of a different conspiracy or merely on the basis of their associations.

In connection with count 16, defendants argued that the robbery, the money transfers, and the gift giveaway need not be considered part of the same conspiracy, and they asked the court to instruct the jury that "[i]f you find that instead of proving one overall conspiracy with several different objectives, you find that the prosecution has proved that there were several distinct conspiracies, then you must acquit." They contend that the court's refusal to give this charge was error. We disagree.

Though where the proof is susceptible to the inference that there was more than one conspiracy, the question of whether one or more than one conspiracy has been established is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, see, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1086 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed.2d 92 (1984); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 63 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983); United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir.1980), "if only one conspiracy has been alleged and proved the defendants are not entitled to a multiple conspiracy charge," United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 875 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 3493, 73 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1982); see United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 429-30 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 621 n. 15. Further, in order to secure a reversal for a failure to give a requested multiple-conspiracy charge, a defendant must show both that there was evidence of "separate networks operating independently of each other" and that he suffered "substantial prejudice resulting from the failure to give the requested charge." United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 89 (2d Cir.1982); see also United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 983 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926, 93 S.Ct. 1386, 35 L.Ed.2d 587 (1973).

The essence of any conspiracy is, of course, agreement, and "in order to prove a single conspiracy, the government must show that each alleged member agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal." United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d at 876; see also United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 625-27 (multiple-conspiracy charge required where, inter alia, the only apparent connection among most of the coconspirators was that they were from Colombia). The coconspirators need not have agreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they agreed on the essential nature of the plan. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 63. The goals of all the participants need not be congruent for a single conspiracy to exist, so long