Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Gen. Counsel, David Ferber, Sol., Roger S. Foster, Sp. Counsel, Ofc. of Policy Research, SEC, Frank E. Kennamer, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Donald M. Feuerstein, Atty., SEC, for Securities and Exchange Commission.
Orison S. Marden, White & Case, William D. Conwell, Edward C. Schmults, P. R. Konrad Knake, Thomas McGanney, Peter G. Eikenberry, New York City, for Texas Gulf Sulphur, Forgarty, Mollison, Holyk, Darke, Stephens, Murray, Huntington and Kline, for Crawford and Clayton.
Albert R. Connelly, Donald I. Strauber, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for Coates.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and WATERMAN, MOORE, FRIENDLY, SMITH, KAUFMAN, HAYS, ANDERSON and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge:
This action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) pursuant to Sec. 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 15 U.S.C. 78u(e), against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS) and several of its officers, directors and employees, to enjoin certain conduct by TGS and the individual defendants said to violate Section 10(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 (17 CFR 240.10b-5) (the Rule), promulgated thereunder, and to compel the rescission by the individual defendants of securities transactions assertedly conducted contrary to law.1 The complaint alleged (1) that defendants Fogarty, Mollison, Darke, Murray, Huntington, O'Neill, Clayton, Crawford, and Coates had either personally or through agents purchased TGS stock or calls thereon from November 12, 1963 through April 16, 1964 on the basis of material inside information concerning the results of TGS drilling in Timmins, Ontario, while such information remained undisclosed to the investing public generally or to the particular sellers;2 (2) that defendants Darke and Coates had divulged such information to others for use in purchasing TGSstock or calls3 or recommended its purchase while the information was undisclosed to the public or to the sellers;4 that defendants Stephens, Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk, and Kline had accepted options to purchase TGS stock on Feb. 20, 1964 without disclosing the material information as to the drilling progress to either the Stock Option Committee or the TGS Board of Directors; and (4) that TGS issued a deceptive press release on April 12, 1964. The case was tried at length before Judge Bonsal of the Southern District of New York, sitting without a jury. Judge Bonsal in a detailed opinion5 decided, inter alia, that the insider activity prior to April 9, 1964 was not illegal because the drilling results were not 'material' until then; that Clayton and Crawford had traded in violation of law because they traded after that date; that Coates had committed no violation as he did not trade before disclosure was made; and that the issuance of the press release was not unlawful because it was not issued for the purpose of benefiting the corporation, there was no evidence that any insider used the release to his personal advantage and it was not 'misleading, or deceptive on the basis of the facts then known,' 258 F.Supp. 262, at 292-296 (SDNY 1966). Defendants Clayton and Crawford appeal from that part of the decision below which held that they had violated Sec. 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 and the SEC appeals from the remainder of the decision which dismissed the complaint against defendants TGS, Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk, Darke, Stephens, Kline, Murray, and Coates.6
For reasons which appear below, we decide the various issues presented as follows:
(1) As to Clayton and Crawford, as purchasers of stock on April 15 and 16, 1964, we affirm the finding that they violated 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 and remand, pursuant to the agreement by all the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.
(2) As to Murray, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
(3) As to Mollison and Holyk, as recipients of certain stock options, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
(4) As to Stephens and Fogarty, as recipients of stock options, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand for a further determination as to whether an injunction, in the exercise of the trial court's discretion, should issue.
(5) As to Kline, as a recipient of a stock option, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand with directions to issue an order rescinding the option and for a determination of any other appropriate remedy in connection therewith.
(6) As to Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk, Darke, and Huntington, as purchasers of stock or calls thereon between Novermber 12, 1963, and April 9, 1964, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and find that they violated 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, and remand, pursuant to the agreement of all the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.
(7) As to Clayton, although the district judge did not specify that the complaint be dismissed with respect to his purchases of TGS stock before April 9, 1964, such a dismissal is implicit in his treatment of the individual appellees who acted similarly. Consequently, although Clayton is named only as an appellant our decision with respect to the materiality of K-55-1 renders it necessary to treat him also as an appellee. Thus, as to him, as one who purchased stock between November 12, 1963 and April 9, 1964, we reverse the implicit dismissal of the complaint, find that he violated 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, and remand, pursuant to the agreement by all the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.
(8) As to Darke, as one who passed on information to tippees, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand, pursuant to the agreement by all the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.
(9) As to Coates, as one who on April 16th purchased stock and gave information on which his son-in-law broker and the broker's customers purchased shares, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint, find that he violated 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, and remand, pursuant to the agreement by all the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.
(10) As to Texas Gulf Sulphur, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand for a further determination by the district judge in the light of the approach taken in this opinion.
The occurrences out of which this litigation arose are not set forth hereafter in as detailed a manner as they are set out in the published opinion of the court below, but are stated sufficiently, we believe, for the exposition of the issues raised by the several appeals to us.
THE FACTUAL SETTING
This action derives from the exploratory activities of TGS begun in 1957 on the Canadian Shield in eastern Canada. In March of 1959, aerial geophysical surveys were conducted over more than 15,000 square miles of this area by a group led by defendant Mollision, a mining engineer and a Vice President of TGS. The group included defendant Holyk, TGS's chief geologist, defendant Clayton, an electrical engineer and geophysicist, and defendant Darke, a geologist. These operations resulted in the detection of numerous anomalies, i.e., extraordinary variations in the conductivity of rocks, one of which was on the Kidd 55 segment of land located near Timmins, Ontario.
On October 29 and 30, 1963, Clayton conducted a ground geophysical survey on the northeast portion of the Kidd 55 segment which confirmed the presence of an anomaly and indicated the necessity of diamond core drilling for further evaluation. Drilling of the initial hole, K-55-1, at the strongest part of the anomaly was commenced on November 8 and terminated on November 12 at a depth of 655 feet. Visual estimates by Holyk of the core of K-55-1 indicated an average copper content of 1.15% And an average zinc content of 8.64% Over a length of 599 feet. This visual estimate convinced TGS that it was desirable to acquire the remainder of the Kidd 55 segment, and in order to facilitate this acquisition TGS President Stephens instructed the exploration group to keep the results of K-55-1 confidential and undisclosed even as to other officers, directors, and employees of TGS. The hole was concealed and a barren core was intentionally drilled off the anomaly. Meanwhile, the core of K-55-1 had been shipped to Utah for chemical assay which, when received in early December, revealed an average mineral content of 1.18% Copper, 8.26% Zinc, and 3.94% Ounces of silver per ton over a length of 602 feet. These results were so remarkable that neither Clayton, an experienced geophysicist, nor four other TGS expert witnesses, had ever seen or heard of a comparable initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit. So, the trial court concluded, 'There is no doubt that the drill core of K-55-1 was unusually good and that it excited the interest and speculation of those who knew about it.' Id. at 282. By March 27, 1964, TGS decided that the land acquisition program had advanced to such a point that the company might well resume drilling, and drilling was resumed on March 31.
During this period, from November 12, 1963 when K-55-1 was completed, to March 31, 1964 when drilling was resumed, certain of the individual defendants listed in fn. 2, supra, and persons listed in fn. 4, supra, said to have received 'tips' from them, purchased TGS stock or calls thereon. Prior to these transactions these persons had owned 1135 shares of TGS stock and possessed no calls; thereafter they owned a total of 8235 shares and possessed 12,300 calls.
On February 20, 1964, also during this period, TGS issued stock options to 26 of its officers and employees whose salaries exceeded a specified amount, five of whom were the individual defendants Stephens, Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk, and Kline. Of these, only Kline was unaware of the detailed results of K-55-1, but he, too, knew that a hole containing favorable bodies of copper and zinc ore had been drilled in Timmins. At this time, neither the TGS Stock Option Committee nor its Board of Directors had been informed of the results of K-55-1, presumably because of the pending land acquisition program which required confidentiality. All of the foregoing defendants accepted the options granted them.
When drilling was resumed on March 31, hole K-55-3 was commenced 510 feet west of K-55-1 and was drilled easterly at a 45 degrees angle so as to cross K-55-1 in a vertical plane. Daily progress reports of the drilling of this hole K-55-3 and of all subsequently drilled holes were sent to defendants Stephens and Fogarty (President and Executive Vice President of TGS) by Holyk and Mollison. Visual estimates of K-55-3 revealed an average mineral content of 1.12% Copper and 7.93% Zinc over 641 of the hole's 876-foot length. On April 7, drilling of a third hole, K-55-4, 200 feet south of and parallel to K-55-1 and westerly at a 45 degrees angle, was commenced and mineralization was encountered over 366 of its 579-foot length. Visual estimates indicated an average content of 1.14% Copper and 8.24% Zinc. Like K-55-1, both K-55-3 and K-55-4 established substantial copper mineralization on the eastern edge of the anomaly. On the basis of these findings relative to the foregoing drilling results, the trial court concluded that the vertical plane created by the intersection of K-55-1 and K-55-3, which measured at least 350 feet wide by 500 feet deep extended southward 200 feet to its intersection with K-55-4, and that 'There was real evidence that a body of commercially mineable ore might exist.' Id. at 281-82.
On April 8 TGS began with a second drill rig to drill another hole, K-55-6, 300 feet easterly of K-55-1. This hole was drilled westerly at an angle of 60 degrees and was intended to explore mineralization beneath K-55-1. While no visual estimates of its core were immediately available, it was readily apparent by the evening of April 10 that substantial copper mineralization had been encountered over the last 127 feet of the hole's 569-foot lenght. On April 10, a third drill rig commenced drilling yet another hole, K-55-5, 200 feet north of K-55-1, parallel to the prior holes, and slanted westerly at a 45 degrees angle. By the evening of April 10 in this hole, too, substantial copper mineralization had been encountered over the last 42 feet of its 97-foot length.
Meanwhile, remors that a major ore strike was in the making had been circulating throughout Canada. On the morning of Saturday, April 11, Stephens at his home in Greenwich, Conn. read in the New York Herald Tribune and in the New York Times unauthorized reports of the TGS drilling which seemed to infer a rich strike from the fact that the drill cores had been flown to the United States for chemical assay. Stephens immediately contacted Fogarty at his home in Rye, N.Y., who in turn telephoned and later that day visited Mollison at Mollison's home in Greenwich to obtain a current report and evaluation of the drilling progress.7 The following morning, Sunday, Fogarty again telephoned Mollison, inquiring whether Mollison had any further information and told him to return to Timmins with Holyk, the TGS Chief Geologist, as soon as possible 'to move things along.' With the aid of one Carroll, a public relations consultant, Fogarty drafted a press release designed to quell the remors, which release, After having been channeled through Stephens and Huntington, a TGS attorney, was issued at 3:00 P.M. on Sunday, April 12, and which appeared in the morning newspapers of general circulation on Monday, April 13. It read in pertinent part as follows:
NEW YORK, April 12-- The following statement was made today by Dr. Charles F. Fogarty, executive vice president of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, in regard to the company's drilling operations near Timmins, Ontario, Canada. Dr. Fogarty said:
'During the past few days, the exploration activities of Texas Gulf Sulphur in the area of Timmins, Ontario, have been widely reported in the press, coupled with rumors of a substantial copper discovery there. These reports exaggerate the scale of operations, and mention plans and statistics of size and grade of ore that are without factual basis and have evidently originated by speculation of people not connected with TGS.
'The facts are as follows. TGS has been exploring in the Timmins area for six years as part of its overall search in Canada and elsewhere for various minerals-- lead, copper, zinc, etc. During the course of this work, in Timmins as well as in Eastern Canada, TGS has conducted exploration entirely on its own, without the participation by others. Numerous prospects have been investigated by geophysical means and a large number of selected ones have been core-drilled. These cores are sent to the United States for assay and detailed examination as a matter of routine and on advice of expert Canadian legal counsel. No inferences as to grade can be drawn from this procedure.
'Most of the areas drilled in Eastern Canada have revealed either barren pyrite or graphite without value; a few have resulted in discoveries of small or marginal sulphide ore bodies.
'Recent drilling on one property near Timmins has led to preliminary indications that more drilling would be required for proper evaluation of this prospect. The drilling done to date has not been conclusive, but the statements made by many outside quarters are unreliable and include information and figures that are not available to TGS.
'The work done to date has not been sufficient to reach definite conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be premature and possibly misleading. When we have progressed to the point where reasonable and logical conclusions can be made, TGS will issue a definite statement to its stockholders and to the public in order to clarify the Timmins project.'
The release purported to give the Timmins drilling results as of the release date, April 12. From Mollison Fogarty had been told of the developments through 7:00 P.M. on April 10, and of the remarkable discoveries made up to that time, detailed supra, which discoveries, according to the calculations of the experts who testified for the SEC at the hearing, demonstrated that TGS had already discovered 6.2 to 8.3 million tons of proven ore having gross assay values from $26 to $29 per ton. TGS experts, on the other hand, denied at the hearing that proven or probable ore could have been calculated on April 11 or 12 because there was then no assurance of continuity in the mineralized zone.
The evidence as to the effect of this release on the investing public was equivocal and less than abundant. On April 13 the New York Herald Tribune in an article head-noted 'Copper Rumor Deflated' quoted from the TGS release of April 12 and backtracked from its original April 11 report of a major strike but nevertheless inferred from the TGS release that 'recent mineral exploratory activity near Timmins, Ontario, has provided preliminary favorable results, sufficient at least to require a step-up in drilling operations.' Some witnesses who testified at the hearing stated that they found the release encouraging. On the other hand, a Canadian mining security specialist, Roche, stated that 'earlier in the week (before April 16) we had a Dow Jones saying that they (TGS) didn't have anything basically' and a TGS stock specialist for the Midwest Stock Exchange became concerned about his long position in the stock after reading the release. The trial court stated only that 'While, in retrospect, the press release may appear gloomy or incomplete, this does not make it misleading or deceptive on the basis of the facts then known.' Id. at 296.
Meanwhile, drilling operations continued. By morning of April 13, in K-55-5, the fifth drill hole, substantial copper mineralization had been encountered to the 580 foot mark, and the hole was subsequently drilled to a length of 757 feet without further results. Visual estimates revealed an average content of 0.82% Copper and 4.2% Zinc over a 525-foot section. Also by 7:00 A.M. on April 13, K-55-6 had found mineralization to the 946-foot mark. On April 12 a fourth drill rig began to drill K-55-7, which was drilled westerly at a 45 degrees angle, at the eastern edge of the anomaly. The next morning the 137 foot mark had been reached, fifty feet of which showed mineralization. By 7:00 P.M. on April 15, the hole had been completed to a length of 707 feet but had only encountered additional mineralization during a 26-foot length between the 425 and 451-foot marks. A mill test hole, K-55-8, had been drilled and was complete by the evening of April 13 but its mineralization had not been reported upon prior to April 16. K-55-10 was drilled westerly at a 45 degrees angle commencing April 14 and had encountered mineralization over 231 of its 249-foot length by the evening of April 15. It, too, was drilled at the anomaly's eastern edge.
While drilling activity ensued to completion, TGC officials were taking steps toward ultimate disclosure of the discovery. On April 13, a previously-invited reporter for The Northern Miner, a Canadian mining industry journal, visited the drillsite, interviewed Mollison, Holyk and Darke, and prepared an article which confirmed a 10 million ton ore strike. This report, after having been submitted to Mollison and returned to the reporter unamended on April 15, was published in the April 16 issue. A statement relative to the extent of the discovery, in substantial part drafted by Mollison, was given to the Ontario Minister of Mines for release to the Canadian media. Mollison and Holyk expected it to be released over the airways at 11 P.M. on April 15th, but, for undisclosed reasons, it was not released until 9:40 A.M. on the 16th. An official detailed statement, announcing a strike of at least 25 million tons of ore, based on the drilling data set forth above, was read to representatives of American financial media from 10:00 A.M. to 10:10 or 10:15 A.M. on April 16, and appeared over Merrill Lynch's private wire at 10:29 A.M. and, somewhat later than expected, over the Dow Jones ticker tape at 10:54 A.M.
Between the time the first press release was issued on April 12 and the dissemination of the TGS official announcement on the morning of April 16, the only defendants before us on appeal who engaged in market activity were Clayton and Crawford and TGS director Coates. Clayton ordered 200 shares of TGS stock through his Canadian broker on April 15 and the order was executed that day over the Midwest Stock Exchange. Crawford ordered 300 shares at midnight on the 15th and another 300 shares at 8:30 A.M. the next day, and these orders were executed over the Midwest Exchange in Chicago at its opening on April 16. Coates left the TGS press conference and called his broker son-in-law Haemisegger shortly before 10:20 A.M. on the 16th and ordered 2,000 shares of TGS for family trust accounts of which Coates was a trustee but not a beneficiary; Haemisegger executed this order over the New York and Midwest Exchanges, and he and his customers purchased 1500 additional shares.
During the period of drilling in Timmins, the market price of TGS stock fluctuated but steadily gained overall. On Friday, November 8, when the drilling began, the stock closed at 17 3/8; on Friday, November 15, after K-55-1 had been completed, it closed at 18. After a slight decline to 16 3/8 by Friday, November 22, the price rose to 20 7/8 by December 13, when the chemical assay results of K-55-1 were received, and closed at a high of 24 1/8 on February 21, the day after the stock options had been issued. It had reached a price of 26 by March 31, after the land acquisition program had been completed and drilling had been resumed, and continued to ascend to 30 1/8 by the close of trading on April 10, at which time the drilling progress up to then was evaluated for the April 12th press release. On April 13, the day on which the April 12 release was disseminated, TGS opened at 30 1/8, rose immediately to a high of 32 and gradually tapered off to close at 30 7/8. It closed at 30 1/4 the next day, and at 29 3/8 on April 15. On April 16, the day of the official announcement of the Timmins discovery, the price climbed to a high of 37 and closed at 36 3/8. By May 15, TGS stock was selling at 58 1/4.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
A. Introductory
Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5, on which this action is predicated, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the grant of authority given the SEC by Congress in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b).8 By that Act Congress purposed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges, see 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1455-56 (2d ed. 1961). The Act and the Rule apply to the transactions here, all of which were consummated on exchanges. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, 86 S.Ct. 23, 15 L.Ed.2d 60 (1965); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F.Supp. 239, 243 (SDNY 1962). Whether predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts, see, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fisher,136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan.1932), or on the 'special facts' doctrine, see, e.G., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 29 S.Ct. 521, 53 L.Ed. 853 (1909), the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information, see Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus.Law. 1009, 1010 (1966), Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporation Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1271, 1278-80 (1965). The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' may not take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing,' i.E., the investing public. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by this Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act. Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed. So, it is here no justification for insider activity that disclosure was forbidden by the legitimate corporate objective of acquiring options to purchase the land surrounding the exploration site; if the information was, as the SEC contends, material,9 its possessors should have kept out of the market until disclosure was accomplished. Cady, Roberts, supra at 911.
B. Material Inside Information
An insider is not, of course, always foreclosed from investing in his own company merely because he may be more familiar with company operations than are outside investors. An insider's duty to disclose information or his duty to abstain from dealing in his company's securities arises only in 'those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if (the extraordinary situation is) disclosed.' Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1271, 1289.
Nor is an insider obligated to confer upon outside investors the benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated guesses or predictions. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra at 1463. The only regulatory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of the insiders.
This is not to suggest, however, as did the trial court, the 'the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative one, particularly since many actions under Section 10(b) are brought on the basis of hindsight,'258 F.Supp. 262 at 280, in the sense that the materialith of facts is to be assessed solely by measuring the effect the knowledge of the facts would have upon prudent or conservative investors. As we stated in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462, 'The basic test of materiality * * * is whether a reasonable man would attach importance * * * in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. Restatement, Torts 538(2)(a); accord Prosser, Torts 554-55; I Harper & James, Torts 565-66.' This, of course, encompasses any fact '* * * which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities * * *.' List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra at 462, quoting from Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642, 7 A.L.R.3d 486 (7 Cir. 1963). Such a fact is a material fact and must be effectively disclosed to the investing public prior to the commencement of insider trading in the corporation's securities. The speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders.10 Thus, material facts include not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts which affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities.
In each case, then, whether facts are material within Rule 10b-5 when the facts relate to a particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity. Here, notwithstanding the trial court's conclusion that the results of the first drill core, K-55-1, were 'too 'remote' * * * to have had any significant impact on the market, i.e., to be deemed material,'11 258 F.Supp. at 283, knowledge of the possibility, which surely was more than marginal, of the existence of a mine of the vast magnitude indicated by the remarkably rich drill core located rather close to the surface (suggesting mineability by the less expensive openpit method) within the confines of a large anomaly (suggesting an extensive region of mineralization) might well have affected the price of TGS stock and would certainly have been an important fact to a reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should buy, sell, or hold. After all, this first drill core was 'unusually good and * * * excited the interest and speculation of those who knew about it.' 258 F.Supp. at 282.
Our disagreement with the district judge on the issue does not, then, go to his findings of basic fact, as to which the 'clearly erroneous' rule would apply, but to his understanding of the legal standard applicable to them. See Baranow v. Gibralter Factors Corp., 366 F.2d 584, 587-589 (2 Cir. 1966), and cases cited in footnote 11 supra. Our survey of the facts found below conclusively establishes that knowledge of the results of the discovery hole, K-55-1, would have been important to a reasonable investor and might have affected the price of the stock.12 On April 16, The Northern Miner, a trade publication in wide circulation among mining stock specialists, called K-55-1, the discovery hole, 'one of the most impressive drill holes completed in modern times.'13 Roche, a Canadian broker whose firm specialized in mining securities, characterized the importance to investors of the results of K-55-1. He stated that the completion of 'the first drill hole' with 'a 600 foot drill core is very very significant * * * anything over 200 feet is considered very significant and 600 feet is just beyond your wildest imagination.' He added, however, that it 'is a natural thing to buy more stock once they give you the first drill hole.' Additional testimony revealed that the prices of stocks of other companies, albeit less diversified, smaller firms, had increased substantially solely on the basis of the discovery of good anomalies or even because of the proximity of their lands to the situs of a potentially major strike.
Finally, a major factor in determining whether the K-55-1 discovery was a material fact is the importance attached to the drilling results by those who knew about it. In view of other unrelated recent developments favorably affecting TGS, participation by an informed person in a regular stock-purchase program, or even sporadic trading by an informed person, might lend only nominal support to the inference of the materiality of the K-55-1 discovery; nevertheless, the timing by those who knew of it of their stock purchases and their purchases of short-term calls-- purchases in some cases by individuals who had never before purchased calls or even TGS stock-- virtually compels the inference that the insiders were influenced by the drilling results. This insider trading activity, which surely constitutes highly pertinent evidence and the only truly objective evidence of the materiality of the K-55-1 discovery, was apparently disregarded by the court below in favor of the testimony of defendants' expert witnesses, all of whom 'agreed that one drill core does not establish an ore body, much less a mine,' 258 F.Supp. at 282-283. Significantly, however, the court below, while relying upon what these defense experts said the defendant insiders ought to have thought about the worth to TGS of the K-55-1 discovery, and finding that from November 12, 1963 to April 6, 1964 Fogarty, Murray, Holyk and Darke spent more than $100,000 in purchasing TGS stock and calls on that stock, made no finding that the insiders were motivated by any factor other than the extraordinary K-55-1 discovery when they bought their stock and their calls. No reason appears why outside investors, perhaps better acquainted with speculative modes of investment and with, in many cases, perhaps more capital at their disposal for intelligent speculation, would have been less influenced, and would not have been similarly motivated to invest if they had known what the insider investors knew about the K-55-1 discovery.
Our decision to expand the limited protection afforded outside investors by the trial court's narrow definition of materiality is not at all shaken by fears that the elimination of insider trading benefits will deplete the ranks of capable corporate managers by taking away an incentive to accept such employment. Such benefits, in essence, are forms of secret corporate compensation, see Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 Calif.L.Rev. 408, 409-10 (1962), derived at the expense of the uninformed investing public and not at the expense of the corporation which receives the sole benefit from insider incentives. Moreover, adequate incentives for corporate officers may be provided by properly administered stock options and employee purchase plans of which there are many in existence. In any event, the normal motivation induced by stock ownership, i.e., the identification of an individual with corporate progress, is ill-promoted by condoning the sort of speculative insider activity which occurred here; for example, some of the corporation's stock was sold at market in order to purchase short-term calls upon that stock, calls which would never be exercised to increase a stockholder equity in TGS unless the market price of that stock rose sharply.
The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks,-- which market risks include, of course the risk that one's evaluative capacity or one's capital available to put at risk may exceed another's capacity or capital. The insiders here were not trading on an equal footing with the outside investors. They alone were in a position to evaluate the probability and magnitude of what seemed from the outset to be a major ore strike; they alone could invest safely, secure in the expectation that the price of TGS stock would rise substantially in the event such a major strike should materialize, but would decline little, if at all, in the event of failure, for the public, ignorant at the outset of the favorable probabilities would likewise be unaware of the unproductive exploration, and the additional exploration costs would not significantly affect TGS market prices. Such inequities based upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected.
We hold, therefore, that all transactions in TGS stock or calls by individuals apprised of the drilling results14 of K-55-1 were made in violation of Rule 10b-5.15 Inasmuch as the visual evaluation of that drill core (a generally reliable estimate though less accurate than a chemical assay) constituted material information, those advised of the results of the visual evaluation as well as those informed of the chemical assay traded in violation of law. The geologist Darke possessed undisclosed material information and traded in TGS securities. Therefore we reverse the dismissal of the action as to him and his personal transactions. The tril court also found, 258 F.Supp. at 284, that Darke, after the drilling of K-55-1 had been completed and with detailed knowledge of the results thereof, told certain outside individuals that TGS 'was a good buy.' These individuals thereafter acquired TGS stock and calls. The trial court also found that later, as of March 30, 1964, Darke not only used his material knowledge for his own purchases but that the substantial amounts of TGS stock and calls purchased by these outside individuals on that day, see footnote 4, supra, was 'strong circumstantial evidence that Darke must have passed the word to one or more of his 'tippees' that drilling on the Kidd 55 segment was about to be resumed.' 258 F.Supp. at 284. Obviously if such a resumption were to have any meaning to such 'tippees,' they must have previously been told of K-55-1.
Unfortunately, however, there was no definitive resolution below of Darke's liability in these premises for the trial court held as to him, as it held as to all the other individual defendants, that this 'undisclosed information' never became material until April 9. As it is our holding that the information acquired after the drilling of K-55-1 was material, we, on the basis of the findings of direct and circumstantial evidence on the issue that the trial court has already expressed, hold that Darke violated Rule 10b-5(3) and Section 10(b) by 'tipping' and we remand, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, for a determination of the appropriate remedy.16 As Darke's 'tippees' are not defendants in this action, we need not decide whether, if they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the material information was undisclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the conduct of their insider source, though we note that it certainly could be equally reprehensible.
With reference to Huntington, the trial court found that he 'had no detailed knowledge as to the work' on the Kidd-55 segment, 258 F.Supp. 281. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that he knew about and participated in TGS's land acquisition program which followed the receipt of the K-55-1 drilling results, and that on February 26, 1964 he purchased 50 shares of TGS stock. Later, on March 16, he helped prepare a letter for Dr. Holyk's signature in which TGS made a substantial offer for lands near K-55-1, and on the same day he, who had never before purchased calls on any stock, purchased a call on 100 shares of TGS stock. We are satisfied that these purchases in February and March, coupled with his readily inferable and probably reliable, understanding of the highly favorable nature of preliminary operations on the Kidd segment, demonstrate that Huntington possessed material inside information such as to make his purchase violative of the Rule and the Act.
C. When May Insiders Act?
Appellant Crawford, who ordered17 the purchase of TGS stock shortly before the TGS April 16 official announcement, and defendant Coates, who placed orders with and communicated the news to his broker immediately after the official announcement was read at the TGS-called press conference, concede that they were in possession of material information. They contend, however, that their purchases were not proscribed purchases for the news had already been effectively disclosed. We disagree.
Crawford telephoned his orders to his Chicago broker about midnight on April 15 and again at 8:30 in the morning of the 16th, with instructions to buy at the opening of the Midwest Stock Exchange that morning. The trial court's finding that 'he sought to, and did, 'beat the news," 258 F.Supp. at 287, is well documented by the record. The rumors of a major ore strike which had been circulated in Canada and, to a lesser extent, in New York, had been disclaimed by the TGS press release of April 12, which significantly promised the public an official detailed announcement when possibilities had ripened into actualities. The abbreviated announcement to the Canadian press at 9:40 A.M. on the 16th by the Ontario Minister of Mines and the report carried by The Northern Miner, parts of which had sporadically reached New York on the morning of the 16th through reports from Canadian affiliates to a few New York investment firms, are assuredly not the equivalent of the official 10-15 minute announcement which was not released to the American financial press until after 10:00 A.M. Crawford's orders had been placed before that. Before insiders may act upon material information, such information must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availibility to the investing public. Particularly here, where a formal announcement to the entire financial news media had been promised in a prior official release known to the media, all insider activity must await dissemination of the promised official announcement.
Coates was absolved by the court below because his telephone order was placed shortly before 10:20 A.M. on April 16, which was after the announcement had been made even though the news could not be considered already a matter of public information. 258 F.Supp. at 288. This result seems to have been predicated upon a misinterpretation of dicta in Cady, Roberts, where the SEC instructed insiders to 'keep out of the market until the established procedures for public release of the information are carried out instead of hastening to execute transactions in advance of, and in frustration of, the objectives of the release,' 40 SEC at 915. The reading of a news release, which prompted Coates into action, is merely the first step in the process of dissemination required for compliance with the regulatory objective of providing all investors with an equal opportunity to make informed investment judgments. Assuming that the contents of the official release could instantaneously be acted upon,18 at the minimum Coates should have waited until the news could reasonably have been expected to appear over the media of widest circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape, rather than hastening to insure an advantage to himself and his broker son-in-law.19
D. Is An Insider's Good Faith A Defense Under 10b-5?
Coates, Crawford and Clayton, who ordered purchases before the news could be deemed disclosed, claim, nevertheless, that they were justified in doing so because they honestly believed that the news of the strike had become public at the time they placed their orders. However, whether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforcement proceeding or as a private action,20 proof of a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary. In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful. See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141-142 (2 Cir. 1963); SEC v. Capital Gains, etc., Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963). A similar standard has been adopted in private actions, see, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10 Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9 Cir. 1961); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9 Cir. 1962); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.Supp. 26 (SDNY 1964); but see, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F.Supp. 321 (SDNY 1965); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F.Supp. 416 (SDNY 1955), for policy reasons which seem perfectly consistent with the broad Congressional design '* * * to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in * * * (securities) transactions.' Sec. 2 of SEC Act, 15 U.S.C. 78b, see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7 Cir. 1963); Note, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 824, 839-44 (1965); Note, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 1070, 1079-81 (1965).
Absent any clear indication of a legislative intention to require a showing of specific fraudulent intent, see Note, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 1070, 1075, 1076 n. 29 (1965), the securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law21 both to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, supra, 375 U.S. at 195,84 S.Ct. 275, and to insure uniformity of enforcement, see Note, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 824, 832 n. 36 (1965), citing McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.,292 F.2d 824, 834 (3 Cir. 1961). Moreover, a review of other sections of the Act from which Rule 10b-5 seems to have been drawn suggests that the implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as well as active fraud comports with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the Rule.22 Finally, we note that this position is not, as asserted by defendants, irreconcilable with previous language in this circuit because 'some form of the traditional scienter requirement,' Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2 Cir. 1967), sometimes defined as 'fraud,' Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (SDNY 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2 Cir. 1951) is preserved. This requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard, a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.
Thus, the beliefs of Coates, Crawford and Clayton that the news of the ore strike was sufficiently public at the time of their purchase orders are to no avail if those beliefs were not reasonable under the circumstances. Crawford points to the scattered rumors of the discovery which had been circulating for some time before April 15, to the release of the information to The Northern Miner on April 15 to be published by it on the 16th, to the arrangement made by TGS with the Ontario Minister of Mines for the release of an abbreviated report on the evening of the 15th (which did not eventuate until 9:40 A.M., April 16), and to the corporation's official announcement at 10:00 A.M. on the 16th, all of which transpired prior to an anticipated execution of his purchase orders that had been placed by him after trading had closed on the Midwest Exchange on April 15. However, the rumors and casual disclosure through Canadian media, especially in view of the April 12 'gloomy' or incomplete release denying the rumors and promising official confirmation, hardly sufficed to inform traders on American exchanges affected by Crawford's purchases. Moreover, the formal announcement could not reasonably have been expected to be disseminated by the time of the opening of the exchanges on the morning of April 16, when Crawford must have expected his orders would be executed.
Clayton, who was unaware of the April 16 disclosure announcement TGS was to make can, in support of his claim that the favorable news was public, rely only on the rumors and on the phone calls received by TGS prior to the placing of his order from those who seemed to have heard some version or rumors of the news. His awareness of the contents of the April 12 release renders unreasonable any claim that he believed the news was truly public.
Finally, Coates, as we have already indicated in fn. 19, supra, could not reasonably have expected the official release to have been disseminated when he placed his order before 10:20 for immediate execution nor were the Canadian disclosures relied on by Crawford sufficient to render the conduct of Coates permissible under the circumstances.23
E. May Insiders Accept Stock Options Without Disclosing Material Information To the Issuer?
On February 20, 1964, defendants Stephens, Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk and Kline accepted stock options issued to them and a number of other top officers of TGS, although not one of them had informed the Stock Option Committee of the Board of Directors or the Board of the results of K-55-1, which information we have held was then material. The SEC sought rescission of these options. The trial court, in addition to finding the knowledge of the results of the K-55 discovery to be immaterial, held that Kline had no detailed knowledge of the drilling progress and that Holyk and Mollison could reasonably assume that their superiors, Stephens and Fogarty, who were directors of the corporation, would report the results if that was advisable; indeed all employees had been instructed not to divulge this information pending completion of the land acquisition program, 258 F.Supp. at 291. Therefore, the court below concluded that only directors Stephens and Fogarty, of the top management, would have violated the Rule by accepting stock options without disclosure, but it also found that they had not acted improperly as the information in their possession was not material. 258 F.Supp. at 292. In view of our conclusion as to materiality we hold that Stephens and Fogarty violated the Rule by accepting them. However, as they have surrendered the options and the corporation has canceled them, supra at 292, n. 17, we find it unnecessary to order that the injunctions prayed for be actually issued. We point out, nevertheless, that the surrender of these options after the SEC commenced the case is not a satisfaction of the SEC claim, and a determination as to whether the issuance of injunctions against Stephens and Fogarty is advisable in order to prevent or deter future violations of regulatory provisions is remanded for the exercise of discretion by the trial court.
Contrary to the belief of the trial court that Kline had no duty to disclose his knowledge of the Kidd project before accepting the stock option offered him, we believe that he, a vice president, who had become the general counsel of TGS in January 1964, but who had been secretary of the corporation since January 1961, and was present in that capacity when the options were granted, and who was in charge of the mechanics of issuance and acceptance of the options, was a member of top management and under a duty before accepting his option to disclose any material information he may have possessed, and, as he did not disclose such information to the Option Committee we direct rescission of the option he received.24 As to Holyk and Mollison, the SEC has not appealed the holding below that they, not being then members of top management (although Mollison was a vice president) had no duty to disclose their knowledge of the drilling before accepting their options. Therefore, the issue of whether, by accepting, they violated the Act, is not before us, and the holding below is undisturbed.
II. THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT
Introductory
At 3:00 P.M. on April 12, 1964, evidently believing it desirable to comment upon the rumors concerning the Timmins project, TGS issued the press release quoted in pertinent part in the text at page 845, supra. The SEC argued below and maintains on this appeal that this release painted a misleading and deceptive picture of the drilling progress at the time of its issuance, and hence violated Rule 10b-5(2).25 TGS relies on the holding of the court below that 'the issuance of the release produced no unusual market action' and 'in the absence of a showing that the purpose of the April 12 press release was to affect the market price of TGS stock to the advantage of TGS or its insiders, the issuance of the press release did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 since it was not issued 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and, alternatively, 'even if it had been established that the April 12 release was issued in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, the Commission has failed to demonstrate that it was false, misleading or deceptive.' 258 F.Supp. at 294.
Before further discussing this matter it seems desirable to state exactly what the SEC claimed in its complaint and what it seeks. The specific SEC allegation in its complaint is that this April 12 press release '* * * was materially false and misleading and was known by certain of defendant Texas Gulf's officers and employees, including defendants Fogarty, Mollison, Holyk, Darke and Clayton, to be materially false and misleading.'
The specific relief the SEC seeks is, pursuant to Section 21(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u(e), a permanent injunction restraining the issuance of any further materially false and misleading publicly distributed informative items.26
B. The 'In Connection With * * *' Requirement.
In adjudicating upon the relationship of this phrase to the case before us it would appear that the court below used a standard that does not reflect the congressional purpose that prompted the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The dominant congressional purposes underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were to promote free and open public securities markets and to protect the investing public from suffering inequities in trading, including, specifically, inequities that follow from trading that has been stimulated by the publication of false or misleading corporate information releases. Commenting on the disclosure purposes of the House bill (H.R. 9323), the bill a Committee of Conference eventually integrated with a similar Senate bill (S. 3420) to make the bill passed by both Houses of Congress that became the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the House Committee which reported out H.R. 9323 stated:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy. The disclosure of information materially important to investors may not instantaneously be reflected in market value, but despite the intricacies of security values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market. That is why in many cases it is so carefully guarded. Delayed, inaccurate, and misleading reports are the tools of the unconscionable market operator and the recreant corporate official who speculate on inside information. Despite the tug of conflicting interests and the influence of popular groups, responsible officials of the leading exchanges have unqualifiedly recognized in theory at least the vital importance of true and accurate corporate reporting as an essential cog in the proper functioning of the public exchanges. Their efforts to bring about more adequate and prompt publicity have been handicapped by the lack of legal power and by the failure of certain banking and business groups to appreciate that a business that gathers its capital from the investing public has not the same right to secrecy as a small privately owned and managed business. It is only a few decades since men believed that the disclosure of a balance sheet was a disclosure of a trade secret. Today few people would admit the right of any company to solicit public funds without the disclosure of a balance sheet. H.R.Rep.No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
Section 10(b) of the Act (see footnote 8, supra) was taken by the Conference Committee from Section 10(b) of the proposed Senate bill, S. 3420, and taken from it verbatim insofar as here pertinent. The only alteration made by the Conference Committee was to substitute the present closing language of Section 10(b), '* * * in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors' for the closing language of the original Section 10(b) of S. 3420, '* * * which the Commission may declare to be detrimental to the interests of investors.' 78 Cong.Rec. 10261 (1934).
The Report of the Senate Committee which presented S. 3420 to the Senate summarized Section 10(b) as follows:
Subsection (b) authorizes the Commission by rules and regulations to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interests of the investor. S.Rep.No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
Indeed, from its very inception, Section 10(b), and the proposed sections in H.R. 1383 and S. 3420 from which it was derived, have always been acknowledged as catchalls. See Bromberg, Securities Law: SEC Rule 10b-5, p. 19 (1967). In the House Committee hearings on the proposed House bill, Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and a spokesman for the Roosevelt Administration, described the broad prohibitions contained in 9(c), the section which corresponded to Section 10(b) of S. 3420 and eventually to Section 10(b) of the Act, as follows: 'Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices' * * *. Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.' Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934). Although several other witnesses objected to the breadth of the proposed prohibition that Corcoran was supporting, the section as enacted did not in any way limit the broad scope of the 'in connection with' phrase. See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation, 1424 n. 7 (2d ed. 1961).
Thus, the legislative history of Section 10(b) does not support the proposition urged upon us by Texas Gulf Sulphur that Congress intended the limited construction of the 'in connection with' phrase applied by the trial court. Moreover, comparisons of Section 10(b) with the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (12(2), 15 U.S.C. 77l(2) '* * * (offers or) sells a security by means of * * *'; 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) '* * * in the (offer or) sale of any securities to obtain money or property by means of * * *'; (language in brackets was added in 1954 amendments)), and with the 1936 antifraud amendment of Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15(c) (1), 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(1) '* * * effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security * * *') demonstrate that when Congress intended that there be a participation in a securities transaction as a prerequisite of a violation, it knew how to make that intention clear. See Bromberg, op. cit. supra Table 1 at 16-17.
Therefore it seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in the Act, and the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the phrase 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' intended only that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities. There is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations or persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement would not violate the section unless they engaged in related securities transactions or otherwise acted with wrongful motives; indeed, the obvious purposes of the Act to protect the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets would be seriously undermined by applying such a gloss onto the legislative language. Absent a securities transaction by an insider it is almost impossible to prove that a wrongful purpose motivated the issuance of the misleading statement. The mere fact that an insider did not engage in securities transactions does not negate the possibility of wrongful purpose; perhaps the market did not react to the misleading statement as much as was anticipated or perhaps the wrongful purpose was something other than the desire to buy at a low price or sell at a high price. Of even greater relevance to the Congressional purpose of investor protection is the fact that the investing public may be injured as much by one's misleading statement containing inaccuracies caused by negligence as by a misleading statement published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose. We do not believe that Congress intended that the proscriptions of the Act would not be violated unless the makers of a misleading statement also participated in pertinent securities transactions in connection therewith, or unless it could be shown that the issuance of the statement was motivated by a plan to benefit the corporation or themselves at the expense of a duped investing public.
Nor is there anything about Rule 10b-5 which demonstrates that the SEC sought by the Rule not fully to implement the Congressional purpose and objectives underlying Section 10(b). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); 10 SEC Ann.Rep. 56-7 (1944); 8 SEC Ann.Rep. 10 (1942). To be sure, SEC official publicity accompanying the promulgation of the Rule emphasized the insider trading aspects of the Rule, particularly the prohibition against purchases by insiders, but this was emphasized because 'the previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers,' 8 SEC Ann.Rep. 10, and the Commission wished to make it emphatically clear that the Rule was expected, inter alia, to close this loophole.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Congress intended to protect the investing public in connection with their purchases or sales on Exchanges from being misled by misleading statements promulgated for or on behalf of corporations irrespective of whether the insiders contemporaneously trade in the securities of that corporation and irrespective of whether the corporation or its management have an ulterior purpose or purposes in making an official public release. Indeed, the Commission has been charged by Congress with the responsibility of policing all misleading corporate statements from those contained in an initial prospectus to those contained in a notice to stockholders relative to the need or desirability of terminating the existence of a corporation or of merging it with another. To render the Congressional purpose ineffective by inserting into the statutory words the need of proving, not only that the public may have been misled by the release, but also that those responsible were actuated by a wrongful purpose when they issued the release, is to handicap unreasonably the Commission in its work. We should have in mind the wise words of Judge Learned Hand in Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2 Cir. 1959), relative to an interpretation of the words contained within a congressional statute, that '* * * unless they explicitly forbid it, the purpose of a statutory provision is the best test of the meaning of the words chosen. We are to put ourselves so far as we can in the position of the legislature that uttered them, and decide whether or not it would declare that the situation that has arisen is within what it wishes to cover. Indeed, at times the purpose may be so manifest as to override even the explicit words used. Markham v. Cabell,326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165.'
As was pointed out by the trial court, 258 F.Supp. at 293, the intent of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the protection of investors against fraud. Therefore, it would seem elementary that the Commission has a duty to police management so as to prevent corporate practices which are reasonably likely fraudulently to injure investors. And, of course, as we have already emphasized, a corporation's misleading material statement may injure an investor irrespective of whether the corporation itself, or those individuals managing it, are contemporaneously buying or selling the stock of the corporation. Therefore, when materially misleading corporate statements or deceptive insider activities have been uncovered, the courts, as they should, have broadly construed the statutory phrase 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCH Fed. SEC L.Rep. P91,317 (N.D.Ill.1964); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F.Supp. 215 (SDNY 1965); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F.Supp. 972, 978 (SDNY 1964); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F.Supp. 33, 37 (E.D.Pa.1964); see Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw.U.L.Rev. 872, 895 (1967). The court below found: 'There is no evidence that TGS derived any direct benefit from the issuance of the press release or that any of the defendants who participated in its preparation used it to their personal advantage.' 258 F.Supp. at 294. The requirement that a statement may not be found misleading unless its issuance is actuated by a 'wrongful purpose' might well have the effect of permitting the issuers of misleading statements to seek an advantage but to escape liability if the advantage fails to materialize to the degree contemplated, or cannot be demonstrated.
More important, however, is the realization which we must again underscore at the risk of repetition, that the investing public is hurt by exposure to false or deceptive statements irrespective of the purpose underlying their issuance.27 It does not appear to be unfair to impose upon corporate management a duty to ascertain the truth of any statements the corporation releases to its shareholders or to the investing public at large. Accordingly, we hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of the financial media, Fleischer, supra,51 Va.L.Rev. at 1294-95, if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes. It seems clear, however, that if corporate management demonstrates that it was diligent in ascertaining that the information it published was the whole truth and that such diligently obtained information was disseminated in good faith, Rule 10b-5 would not have been violated.
C. Did the Issuance of the April 12 Release Violate Rule 10b-5?
Turning first to the question of whether the release was misleading, i.e., whether it conveyed to the public a false impression of the drilling situation at the time of its issuance, we note initially that the trial court did not actually decide this question. Its conclusion that 'the Commission has failed to demonstrate that it was false, misleading or deceptive,' 258 F.Supp. at 294, seems to have derived from its views that 'The defendants are to be judged on the facts known to them when the April 12 release was issued,'258 F.Supp. at 295, that the draftsmen 'exercised reasonable business judgment under the circumstances,' 258 F.Supp. at 296, and that the release was not 'misleading or deceptive on the basis of the facts then known,' 258 F.Supp. at 296 rather than from an appropriate primary inquiry into the meaning of the statement to the reasonable investor and its relationship to truth. While we certainly agree with the trial court that 'in retrospect, the press release may appear gloomy or incomplete,'28 258 F.Supp. at 296, we cannot, from the present record, by applying the standard Congress intended, definitively conclude that it was deceptive or misleading to the reasonable investor, or that he would have been misled by it. Certain newspaper accounts of the release viewed the release as confirming the existence of preliminary favorable developments, and this optimistic view was held by some brokers, so it could be that the reasonable inverstor would have read between the lines of what appears to us to be an inconclusive and negative statement and would have envisioned the actual situation at the Kidd segment on April 12. On the other hand, in view of the decline of the market price of TGS stock from a high of 32 on the morning of April 13 when the release was disseminated to 29 3/8 by the close of trading on April 15, and the reaction to the release by other brokers, it is far from certain that the release was generally interpreted as a highly encouraging report or even encouraging at all. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the district court that took testimony and heard and saw the witnesses for a determination of the character of the release in the light of the facts existing at the time of the release, by applying the standard of whether the reasonable investor, in the exercise of due care, would have been misled by it.
In the event that it is found that the statement was misleading to the reasonable investor it will then become necessary to determine whether its issuance resulted from a lack of due diligence. The only remedly the Commission seeks against the corporation is an injunction, see footnote 26, supra, and therefore we do not find it necessary to decide whether just a lack of due diligence on the part of TGS, absent a showing of bad faith, would subject the Corporation to any liability for damages. We have recently stated in a case involving a private suit under Rule 10b-5 in which damages and an injunction were sought, "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages." Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547, quoting from SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963)
We hold only that, in an action for injunctive relief, the district court has the discretionary power under Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) to issue an injunction, if the misleading statement resulted from a lack of due diligence on the part of TGS. The trial court did not find it necessary to decide whether TGS exercised such diligence and has not yet attempted to resolve this issue. While the trial court concluded that TGS had exercised 'reasonable business judgment under the circumstances,' 258 F.Supp. at 296 it applied an incorrect legal standard in appraising whether TGS should have issued its April 12 release on the basis of the facts known to its draftsmen at the time of its preparation, 258 F.Supp. at 295, and in assuming that disclosure of the full underlying facts of the Timmins situation was not a viable alternative to the vague generalities which were asserted. 258 F.Supp. at 296.
It is not altogether certain from the present record that the draftsmen could, as the SEC suggests, have readily obtained current reports of the drilling progress over the weekend of April 10-12, but they certainly should have obtained them if at all possible for them to do so. However, even if it were not possible to evaluate and transmit current data in time to prepare the release on April 12, it would seem that TGS could have delayed the preparation a bit until an accurate report of a rapidly changing situation was possible. See 258 F.Supp. at 296. At the very least, if TGS felt compelled to respond to the spreading rumors of a spectacular discovery, it would have been more accurate to have stated that the situation was in flux and that the release was prepared as of April 10 information rather than purporting to report the progress 'to date.' Moreover, it would have obviously been better to have specifically described the known drilling progress as of April 10 by stating the basic facts. Such an explicit disclosure would have permitted the investing public to evaluate the 'prospect' of a mine at Timmins without having to read between the lines to understand that preliminary indications were favorable-- in itself an understatement.
The choice of an ambiguous general statement rather than a summary of the specific facts cannot reasonably be justified by any claimed urgency. The avoidance of liability for misrepresentation in the event that the Timmins project failed, a highly unlikely event as of April 12 or April 13, did not forbid the accurate and truthful divulgence of detailed results which need not, of course, have been accompanied by conclusory assertions of success. Nor is it any justification that such an explicit disclosure of the truth might have 'encouraged the rumor mill which they were seeking to allay.' 258 F.Supp. at 296.
We conclude, then, that, having established that the release was issued in a manner reasonably calculated to affect the market price of TGS stock and to influence the investing public, we must remand to the district court to decide whether the release was misleading to the reasonable investor and if found to be misleading, whether the court in its discretion should issue the injunction the SEC seeks.
CONCLUSION
In summary, therefore, we affirm the finding of the court below that appellants Richard H. Clayton and David M. Crawford have violated 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5; we reverse the judgment order entered below dismissing the complaint against appellees Charles F. Fogarty, Richard H. Clayton, Richard D. Mollison, Walter Holyk, Kenneth H. Darke, Earl L. Huntington, and Francis G. Coates, as we find that they have violated 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5. As to these eight individuals we remand so that in accordance with the agreement between the parties the Commission may notice a hearing before the court below to determine the remedies to be applied against them. We reverse the judgment order dismissing the complaint against Claude O. Stephens, Charles F. Fogarty, and Harold B. Kline as recipients of stock options, direct the district court to consider in its discretion whether to issue injunction orders against Stephens and Fogarty, and direct that an order issue rescinding the option granted Kline and that such further remedy be applied against him as may be proper by way of an order of restitution; and we reverse the judgment dismissing the complaint against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, remand the cause as to it for a further determination below, in the light of the approach explicated by us in the foregoing opinion, as to whether, in the exercise of its discretion, the injunction against it which the Commission seeks should be ordered.
Purchase Shares Calls
Date Purchaser Number Price Number Price
Hole K-55-1 Completed November 12, 1963
1963
Nov. 12 Fogarty 300 17 3/4-18
15 Clayton 200 17 3/4
15 Fogarty 700 17 5/8-17 7/8
15 Mollison 100 17 7/8
19 Fogarty 500 18 1/8
26 Fogarty 200 17 3/4
29 Holyk (Mrs.) 50 18
Chemical Assays of Drill Core of K-55-1 Received December 9-13, 1963
Dec. 10 Holyk (Mrs.) 100 20 3/8
12 Holyk (or wife) 200 21
13 Mollison 100 21 1/8
30 Fogarty 200 22
31 Fogarty 100 23 1/4
1964
Jan. 6 Holyk (or wife) 100 23 5/8
8 Murray 400 23 1/4
24 Holyk (or wife) 200 22 1/4-
-22
3/8
FEB. 10 Fogarty 300 22 1/8-22 1/4
20 Darke 300 24 1/8
24 Clayton 400 23 7/8
24 Holyk (or wife) 200 24 1/8
26 Holyk (or wife) 200 23 3/8
26 Huntington 50 23 1/4
27 Darke (Moran as nominee) 1000 22 5/8-
-22
3/4
Mar. 2 Holyk (Mrs.) 200 22 3/8
3 Clayton 100 22 1/4
16 Huntington 100 22 3/8
16 Holyk (or wife) 300 23 1/4
17 Holyk (Mrs.) 100 23 7/8
23 Darke 1000 24 3/4
26 Clayton 200 25
Land Acquisition Completed March 27, 1964
Mar. 30 Darke 1000 25 1/2
30 Holyk (Mrs.) 100 25 7/8
Core Drilling of Kidd Segment Resumed March 31, 1964
April 1 Clayton 60 26 1/2
1 Fogarty 400 26 1/2
2 Clayton 100 26 7/8
6 Fogarty 400 28 1/8-28 7/8
8 Mollison (Mrs.) 100 28 1/8
First Press Release Issued April 12, 1964
April 15 Clayton 200 29 3/8
16 Crawford (and wife) 600 30 1/8-30 1/4
Second Press Release Issued 10:00-10:10 or 10:15 A.M.,April 16, 1964
Purchase Shares Calls
Date Purchaser Number Price Number Price
1963
April 16 (app. 10:20 A.M.)
Coates (for family trusts) 2000 31 -31 5/8
Purchase Shares Calls
Date Purchaser Number Price Number Price
Chemicals Assays of K-55-1 Received Dec.9-13, 1963
1963
Dec. 30 Caskey (Darke) 300 22 1/4
1964
Jan. 16 Westreich (Darke) 2000 21 1/4-21
3/4
Feb. 17 Atkinson (Darke) 50 23 1/4 200 23 1/8
17 Westreich (Darke) 50 23 1/4 1000 23 1/4-23 3/8
24 Miller (Darke) 200 23 3/4
25 Miller (Darke) 300 23 3/8-23 1/2
Mar. 3 E. W. Darke (Darke) 500 22 1/2-22 5/8
17 E. W. Darke (Darke) 200 23 3/8
Land Acquisition Completed Mar. 27, 1964
1964
Mar. 30 Atkinson (Darke) 400 25 3/4-25 7/8
Caskey (Darke) 100 25 7/8
E. W. Darke (Darke) 1000 25 3/4-25 7/8
Miller (Darke) 200 25 1/2
Westreich (Darke) 500 25 3/4
30-31 Klotz (Darke) 2000 25 1/2-26 1/8
Second Press Release Issued April 16, 1964 (Reported over Dow Jones tape at
10:54 A.M.)
April 16 (from 10:31 A.M.)
Haemisegger (Coates) 1500 31 1/4-35
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge (concurring):
Agreeing with the result reached by the majority and with most of Judge Waterman's searching opinion, I take a rather different approach to two facets of the case.
I.
The first is a situation that will not often arise, involving as it does the acceptance of stock options during a period when inside information likely to produce a rapid and substantial increase in the price of the stock was known to some of the grantees but unknown to those in charge of the granting. I suppose it would be clear, under Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2 Cir. 1964),1 that if a corporate officer having such knowledge persuaded an unknowing board of directors to grant him an option at a price approximation the current market, the option would be rescindable in an action under Rule 10b-5. It would seem, by the same token, that if, to make the pill easier to swallow, he urged the directors to include others lacking the knowledge he possessed, he would be liable for all the resulting damage. The novel problem in the instant case is to define the responsibility of officers when a directors' committee administering a stock option plan proposes of its own initiative to make options available to them and others at a time when they know that the option price, geared to the market value of the stock, did not reflect a substantial increment likely to be realized in short order and was therefore unfair to the corporation.
A rule requiring a minor officer to reject an option so tendered would not comport with the realities either of human nature or of corporate life. If the SEC had appealed the ruling dismissing this portion of the complaint as to Holyk and Mollison, I would have upheld the dismissal quite apart from the special circumstance that a refusal on their part could well have broken the wall of secrecy it was important for TGS to preserve. Whatever they knew or didn't know about Timmins, they were entitled to believe their superiors had reported the facts to the Option Committee unless they had information to the contrary. Stephens, Fogarty and Kline stand on an altogether different basis; as senior officers they had an obligation to inform the Committee that this was not the right time to grant options at 95% Of the current price. Silence, when there is a duty to speak, can itself be a fraud. I am unimpressed with the argument that Stephens, Fogarty and Kline could not perform this duty on the peculiar facts of this case, because of the corporate need for secrecy during the land acquisition program. Non-management directors would not normally challenge a recommendation for postponement of an option plan from the President, the Executive Vice President, and the Vice President and General Counsel. Moreover, it should be possible for officers to communicate with directors, of all people, without fearing a breach of confidence. Hence, as one of the foregoing hypotheticals suggests, I am not at all sure that a company in the position of TGS might not have a claim against top officers who breached their duty of disclosure for the entire damage suffered as a result of the untimely issuance of options, rather than merely one for rescission of the options issued to them.2 Since that issue is not before us, I merely make the reservation of my position clear.
II.
The second point, to me transcending in public importance all others in this important case, is the press release issued by TGS on April 12, 1964. This seems to me easier on the facts but harder on the law than it does to the majority.
No one has asserted, or reasonably could assert, that the purpose for issuing a release was anything but good. TGS felt it had a responsibility to protect would-by buyers of its shares from what it regarded as exaggerated rumors first in the Canadian and then in the New York City press, and none of the individual defendants sought to profit from the decline in the price of TGS stock caused by the release. I find it equally plain, as Judge Waterman's opinion convincingly demonstrates, that the release did not properly convey the information in the hands of the draftsmen on April 12, even granting, as I would, that in a case like this a court should not set the standard of care too high. To say that the drilling at Timmins had afforded only 'preliminary indications that more drilling would be required for proper evaluation of this prospect,' was a wholly insufficient statement of what TGS knew. Cf. Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 545 (2 Cir. 1962). Since the issue of negligence is open to full review, Mamiye Bros v. Barber SS. Lines, 360 F.2d 774 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835, 87 S.Ct. 80, 17 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1965); Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 1808, 20 L.Ed.2d 653 (May 21, 1968), I see no need for a remand on that score. It is an equally needless exercise cise to require the district court to determine whether a reasonable investor would have been misled. The text of the release and the three point drop in the market price following its issuance in the face of press reports that would normally have led to a large and, as matters developed, justified increase, are sufficient proof of that.
The majority says that negligent misstatement by a corporation is enough for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5(2) in a proper case; it reserves the question, not here presented, whether the corporation is liable for damages. I think the remand should make crystal clear that the issue whether this is a proper case for an injunction remains open, and that with 49 private actions pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, see 258 F.Supp. 262, 267 n. 1 (1966), some of which may involve this issue, we should explicate more clearly why, despite the principle that a violation of the securities laws or regulations generally gives rise to a private claim for damages, see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), violation of Rule 10b-5(2) may not do so under all circumstances, including those presented by the April 12 press release. The attention this case has received from the profession and our in banc consideration make it incumbent on us to give the district courts in our circuit as much guidance as we can.
A.
The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting of a press release such as that of April 12, 1964, may impose civil liability on the corporation are frightening. As has been well said, of a situation where time pressures and consequent risks were less, 'One source of perplexity as to the appropriate bounds of the civil remedy for misleading filings is that any remedy imposed against the issuer itself is indirectly imposed on all holders of the common stock, usually the most important segment of the total category of investors intended to be protected.' Milton Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 Harv.L.Rev. L.Rev. 1340, 1370 (1967). Beyond this, a rule imposing civil liability in such cases would work directly counter to what the SEC has properly called 'a commendable and growing recognition on the part of industry and the investment community of the importance of informing security holders and the public generally with respect to important business and financial developments.' Securities Act Interpretation Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957). If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly to amass or weigh the facts-- all judged in the bright gleam of hindsight-- will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers, most corporations would opt for the former.
The derivation of Rule 10b-5 is peculiar. Although the authority for the Rule comes from 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the draftsmen turned their backs on the language of that section and borrowed the words of 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, simply broadening these to include frauds on the seller as well as on the buyer. So far as concerns paragraphs (1) and (3), this is not very important since these are clearly within the ambit of 10(b) and relate to frauds that would give rise to civil liability in any event. But the case stands differently as to paragraph (2). The only provision in either the 1933 or the 1934 Act that can be read to impose liability for damages for negligent misrepresentation without restrictions as to the kinds of plaintiffs, due diligence defenses, a short statute of limitations, or an undertaking for costs that were insisted on by the investment community, is 17(a)(2) of the Act of 1933-- the source of Rule 10b-5(2).3 But there is unanimity among the commentators, including some who were in a peculiarly good position to know, that 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act-- indeed the whole of 17-- was intended only to afford a basis for injunctive relief and, on a proper showing, for criminal liability, and was never believed to supplement the actions for damages provided by 11 and 12. See Landis, Liability Sections of Securities Act, 18 Am.Acct. 330, 331 (1933); Douglas and Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 181-82 (1933); 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1785-86 (1961). When the House Committee Report listed the sections that 'define the civil liabilities imposed by the Act' it pointed only to 11 and 12 and stated that 'to impose a greater responsibility (than that provided by 11 and 12) * * * would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the public.' H.Rep.No. 85, 73dCong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). Once it had been established, however, that an aggrieved buyer has a private action under 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical point in denying the existence of such an action under 17-- with the important proviso that fraud, as distinct from mere negligence, must be alleged. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Corp., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n. 2 (2 Cir. 1951); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F.Supp. 321, 322-325 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Wyatt, J.); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F.Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y.1955) (Kaufman, J.); but see Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.1964). To go further than this, as Professor Loss powerfully argues, Securities Regulation at 1785, would totally undermine the carefully framed limitations imposed on the buyer's right to recover granted by 12(2) of the 1933 Act.
Even if, however, we were to disregard the teaching of Judge Frank in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Corp., supra, 188 F.2d at 786, and follow the lead of those Circuits that seem to have discarded the scienter requirement in actions for damages under Rule 10b-5,4 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9 Cir. 1961); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9 Cir. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F.Supp. 808, 823 (E.D.Wisc.1962) (dictum), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7 Cir. 1962); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10 Cir. 1965); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8 Cir. 1967); we should not impose such expansive liability in a situation, markedly different from those considered in the cases just cited, where to do so would frustrate, not further, the larger goals of the securities laws. While I am not convinced that imposition of liability for damages under Rule 10b-5(2), absent a scienter requirement, even limited in the way just proposed, would not go beyond the authority vested in the Commission by 10(b) to act against 'any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' and be so inconsistent with the general structure of the statutes as to be impermissible, it is at least clear that the April 12 press release would be the worst possible case for the award of damages for merely negligent misstatement, as distinguished from the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to wilful fraud, see SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2 Cir. 1968).
The issue here, however, is the different one of an injunction. Mr. Justice Goldberg noted in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963), that the elements of a cause of action for 'fraud' vary 'with the nature of the relief sought' and that 'It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for money damages.' See also Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2 Cir. 1968). It can, indeed, be argued that, even on this basis, Rule 10b-5(2), absent the reading in of a scienter requirement, goes beyond the authority granted by 10(b) of the 1934 Act. However, it cannot be doubted that one of the most important purposes of the securities legislation was to prevent improper information being circulated by the issuer, and I therefore am not disposed to hold that Congress meant to deny a power whose use in appropriate cases can be of such great public benefit and do so little harm to legitimate activity.
B.
However, it does not necessarily follow that this is an appropriate case for granting an injunction as to future press releases. While we have often said that 'a cessation of the alleged objectionable activities by the defendant in contemplation of an SEC suit will not defeat the district court's power to grant an injunction restraining continued activity,' SEC v. Boren, 283 F.2d 312 (2 Cir. 1960), and cases there cited, it is likewise true that an isolated violation, especially in the absence of bad faith, does not require such relief. SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2 Cir. 1937). Absent much clearer language than is found in the 1934 Act, the entitlement of a plaintiff to an injunction thereunder remains subject to principles of equitable discretion. The Supreme Court made this clear beyond peradventure in the leading case of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1975-83 (1961). Here there is no danger of repetition of an unduly gloomy press release like that of April 12. The essence of the SEC's case is that Timmins was a once-in-a-lifetime affair; the company's motive in issuing the release was laudable; and the defect was solely a pardonable one of execution. If Judge Bonsal had denied a injunction on these grounds, I see no basis on which we could properly have reversed him. Instead he acted on the view, erroneous in the court's belief, that no violation of the Rule had occurred and he was thus without power to enjoin, 258 F.Supp. 296. Although I see no reason why we could not affirm nevertheless, I am content to leave it for him to consider whether, although he has power to issue an injunction, there is equity in this portion of the bill. My concurrence in the disposition of the press release issue assumes that such consideration is permitted.
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge (concurring):
I concur in Judge Waterman's reasoned and thorough opinion and in the court's disposition of the instant appeal. I agree with Judge Friendly, however, that